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Politics, Pedagogy, & Scholarship

Memoriae Carol Kay (1947-1998)

ANNALS OF SCHOLARSHIP, a journal, founded in 1980 by the social historian, RUTH GRAHAM (1922-74), promotes the study of the historical and methodological developments in all the disciplines but in particular in the Humanities and Social Sciences. **ANNALS** also deals with the interaction between and Art Practices and the Human Sciences in a global culture.

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POLITICS, PEDAGOGY, AND SCHOLARSHIP:

MEMORIAE CAROL KAY (1947-1998)

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WITHDRAWN

PREFACE: *The Long Reach of Carol Kay*

MARIE-ROSE LOGAN

The essays gathered here highlight and celebrate Carol Kay's intellectual legacy as a scholar, educator, and activist. The issue opens with "Richardson's Ventriloquism: Habermas on the Public, Hume on the Moral," an unpublished essay presented by Kay in spring 1996 at a conference held in Montreal. Whether or not they are familiar with her path-breaking book, *Political Constructions: Defoe, Richardson, and Sterne in Relation to Hobbes, Hume, and Burke* (1988), readers of the present volume will experience Carol Kay's unique way of inscribing literature (Richardson's ventriloquism) in relation to philosophy (Habermas and Hume) in order to question the past and contemporary relations of literary practice to public and moral issues. The echo of her voice "intense, animated, melodious in its way, and often admonitory" [1] can be heard throughout the pages of her essay and, especially, in the passage below:

> Perhaps we could view our use of literary texts as a kind of ventriloquism, a way of throwing our voices that defers to social requirements that limit equality while attempting to cancel them out. And, as in the case of Richardson's fiction, we could be seen as failing to qualify for full participation in a political public sphere or developing practices that might constitute new possibilities for achieving a better approximation of this narrative category." [2]

Carol Kay was always in search of ways to expand the "knowledge of things [that] lay round but unperceived." [3] Therefore, we have attempted in the four sections that make up the body of this special issue *Politics, Pedagogy, and Scholarship*, to show that Kay's inquisitive stance vis-à-vis eighteenth-century philosophy and literature, collegiality, postcolonial and cosmopolitan issues, remains and will continue to remain influential.

Kay herself chose the title of the first section, "Pedagogy and Politics: The Long Reach of John Locke." In the spring of 1998, she selected the papers included in this section in view of a special session she was to chair at the 1999 annual meeting of the *American Association of Eighteenth-Century Studies*. These proceedings illuminate an important aspect of Carol Kay's interdisciplinary reach into the realm of eighteenth-century scholarship. In their papers, Gillian Brown, Raymond Ricketts, and Richard Kroll draw seminal connections between education, dance, and politics in the work of John Locke. As a member of the editorial committee of *Annals of Scholarship*, Kay envisaged to guest-edit an interdisciplinary issue of the journal and to incorporate these papers in that issue. [4] Carol Kay was a

discerning and active member of the Editorial Committee of *Annals of Scholarship*.We sorely miss her intellectual acumen, rigor, and probity. Kay was also a member of the editorial collective of *boundary 2*, an international journal of Literature and Culture, edited by her colleague, Paul Bové.

The third section consists of papers presented at a special session of the annual *Meeting of the Modern Language Association* (Chicago, 1999), entitled "*Political Constructions* in the Future of Eighteenth-Century Studies." [5] David Bromwich turns to rhetoric and, in particular, to Burke's section on "words" in *The Sublime and the Beautiful,* to show that works of political thought very often dramatize the passions of participation in a political order in a discussion of Kay's contribution to Burke in the last chapter of her book. Bruce Robbins corroborates, in "Cerebral Love: Rousseau, the Novel, and the State," Kay's assumption that the development of the sovereign state is assumed by and essential to the "private" domain of the novel. In "William Godwin and the Political Institution of Literature," Anthony Jarrells explores the relationship between Godwin's novel, *Caleb Williams* and the treatise, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice*, in light of the philosophico-political approach developed by Kay in her book.

In both sections, mature scholars—Gillian Brown, David Bromwich, and Bruce Robbins—as well as younger ones, Raymond Ricketts, Richard Kroll, and Anthony Jarrells— powerfully and elegantly confirm that *Political Constructions:Defoe, Richardson, and Sterne in Relation to Hobbes, Hume, and Burke* is " a magnificently authoritative book," as Claudia L. Johnson of Princeton University had predicted upon its publication.

Kay's notion of "political constructions" has gained attention not only from eighteenth-century scholars, but also from scholars whose work is grounded in the contemporary period. For instance, in Part IV, Irem Balkir (Turkey), Rashmi Dube Bhatnagar (India), and Yi Zheng (China), who were graduate students at the University of Pittsburgh during Kay's tenure there, analyze and conceptualize the interrelationship between fiction, philosophy, and political theory in the work of Oran Pamuk, Jonathan Swift, and Ailing Zhang.

In the preface to *Political Constructions*, Carol Kay writes: "The taste for intimate friendship and many other things that motivate intellectual projects I attribute to my parents, Albert Kay and Lucie Breyer Kay, economists, novel lovers, New Deal democrats, and friends." [6] As a scholar, mentor, and colleague, Carol Kay freely shared the gifts of friendship she had enjoyed during childhood. In more ways than one, the contributors to the second section, "Women of Achievement," acknowledge their debt to Kay as a classmate and co-chair of the Graduate Women's Organization at Harvard (Penelope Laurans, Maureen Quilligan), a colleague (David Bromwich), and a mentor (Claudia L. Johnson and Rashmi Dube Bhatnagar). By the same token they inscribe Carol Kay's manifold and innovative contributions within the history of Higher Education as it unfolded during the last three decades of the twentieth century.

Illustrations culled from Cesare Ripa's *Iconologia* in the 1758-60 Hertel edition frame each section of *Politics, Pedagogy, and Scholarship*: Statecraft (*Ars Politica*), Friendship (*Amicitia*), Audacity(*Audacia*), and the World (*Mundus*). The iconographic material was chosen not only to cor-

respond with the dominant theme of each section, but also to mirror values dear to Carol Kay: her passion for politics, her taste for friendship, her intellectual boldness—exemplified in *Political Constructions*—as well as her interest in journeys of all kinds. In this respect, Paul Bové's preface to the Chinese edition of his book *Intellectuals in Power* is a case in point. Like Bové, she enjoyed trips to Hong Kong and the Far East. And, her gift for *sprezzatura* evoked in Paul Bové's epigraph was a blend of *ars politica*, *amicitia*, and *audacia*. Finally, the late Renaissance iconographer—Ripa was born around 1560—enjoyed a special vogue in the 18th century. I do like to think of these illustrations as allegorically linking our mutual concerns about the relationship among literature, philosophy, and politics.

Carol Kay was an esteemed scholar, and a dear friend. I met her in 1975 at the annual meeting of the English Institute. We happened to sit next to one another during a session on Kenneth Burke, directed by Hayden White. Carol and I actively participated in the discussion that followed the lectures of John Freccero, Angus Fletcher, and Frederic Jameson. After the session Carol introduced herself. We pursued the discussion on our way to the reception. It turned out to be the starting point of a solid and loyal friendship. In my eyes, Carol Kay embodied an ideal toward which we—the academic women of her generation—were all striving. She liked to call herself a "Hobbesian feminist." In truth, she practiced an "enlightened feminism" that was frank, direct, but never self-serving. In joining the contributors in their appreciation of Carol Kay, I share their deep sense of loss. Verses from John Hollander's "The Widener Burying-Ground" perhaps help to make up for an otherwise unbearable loss:

> In spite of all the learned have said
> We hear the voices of the dead
> .....
> Until they strike us once more,
> Whispers of their receding shore,
> And Reason's Self must bend the ear
> To echoes and allusions here. [7]

I am much indebted to Jonathan Arac, Carol Kay's companion of over thirty years, Daniel T. O'Hara and Claudia L. Johnson. Without their involvement and cooperation it would have been much harder to bring this project to fruition. Tiffany Ford, who is now a graduate student at Columbia University, was an undergraduate student at Temple University and Managing Editor of *Annals of Scholarship* when I began to work on a special issue devoted to the memory of Carol Kay. I wish to thank her for her invaluable help with the early drafts of most of the articles. I also extend my gratitude to the current Managing Editor, Margaret Barton-Fumo, Temple '04. She diligently and expertly dealt with the final orchestration of the project.

Temple University

NOTES

1. See "Recollections of Carol Kay," p. 55.

2. See "Richardson's Ventriloquism," p. 8.

3. Wallace Stevens, "Things of August," in *The Collected Poems*, Random House: New York, 1982, p. 493.

4. In the wake of Carol Kay's tragic death, Claudia L. Johnson chaired the session. For a biography of Carol Kay, see, for example, Claudia L. Johnson, "Carol Kay (1947-1998)," ASECS, *Newsletter*, Winter 1998, Circular n0 101.

5. Gillian Brown presented a paper on "Clarissa's American Progeny" at that session. It is not included here as it has been incorporated in Gillian Brown, *The Consent of the Governed: The Lockean Legacy in America*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. Brown dedicated her book to the memory of Carol Kay.

6. Carol Kay, *Political Constructions:Defoe, Richardson, and Sterne in Relation to Hobbes, Hume, and Burke*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988, p.XI.

7. John Hollander, *The Figure of Echo: A Mode of Allusion in Milton and After,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981, p.I.

RICHARDSON'S VENTRILOQUISM: HABERMAS ON THE PUBLIC, HUME ON THE MORAL[1]

CAROL KAY

In my title, in an effort to characterize Richardson's astonishing feat of illusionism, I succumbed to the temptation of referring to Richardson's "lively present tense manner" as if it were an oral, rather than written, performance. I went searching among OED citations to save face, where I was relieved, and annoyed, to find that the inevitable Coleridge had preceded me in applying the term *ventriloquism* to an author's use of speech by a fictional character to put forward his own views: "I call it ventrilo*quism*, because Sejanus is a puppet, out of which the poet [Ben Jonson] makes his own voice appear to come." As you may have gathered, Coleridge's tone is negative, and the passage involves a negative comparison with Shakespeare, who would never make his characters mere puppets; for Coleridge, Shakespeare's characters "are like those in real life, to be inferred by the reader—they are not told to him." Jonson, according to Coleridge, has had Sejanus violate nature and real life by naming his own character traits in an authoritative way. This is the exemplary passage from Jonson:

> Adultery, it is the lightest ill I shall commit.
> A race of wicked acts
> Shall flow out of my anger, and o'er spread
> The world's wide face, which no posterity
> Shall e'er approve nor yet keep silent

I don't mean to imply a negative judgment on Richardson, whose method of characterization is in any case more like what Coleridge described as Shakespearean than what he disparages in Jonson: in Richardson the reader must infer the author's view of the character from the various assertions of friends, foes, and the confused pronouncements of the characters' own self-reflections. And I'd think behind this Coleridgean distaste lies an antididacticism which the Romantics passed on to our time, and from which I also wish to detach myself. Too much Richardson criticism is afflicted by the implication that Richardson's talent for doing voices undermines his didacticism, or rather, it is claimed, his imaginative form rescues the art of his fiction from his morality. Didacticism seems to me far more interesting and important a practice than that scenario allows.

Today, I want to ask why Richardson needed ventriloquism for his didacticism. Why, even as his fame increased, could he not effect his moral teaching without throwing his voice? Of course Richardson was not one of the great talkers of the eighteenth century. Richardson's ventriloquism is effected

by his use of the fictional epistolary form, without which he could hardly be said to have had a voice in public. I was delighted to learn that one of my co-panelists would be talking about Habermas, since I have been yearning to develop a discussion of this problem in Richardson's work in relation to Habermas's genealogy of what he calls the public sphere. Richardson's case is not relevant merely to epistolary fiction or to the novel; it is broadly relevant to many eighteenth-century literary practices which involved the letter form or imaginary dialogues among friends.

My operating hypothesis is this: in a period in which the construction of the conventions of the public sphere is still in progress, the egalitarian assumptions of public rational exchange coexist with entrenched rhetorical practices that presume hierarchical authority and signs of deference. Formal echoes of letters and dialogues then serve to negotiate and model a state of friendship and equality among all discussants. Towards the end of this talk, I will investigate two complex examples of Richardson's negotiation of the public sphere through ventriloquism, but I am first going to describe my peculiar interest in developing a Habermasian account. This amounts to a very long act of translation from Humean into Habermasian terms.

My longest treatment of Richardson appears as a chapter in my 1988 book *Political Constructions,* which predated the 1989 publication of the English translation of *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.* Until then, English readers maladroit in German usually made do with Habermas's own later summary of his 1961 book for an encyclopedia entry. In its condensation, the encyclopedia article tends to rely heavily on the structural analysis of sphere divisions that characterizes Habermas's later work, obscuring the more fully historical account to be found in the original version. And it is the complex historical account of the emergence of a normative category that I find truly admirable. In *The Structural Transformation*, Habermas offers a view, to be sure still a very synoptic view, of diverse, evolving social practices in economic, administrative, political, familial, literary, and linguistic categories, in the differentiated but comparable national settings of England, France, and Germany. In my book, I produced a rather different, but compatible, synoptic account, largely confined to England.

My account was structured by a kind of conceptual dialogue between, on the one side, Hobbes, on the construction of the nation-state through the political institutions of sovereign law and the consent of the governed, and, on the other side, Hume, who accounted for social cohesion primarily through self-regulating systems of social practice, especially property relations and moral discourse. In my account, Richardson orients his fiction to the self-regulating system of moral discourse, but he reveals the dangerous, Hobbesian problematic of conflicting wills at work in a field of opinion which is not regulated by a sovereign arbiter. This revelation of murderous conflicts assaults Richardson's own optimism, so well evidenced in the happy ending of *Pamela* I, that well-sustained moral discourse will, as Hume describes, educate all parties in the generally shared moral view, because we all recognize a difference between the language of morality and the language of self-love.

The first passage I will discuss from my handout is one of Hume's most powerful formulations of the educative force of moral language as social practice:

> The more we converse with mankind, and the greater social intercourse we maintain, the more shall we be familiarized to these general preferences and distinctions, without which our conversations and discourse could scarcely be rendered intelligible to each other. Every man's interest is peculiar to himself, and the aversions and desires, which result from it, cannot be supposed to affect others in a like degree. General language, therefore, being formed for general use, must be moulded on some more general views, and must affix the epithets of praise or blame, in conformity to sentiments, which arise from the general interests of the community. And if these sentiments, in most men, be not so strong as those, which have a reference to private good; yet still they must make some distinction, even in persons the most depraved and selfish; and must attach the notion of good to a beneficent conduct, and of evil to the contrary. Sympathy, we shall allow, is much fainter than our concern for ourselves, and sympathy with persons remote from us much fainter than that with persons near and contiguous; but for this very reason it is necessary for us, in our calm judgments and discourse concerning the characters of men, to neglect all these differences, and render our sentiments more public and social. Besides, that we ourselves often change our situation in this particular, we every day meet with persons who are in a situation different from us, and who could never converse with us were we to remain constantly in that position and point of view, which is peculiar to ourselves. The intercourse of sentiments, therefore, in society and conversation, makes us form some general unalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of characters and manners. And though the heart takes not part entirely with those general notions, nor regulates all its love and hatred, by the universal abstract differences of vice and virtue, without regard to self, or the persons with whom we are more intimately connected; yet have these moral differences a considerable influence, and being sufficient, at least, for discourse, serve all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools. (*Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, sect 5, pt 2)

Clearly the "general view" Hume describes as required for and available to every user of moral language could be compared to the public use of reason, which, according to Habermas, qualifies all participants, regardless of social status or wealth, for the critical activities of the public sphere. The Habermasian term is more limited, and limited in an interesting way, because Habermas is concerned with the social structures, practices, and concepts that make it possible for citizens to develop public criticism of their government. By contrast, Hume's broad definition of moral discourse includes the virtues of "allegiance" (that is, obedience to government) and the virtue of "justice" (which in Hume's system is restricted to the observance of property rules), but he does not rank these socially useful virtues higher than virtuous character traits, which he classes as more "immediately agreeable," such as "benevolence," family kindness, and sociability, or virtues useful to ourselves, such as hard work and the concern for external reputation. That is, Humean morality consists of sets of differentiated moral rules that arise historically in relation to different kinds of social practices. There are no ultimate sphere divisions (which after all Habermas claims is the tendency of a later modernity). The theoretical perspective of a Hume can provide a valuable critical perspective on more modern modes of thought as well as be more apt for the study of authors of his own time. Let me be more emphatic. Hume is a

world-class philosopher, who can enlarge our resources for critical thought.

For Hume's account of the historical evolution of the practices of public political criticism, you would turn to his essays, especially to the 1741-42 essays on parties and the "liberty of the press." His structural political account for the causes of parties within Parliament is in fact very similar to Habermas's account of the constitutional situation after 1688. Habermas's historiography, which shows its Marxist roots in giving a very large place to the rise of commerce and capitalism, would be compatible with Hume's 1752 "political discourses" on *commerce* and *refinement*, which delineates the interaction between economic development and the development of political institutions of liberty, and Hume's *History of England* gives a detailed narrative of this process. Yet Hume, who after all stretched the English liberty of the press as far as it would go in his day, nevertheless takes a cooler attitude than Habermas toward these structures of English life. Hume argues that every governmental arrangement involves a compromise between the goods of authority and liberty, so the English system of mixed sovereignty, which has led to a free press, also threatens peace and security, a more fundamental good than liberty. Participating responsibly in the institutions of political criticism certainly counts as a virtue with Hume, but it is a rather specialized and highly culture-bound sort of virtue compared to many non-political virtues. And for Hume moral discourse about all the virtues takes place everywhere, in families and in social gatherings and in reading of all sorts.

Habermas, by contrast, tends like Hannah Arendt, who influenced him, to value excessively certain forms and forums of political discourse, with a corresponding tendency to despair about the possibility of actualizing them in contemporary life. Feminist social theorists, notably Nancy Fraser, have rightly criticized the implications of sphere divisions in Habermas for feminist political practice, especially in the modern welfare state. Yet the tendency of Habermas to restrict the modes of discourse that will count as politically significant can be corrected by careful attention to his own early historical work, since it shows how the public sphere is constituted by—brought into existence through—a variety of nonpolitical practices, such as the news gathering and commenting on government regulations especially required by people in business and trade; the production of the arts as commodities available for wide consumption and critical commentary; and the fictional deployment of audience-oriented privatized subjectivity within the conjugal family. All of these practices were available to Richardson and make possible his confident participation in a literary public sphere, as they also would have tended to make him a particularly capable deployer of moral language as defined by Hume. So back to my original question: why does Richardson need to throw his voice?

My first example from Richardson is his account of his first attempt at significant moral discourse. It appears in a highly significant autobiographical letter to a Dutch Mennonite minister who has undertaken to translate *Clarissa* in the period in which he had been forbidden to preach:

> I was not Eleven Years old, when I wrote, spontaneously, a Letter to a Widow near Fifty, who pretending to a Zeal for Religion, and who was a constant Frequenter of Church Ordinances, was continually fomenting Quarrels and Disturbances, by Backbiting and scandal, amongst all her Acquaintance. I collected from the Scripture Texts that made against her. Assuming the Style and Address of a Person of Years, I exhorted her; I expos-

> tulated with her. But my Hand-writing was known: I was challenged with it, and owned the Boldness; for she complained of it to my Mother with Tears. My Mother chid me for the Freedom taken by such a Boy with a Woman of her Years: But knowing that her Son was not of a Pert or froward Nature, but, on the contrary, shy and bashful, she commended my Principles, tho' she censured the Liberty taken. (*Letters to Stinstra*, 26)

In this rather hilarious account, the problem for participation in the public sphere would seem to be obvious. Eleven year old boys are not accepted as qualified for rational discussion, even when they manifest the requisite critical rationality. Therefore young Richardson wrote anonymously and in the "style and address of a person of years." Ventriloquism should be related to various uses of anonymity, which could be viewed as signs of an incompletely constituted public sphere. The rules of the game should specify equality for equally good critical reasoners, but even as an adult, a printer—which is what Richardson was—would not be accepted on equal terms with university educated gentlemen or aristocrats.

The child's anonymity is meant to hide a secret disqualification; the adult's anonymity provides a fictional circuit through which the reader can work out the prejudices that attach to social status. Yet even in choosing, as he increasingly does, gentry figures to speak his views, Richardson likes to represent the complex struggles for attaining public attention for one's argument rather than one's social position, and this may explain his attraction (and the long line of equally attracted male novelists) to imperilled heroines who are threatened with various kinds of silence and discrediting. The later impersonations are meant to be seen through; but they operate as gestures of deference to the hierarchical system of status as well as cancellations of that system. So the boy's attempt to impersonate his elder is taken by his mother as a sign of his good principles, rather than of forwardness. But the childhood story nevertheless demonstrates considerable social aggressiveness in a highly contestatory field, participating in the contentiousness of a culture of satire that enables the punishment of those the laws can't touch. The widow's tears are not provoked merely by boyish impudence but by the apt criticism hitting home. She herself has been a critical judge of others' behavior, but she is outdone by a superior critique of her own behavior. Were it not for the recognizably boyish handwriting, this letter might have been shown around as an exemplary judgment, published as it were, much like Pamela's diary or certain letters of Clarissa's.

Richardson's insistence on the excellent hand of his heroine, his own control of the printing of his novels, his decision to raise the level of the diction of *Pamela,* all suggest what he learned from the childhood episode: to adopt the external signs of polite culture–initially aristocratic in character—in order to acquire fuller, fairer audiences.

The feature of this early episode that Habermas can least account for is the inseparable connection between religion and the public exercise of critical judgment. The boy's arguments are drawn from Scripture; the community whose peace he hopes to restore is the community of churchgoers who have been troubled by the widow's pretended "Zeal for Religion." The young Richardson assumed a kind of clerical authority ("I exhorted her; I expostulated with her"), and indeed in this autobiographical letter he claims that his family had intended him for the church. In Habermas's sociological history,

Protestantism has irreversibly privatized religion; the external church is only a remnant of an older, more founded kind of public representativeness. But this is to replicate a major error of the Marxist historiography Habermas has been seeking to emend.

Far from privatizing religion, the Protestant claim of private conscience and the resulting centuries of political conflict precipitated the developing claims of the emerging nation state over religious institutions. In England, it can be argued that the public sphere is first constituted by the propaganda campaign conducted under Henry VIII to justify the new state church, and the complex, continuously renewed efforts to maintain hegemony over the newly tolerated sects puts a particularly Anglican as well as Protestant stamp on the whole history of modern English culture. Our panel chair Teri Doerksen is writing an ambitious book on the way that the national Anglican cultural project is carried out in the history of the English novel through various typologies of the Catholic. Speaking here in Montreal should remind us of the continuing political implications of the history of cultural domination. For my purposes today, I will merely observe that the attempt of eighteenth-century writers to arrive at a general viewpoint that could be characterized as *moral* or *public,* rather than religious, had more to do with the need for a space for negotiating religious hegemony, a general discourse that could be seen as nonsectarian, rather than the inevitable process of secularization that marks many modernization narratives. Very few were, like Hume, committed to detaching morals from theology. We should consider the ways religious practices constituted (and continue to constitute) public sphere activities directly by providing a host of verbal practices and literary forms that have often been seen as contributing to the novel: sermons, spiritual diaries, autobiographies, saints' lives, all of which can be credited with producing the sort of critical discussing public that Habermas describes. The audience-oriented examination of private life would not have been credentialed for a literary public sphere without the religious grounding. Once again, I find Hume's flexible notion of moral discourse more useful than Habermas's restrictive public sphere. Among the paradigmatic places where moral discourse is to be found, Hume names "the pulpit, the theatre, and the schools."

But note a further consequence for Richardson, who already struggles under the impairment of bourgeois status. He must assert his literary acts to have religious significance in a public sphere that is structured by a relation to a state church. That is, his work at least supplements, but at worst view rivals, that of the licensed clergy, and in this respect as well he projects his problem on to the socially impaired women whose polite culture also lends his voice authority.

Let us turn now to a passage from *Clarissa:*

> Don't you remember, my dear, who it was that told a young gentleman designed for the gown, who owned he was apt to be too easily put out of countenance when he came among free company: "That it was a bad sign: that it looked as if his morals were not proof: but that his good disposition seemed rather the effect of accident and education, than of such choice as was founded upon principle?" And don't you know the lesson the very same young lady gave him: "To endeavour to stem and discountenance vice, and to glory in being an advocate in all companies for virtue": particularly observing, "That it was natural for a man to shun, or give up, what he was ashamed of?" Which she

> would be sorry to think his case on this occasion, adding: "That vice was a coward, and would hide its head when opposed by such a virtue as had presence of mind, and a full persuasion of its own rectitude to support it." The lady, you may remember, modestly put her doctrine into the mouth of a worthy preacher, Dr. Lewin, as she uses to do when she has a mind not to be thought to be what she is at so early an age: and that it may give more weight to anything *she hit upon, that might appear tolerable,* was her modest manner of speech. (*Anna Howe to Clarissa*, 10 o'clock, March 23)

This passage appears in a letter from Anna Howe to Clarissa, reporting the efforts of Anna's suitor Hickman to learn about Lovelace from his fellow rakes. The passage is a kind of parenthesis that follows the report that the rakes put the virtuous Hickman "out of countenance." The example is multiply interesting. Hickman has had trouble maintaining easy social intercourse with Lovelace's friends because he doesn't subscribe to the aristocratic code of libertines, who tease him about his use of the "obsolete" word *sober,* which is only suitable for study at college. As Hume expected, rigorously ascetic morality was a product of the schools which would not stand the test of daily discourse, which refused to valorize the "mawkish virtues." Readers who favor Lovelace over Clarissa replicate this pattern. Anna is led to think of the problems clergymen have in keeping countenance in "Free" society. We see again and again in Richardson's narrative that the church as an arm of the state has no separate standing point and hence little cultural authority over the aristocracy. The clergy need to be supported by the strategic advice of intelligent ladies such as Clarissa and Anna, but in offering a clergyman advice, as a woman and a member of the laity, Clarissa was in the position of boyish Richardson, so her gesture of defense involves a fictional attribution of her remarks to the clergyman Dr. Lewin. I wonder in practice how such a gesture would have played out, when Dr. Lewin should learn about these little white lies. Does he feel strengthened in his authority to be acknowledged thus, or does he bristle at the appropriation of his name?

In any case, Richardson shows that clergymen are little help in shoring up Clarissa's attempt at maintaining the high moral ground, either within her own family or in her struggles with Lovelace. But, as I have argued, no matter how conflicted the terms of discourse, Richardson's heroines have a positive allergy to recourse to authorities of state, the arm of the law, whether wielded by lawyers or clergy, partly because Richardson holds so little personal authority in these venues. Perhaps in a Habermasian vein, I would conclude that the literary public sphere is still *prior* to and clearly distinguishable from a fully political public sphere in which the operations of political authorities could be openly recommended and criticized by a concerned citizenry. That function waits, not only for further popularization of democratic thought, but also for the elaboration of political organization in opposition and reform movements.

In college and university today, operating in departments of literature, our discourse suffers from an incomplete or impaired relation to the norms of the public sphere that is analogous to Richardson's novelistic discourse. Even though teachers train critical rationality, the classroom relation is hierarchical, not egalitarian, and the professional system of ranks and tenure affects attempts to create a critical public among faculty members. The extent to which education is commodified and students are consumers may subject faculty authority to students' market demands without improving the university

as a place for public sphere activities. In addition, modern disciplinary socialization has broken up the old relations within the moral field, so that the authority of a public over a general view must be mediated by various cadres of experts, and even political crises which produce campus teach-ins tend to preserve the special respect afforded hierarchy and professional specialization, and there is little space for activities of this sort. Affirmative action laws offer special protection for certain categories of political speech, but otherwise US laws do not much protect political criticism in any workplace, not even in the workplace of higher education.

Literary studies has sometimes claimed the authority, derived from Coleridgean teaching about art, to represent the union of the various human faculties, but it is not clear that other disciplines recognize these claims or that they are put forward by critics with much confidence anymore. And it increasingly seems to me that the textual deflections and indirections of argument literary critics practice when we articulate principles of social criticism in relation to literary texts do tend to baffle students and nonacademic readers, perhaps even succeed in confusing critics about our own grounds of criticism. Perhaps we could view our use of literary texts as a kind of ventriloquism, a way of throwing our voices that defers to social requirements that limit equality while attempting to cancel them out. And, as in the case of Richardson's fiction, we could be seen as failing to qualify for full participation in a political public sphere or developing practices that might constitute new possibilities for achieving a better approximation of this narrative category. In this respect, Hume's view seems both more and less optimistic than Habermas's. As users of moral terms such as *justice*, we inevitably take part in the constant formation of general views, even if the part is not particularly commanding or innovative.

University of Pittsburgh

NOTE

1. Carol Kay presented this paper at the 1996 meeting of the Northeast Modern Language Association in Montreal. The session was entitled "Samuel Richardson." Kay refers here to Rachel K. Carnell's paper, "Affective Humanism and the Family: Habermas's Misreading of Richardson."

I

PEDAGOGY AND POLITICS: THE LONG REACH OF JOHN LOCKE



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

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"LOCKEAN PEDIATRICS"

GILLIAN BROWN

John Locke opens his *Thoughts Concerning Education* with Juvenal's time-honored maxim "Mens sana in corpore sano."[1] A sound mind in a sound body, he declares, "is a short but full description of a happy state" (114, section 1). Education accordingly starts with proper care of the child's body. Locke's treatise on education, which began as a 1684 series of letters to Edward Clarke on the upbringing of his eight year old son (also named Edward), attends first to the physical health which is the prerequisite of mental development.

Drawn from Locke's medical expertise and experience, the recommendations which comprise the first thirty-two brief sections of the *Education* concern diet, toilet-training, sleep, clothing, and exercise. Locke reiterated these rules in the 1693 first publication of the treatise, and then slightly amended them in the subsequent editions of 1699, 1704, and 1705 (the last published posthumously). Later editors pay little attention to the physical health strictures, sometimes summarizing or even omitting them.[2] What seems most prominent in the *Thoughts Concerning Education* is Locke's emphasis on the mind, which indeed fills most of the treatise's pages. It is crucial for Locke, however, to begin his address to mental faculties with consideration of physical ones because he sees mind and body as inextricably linked from the start.

A sound mind may require a sound body, but it is the operation of the mind that makes for a sound body. Locke's dynamic pediatrics involves instigating the process of keeping the body "in strength and vigor, so that it may be able to obey and exercise the Orders of the Mind" (137, section 31). Since the body is the first object and occasion upon which the mind operates, Locke's system of education takes pediatrics as the most reasonable starting point. Long before a specialized medicine of children emerges, Locke envisions particular care of children's health as central to the development of enlightened persons.[3] His body politic begins with the child's body, which is from birth an entity engrossed in its surroundings. Both enveloped and engaged in its environment, the child epitomizes the lifelong state of the individual: the continual experience of the external world.

Locke's rules for children's health are few: "plenty of open air, exercise, and sleep, plain diet, no wine or strong drink, very little or no physick, not too warm or straight clothing, especially the head and feet kept cold, and the feet often used to cold water and exposed to wet" (137, section 30). In all these matters, Locke stresses both the malleability of the body—to harmful as well as beneficial treatments—and the capacity of the mind to affect and even alter this malleable body. At the cornerstone of Locke's pediatrics and pedagogy is the assumption of the child's, indeed, the infant's, consciousness

and will. The concept of the child's mind as a blank slate is probably the best-known and most often quoted point from Locke's *Education*. At the end of the essay, Locke stresses that he has considered the young child "only as white Paper, or Wax, to be moulded and fashioned as one pleases" (325, section 216). He cautions that "there are a thousand other things, that may need consideration; especially if one should take in the various Tempers, different Inclinations, and particular Defaults, that are to be found in Children" (325, section 216). Throughout the *Education*, Locke significantly qualifies the image of the child's potential receptivity and malleability with reminders of the differing tempers, talents, inclinations, and tastes that children display from the outset, and with which parents and tutors continually must contend. Children, Locke writes in the original letters to Edward Clarke, "are absolute and independent as any of the proudest of you grown men, think of them as you please."[4] Recognizing an identity between children and adults—the presence of individuality in each state—Locke designs a treatment for children that foregrounds their independence. This is a pediatrics that well could apply to adults.

Acknowledging the presence and independence of the child's mind, Locke underscores the child's role in his own well-being. "Men's happiness or misery, is the most part of their own making" (114, section 1). A parent's task, therefore, is to train the child to follow on his own the most healthful practices. As for doctors and medicine, it is safer to "leave [children] wholly to nature than to put them in the hands of those forward to tamper" (136, section 29). Medical tampering interferes with the child's own adaptations to his environment; it intervenes in his relation to his body, the core of his relation to knowledge.

Leaving matters to nature is not, like the later Christian Science tenet of trusting corporeal conditions to God, a recommendation for passivity and faith, but instead a spur to self-determination. Nature, as Locke understands it, continually presents conditions to be negotiated, difficulties to be engaged. Because Locke thinks "the strength of the body lies chiefly in being able to endure hardships," children must be accustomed early to discomfort (138, section 33). Believing "our bodies will endure anything that from the beginning thay are accustomed to," Locke can advise parents to make sure their children sleep in hard beds (116, section 5). While late-twentieth-century medicine finds hard mattresses salutary for back support, Locke ascribes a far wider range of healthful benefits to hard beds. "Hard lodging strengthens the parts whereas being buried every night in feathers melts and dissolves the body and is often the cause of weaknesses and the forerunner of an early grave, and besides the stone, which commonly has its rise from this warm wrapping (of the parts). Several other indispositions, and that which is the worst of them all, a tender weakly constitution, is very much owing to down beds" (133, section 22).

Whatever the soundness of Locke's etiologies here, we can see that his preoccupation with hard beds involves behavior modification as well as physical therapy. If children sleep in hard beds, they will be able to sleep in any conditions they encounter later in life. For "he that is used to hard lodging at home . . . will not miss his sleep when he travels abroad" (133, section 22). To prepare the child for different sleep environments, the parent should "make his bed after different fashions--sometimes his head higher (and) sometimes lower, that he may not feel every change that he must be sure to meet with" (133, section 22). Familiarity in this schema inheres not in objects—a favorite blanket,

a well-known bed, or as in twentieth-century notions of childrearing, beloved teddy bears and stuffed animals—but in a customary sense of being able to cope with anything. Rather than appurtenances of sleep providing regularity and comfort, the child becomes the source of his own comfort. The child ideally is his own familiar.

On the one hand, Locke's hard schooling subjects the child to tremendous effort; on the other hand, such training accords the child vast capacities. If so respecting the child as a complex psychological and physiological entity produces a rather grim portrait of the child as a solitary laborer, such a portrait also bespeaks great optimism in the individual. This conception of the child dovetails with and elaborates Locke's famous political formulation of the individual in the *Second Treatise of Government* as self-possessed, endowed with rights of ownership to himself.[5] By Locke's formulation, an individual owns himself, holding title to his body, faculties, and labor. Political power over the individual can only follow from the individual's consent; the only legitimate government of persons depends upon the determinations of the persons who agree on a system of government.

Childhood, as Locke conceives it, is the crucial state of the individual because it is in childhood that the practices of self-determination are formed. The property with which each individual is born can and should be managed, improved, maintained. The maintenance of the self, beginning in childhood, initially requires adult guardianship and guidance. Thus, in the *Second Treatise*, Locke also defines parental powers and duties as moral and social, rather than biological or natural. The "Care of the Parents due their Off-spring" gives no warrant for the claim of "*an Absolute Arbitrary Dominion* of the Father, whose power reaches no farther, than by such a Discipline as he finds most effectual to give such strength and health to their Bodies, such vigour and rectitude to their Minds, as may best fit his Children to be most useful to themselves and others." Moreover, this power, in which "the Mother too has her share with the Father," belongs to the parent not "by any peculiar right of nature, but only as he is Guardian." It belongs "as much to the Foster-Father of an exposed Child, as to the Natural Father of another."[6] Like the dependent state of childhood that it protects, parental authority is temporary and designed to assist the child in attaining independence. Locke thus dismantles the notion of the family as a prototype for monarchical rule. To reject a patriarchal theory of political power, with its premise of obligation to the past, Locke insists upon obligation to the present and future, as embodied in children.

In light of this account of childhood as the foundation of liberal individualism, we can make sense of what seems the most peculiar of Locke's recommendations, the rule that children's feet be washed every night in cold water. In addition, he advises that children wear "shoes so thin that they might leake and let in water whenever [children] come near it" (118, section 7). Locke thinks such procedures will produce both health and cleanliness. As if he anticipated immediate objections to these prescriptions, he rewrote this section of the *Education* a number of times, quoting classical Romans on the virtues of cold water. He also added the recommendation that all children learn to swim. Aiming to inure children to the discomforts of cold and wetness, Locke would have parents habituate children to such conditions just as he would have them accustom their children to uncomfortable or unpredictable sleeping situations.

In counselling the habituation of children to physical difficulties of all kinds, Locke assumes the primacy of sensory experience in children's encounters with the world, and more importantly, the possibility of children gaining control over their sensory experience. Locke's pediatrics thus promote the defining attributes of the liberal individual: the capacity of each individual to empirically experience the world, and the capacity of each individual to consider, employ, and redirect empirical experience. Cold and wet are basic phenomena that bodies inevitably encounter. While waterproof clothing and good boots might easily remedy the discomforts of such encounters, Locke is not interested in externally equipping the body but in equipping the individual to bear all situations.

This is a gradual process, Locke counsels: parents should little by little lower the temperature of the water in which they bathe their children's feet. Because of Locke's belief that "our bodies will endure anything that from the beginning they are accustomed to," he is particularly skeptical of medical interventions in the case of children (116, section 5). The parental treatments he advises, however, clearly are active interventions in children's lives. What both natural conditions such as cold and parental practices such as cold baths signify are the physical and social limits children are sure to meet. By setting up regular encounters with such limits, Locke schools the child not only in the recognition of limits but also in the knowledge that limits may be managed or even overcome. With proper training, the child negotiates and sometimes surmounts impediments to his or her comfort. Through the successes of bodily control (it is worth noting here that Locke is probably the first educational and political theorist to write on toilet-training), the child learns to respect limits and also to find ways of maneuvering within or despite them. From the pediatric regimen of cold baths, thin shoes, and hard beds emerges the model of the enlightened individual whom Locke is fashioning: a person who employs the knowledge gleaned from his experience.

The experience of the body is foremost for children. Their knowledge stems from what their bodies sense, from corporeal desires and needs. Since the child's body is his initial fund of knowledge, learning what he can do with or to his body sets the pattern for attaining and employing knowledge. In the child's relation to his body, Locke epitomizes his understanding of the individual as a self-reflective entity. From the outset, the child's body appears subject to control, first by the parent and then by the child. Locke thinks almost all aspects of childhood bodily experience can be directed. Crying can (and should) be discouraged, food tastes can be oriented, going to stool can be regularized, drinking can be limited, discomfort can be endured. This conception of the body as an object to be ordered exemplifies and serves Locke's definition of man as a consensual being. He emphatically characterizes even the dependent state of childhood as a consensual state; he describes the child as giving "tacit consent" to parental authority for a limited period of time. So strongly does Locke see humans as creatures with the capacity for choice that he makes self-denial the cardinal principle of human worth and the fundamental lesson of childhood. Man's distinctiveness, Locke maintains, lies in the fact that he can choose against himself, against the inclinations of his own body. Indeed, "the Principle of all Vertue and Excellency lies in a Power of denying ourselves the Satisfaction of our own Desires, where Reason does not authorize them" (143, section 38). Locke accordingly advises that "Children should be used to submit to their Desires, and go without their Longings, even *from their very Cradles"* (143, section 38). The lessons of self-denial in infancy prepare the individual for the lifelong practice of making decisions in the governing of himself.

Locke's Spartan sense of the body's endurance might appear an idealization of humanity, an exaggeration of what minds can accomplish and of what bodies can endure. Certainly his view seems to overlook how physical circumstances might affect or impede the mind. Yet far from Locke's emphasis on the role of self-control in health bespeaking an inflated sense of rational power—or a naive sense of rationality as always available and always successful, his careful injunctions to accustom the body to difficulties suggest the pervasiveness of impediments and impositions on human bodies. His own medical journals indicate a familiarity with the scope of diseases and debilities to which humans are subject that contradict a reading of Locke as a mind-cure enthusiast. What fascinated Locke as a physician was the effects of environments on humans, particularly the effect of weather on disease epidemics. Environmental factors present limits that may or may not be surmounted, depending upon the case. There is thus a marked humility to Locke's sense of medicine's accomplishments: medicine represents both what man can and cannot do with respect to the situation in which he lives. "What we know of the Works of Nature, especially in the Constitution of health, and the operations of our Bodies," Locke wrote to a colleague in 1692, "is only by sensible Efforts, but not by any Certainty we can have of the tools she uses, or the ways she works by. So that there is nothing left for a physician to do, but to observe well, and so by analogy argue the like Cases, and thence to make himself Rules of practice."[8]

In Locke's own practice, he engaged in continual consultation with other physicians in England, Scotland, Ireland, and on the Continent, to make sure that his diagnoses and treatments accorded with all available medical knowledge. He values the mind and the knowledge it acquires as instruments available for human improvements, not as the signs of human mastery and independence from history often described in poststructuralist analyses of Locke's ideas.[9] Enlightenment for Locke is not at all the simple-minded faith in reason that Locke's misreaders discover and decry. Rather, enlightenment involves and inheres in the continual process of engaging in sensory experiences and measuring and re-measuring one's account of those experiences. There is nothing static or necessarily predictable about such empiricism, though the habit of empiricism obviously generates customary ways of perceiving as well as misperceiving. Locke's suspicion of maxims and syllogisms, and of the general tendency of language to operate as a formula for understanding, attests to his recognition of the circumstantial complexities attendant upon empiricism.[10]

This is why Locke finds it crucial always to question and compare one's analyses. That Locke can envision pediatrics as a method of initiating the task of enlightenment suggests how much he appreciated the simultaneous difficulty and practicality of developing human understanding. And he experienced firsthand a sense of how this project can fail. The young Edward Clarke for whom the pediatrics and pedagogy the *Thoughts Concerning Education* were formulated, did not meet his parents' expectations for a healthy, self-directed individual. As a young man, he suffered severe depressions which Locke was called upon to treat. It may be tempting, from the standpoint of late-twentieth-century pediatrics and childcare, to see this turn of events as an indictment of Locke's methods. I would suggest, however, that even if we prefer other, more enlightened modes of childrearing, modes proven by subsequent centuries of physiological and psychological knowledge, we can see failure in the Lockean regimen as consistent with the range of individuals and vicissitudes that Locke recognizes. A child may not conform to the desired pattern. To truly respect the capacities of children, of individuals, is to know that one's experience of them can involve meeting some new or unexpected variable. By Locke's own

logic, people can exceed or evade expectations. This is perhaps Locke's most powerful contribution to Enlightenment and most helpful legacy to modernity: the realization that failures always accompany successes, that we cannot eliminate uncertainty even though we can and do become accustomed to it.

It is therefore in our sense of the customary, which is the record of the uncertainties we have engaged with varying degrees of success, that lies yet unrealized possibilities. Carol Kay often pointed out that the political insights of Locke and other Enlightenment figures (her favorite was Hobbes) have never in fact been fully implemented. As Kay stressed, Hobbes and Enlightenment thinkers as various as Locke, Hume, and Burke all recognized the role of opinion in modern life. Opinion, rather than "immutable principles of natural reason," establishes government, according to both the liberal and conservative political theories that emerged over the eighteenth-century. If the modern nation state is founded on "mutable opinion," an artificial and habitual human expression, the state can best serve its members when they continually examine and justify the ideas and customs at the basis of the state, as Locke urged.[11] The now all too familiar dismissals of Lockean liberalism are habits worth scrutinizing, for our health. Kay's dedication to pursue the tasks that Locke and others initiated remains with us, challenging us to reconstruct our institutions and ourselves.

University of Utah

NOTES

1. John Locke, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, ed. James L. Axtell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 114. This text reproduces the 1705 fifth edition, the last edition which Locke superintended. All subsequent references will be to this edition and will give both Axtell's page number and the section number of the essay so that readers with other editions can follow the quotations.

2. See, for example, *The Educational Writings of John Locke* ed. John Wiliam Adamson (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1922), in which only section 30, the summary of the preceding twenty-nine sections on health, appears.

3. My title, "Lockean Pediatrics," then, is a deliberate misnomer, intended to highlight the innovativeness of Locke's understanding of childhood, which preceded the nineteeenth-century development of the fields of child psychology and child medicine. At the same time, I do not mean to suggest that Locke would agree with the specific forms that the foregrounding of children in psychology, medicine, and politics has taken since the early eighteenth-century.

4. John Locke, Letter to Edward Clarke, 29 April 1687, reprinted in *Letters to Edward Clarke,* Appendix I in Axtell's edition of *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, p. 369.

5. Locke makes this formulation in Chapter V, section 27 of the Second Treatise of Government. See John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government* (1690), ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 305-6.

6. *Two Treatises of Government*, p. 328.

7. *Two Treatises of Government*, p. 335. For a more extensive treatment of the relation between children and consent in Locke's thought, see my *The Consent of the Governed: The Lockean Legacy in Early American Culture*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001

8. John Locke, Letter to William Molyneux, 20 January 1692, quoted in Kenneth Dewhurst, *John Locke(1632-1704), Physican and Philosopher: A Medical Biography* with an edition of the medical notes in his journals (London: The Wellcome Historical Medical Library, 1963), p. 310. Alexander Stewart has informed me of the skepticism among Locke scholars about the accuracy of Dewhurst's transcription of Locke's notes. Such criticism does not alter the status of the already previously published letters of Locke that Dewhurst cites.

9. See, for example, Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political* (London: Verso, 1993), p. 28.

10. Locke devotes a great deal of attention to impediments to the understanding raised by human reliance on custom or hearsay. See Book Three, chapters IX, X, and XI and Book Four, especially chapters II, III, IV, VII, and XX, in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* 1689, 2 volumes, ed. Peter H. Niddetch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). Virtually every page of Locke's short related essay, *Of the Conduct of the Understanding*, 1697, ed. Thomas Fowler (New York: Burt Franklin, 1971), notes and addresses problems within the processes of perception and judgment.

11. See Carol Kay, *Political Constructions: Defoe, Richardson*, & *Sterne in Relation to Hobbes, Hume*, & *Burke* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 268.

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MANLY AIRS: LOCKE'S MORAL EDUCATION AND DANCE IN THE SPECTATOR

RAYMOND J. RICKETTS

When I was an undergraduate at the University of Pittsburgh (1992-96), I discussed with Carol Kay my desire to write about the social role of dancing in early eighteenth-century England. She was both an avid fan of dance—she loved Fred Astaire—and a remarkable cheerleader for her students' projects, so she warmly encouraged me to pursue the topic. I described to her the ways I thought dancing contributed to the shaping of eighteenth-century social selves, peppering my words with the term "self-fashioning," which I imagined at the time to show a Foucauldian sophistication. Carol's countenance darkened; she quickly corrected my anachronism, letting me know in no uncertain terms that self-fashioning was not the eighteenth-century phrase. The appropriate term was, of course, "moral education." This brief encounter did much to guide my thinking on this paper and on my dissertation as a whole. While I write now bereft of her reading and advice, I am still guided by her expectations of intellectual adventurousness and scholarly rigor.

The notion that Addison and Steele's periodical *The Spectator* (1711-1714) owes much to Locke hardly needs defending. One of the many topics covered by the *Spectator*, however, reveals an unexpected Lockean lineage: dance. The philosopher had a lot to say about dancing in his *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693), a wide-ranging text primarily but not exclusively concerned with future gentlemen's "moral education." The influences of the *Education* can be felt in most of the *Spectator*'s discussions of dance and in many of its discussions of manners and "breeding." The conditional promotion of dance in the *Spectator* has a direct antecedent in the *Education*'s guarded endorsement of the place dancing should hold in the education of young people.

This line of influence from Locke to the *Spectator* is mediated through a third text, *An Essay towards an History of Dancing* (1712) by English dancing master John Weaver (1673-1760). In several of its discussions of dancing, the *Spectator* cites Weaver, who relies on Locke to defend dancing, and who makes explicit the increasing potential for social mobility through corporeal change. This increase was also acknowledged but resisted by Locke, who is careful to describe dancing as a means by which to *balance* individual autonomy and sociability. Without attending to the nuances of the philosopher's assertions, Weaver rehearses Locke's endorsement of dancing in the *Education* to justify dissembling with the body to manipulate that balance.

The *Spectator* uses Weaver's text carefully, but in so doing reveals that Weaver's appropriation of Locke is more than simply a coarse misreading. His social claims for dancing reflect the body's changing place in the eighteenth-century's "marketplace of opinion," in which "[i]t begins to be possible to treat attitudes, manners, and ethics as 'things' sensitive to the same forces of novelty and obsolescence as hats, shoes, patches, wigs, and hoops" (Mackie 12). Like Weaver, the periodical finds the new possibilities for corporeal change intriguing (as suggested by the protean nature of "Mr. Spectator" himself). Dance in the *Spectator*'s urbane pages offers new yet familiar social graces to replace the arbitrary and anachronistic (if sometimes reassuring) strictures of aristocratic ideology as they apply to the body. Weaver's writing highlights the ways in which the *Spectator* uses dancing to read—and to teach its readers how to read—the body in an increasingly commercialized world.

In general, when I speak of "the body" in this essay I refer to what might have been considered as one's "person" in the eighteenth century. The word *body* not only denotes the complex of physical attributes that includes one's corporeal being but also alludes to one's manners, carriage, countenance, and mien, all of which reveal something about one's character, mental disposition, and breeding as they operate in the social sphere. The body in this sense encompasses behavior—movement, gesture, posture, and other forms of physical expression—by which one engages with others. Notions of the body as primarily a spectatorial object—as seen in present-day scholarship which considers the royal spectacle of the sovereign's body, the body as pornographic object of the male gaze, or the cadaver under the anatomist's knife, for instance—seem unsatisfying, even anachronistic for my exploration. To think of the body solely as object posits a division between mind and body that elides important ways in which social forces engage with individual agency in the period. "The body" in the scope of my examination is thus both object *and* agent. Through dancing or dance training, Locke, Weaver, and the *Spectator* suggest that the body can lead the mind into the world, and serve to keep the world in mind. Each writer, though, has different ideas of what is at stake.

Turning first to Locke and the *Education*, one place where the attunement of mind (or disposition) and body comes under particular scrutiny is in the burgeoning marketplace. Locke is generally positive about the aims of the commercial arena but also concerned about its potentially uncivilizing practices. He worries, for instance, that hypermasculine excesses, sanctioned and validated in the marketplace, may insinuate themselves into the private realm of the home. He fears that fathers, in valorizing the commercial successes of "bold and bustling men," will encourage schoolboy roughness in their sons, construing vicious public behavior as a necessary component of virtuous private masculinity. As part of the remedy of the *Education,* where Locke stresses the importance of the private sphere to a child's moral education, he advises parents to establish an at-home or "privater" education as a means of inculcating civility. He looks to the training of young women as a good example because of the care by which girls are moved from the home into the dangerous "world of conversation." Among his correctives for overaggressive masculinity, then, Locke suggests that boys would do well to emulate their sisters, whose "retirement and bashfulness," polished by conversation in the home, gives them "a becoming assurance" as they engage with the world (sec. 70). At the same time, however, he expresses concern about male "softness" in anti-effeminate terms: "if my young master [is] to be kept always in the shade and never exposed to the sun and wind for fear of his complexion, it may be a good way to make him *beau* but not a man of business." Yet Locke's worry about a lack of toughness leads

him to recommend that girls too be subject to the same "hardening" of the body and mind as boys "in their education" (sec. 9). Locke may be anti-effeminate, perhaps even antifeminine, but he is not anti*female*, at least in this instance.

Locke's concerns vacillate between overweening masculinity and effectual manliness on the one hand, and oversensitive effeminacy and civilizing femininity on the other. Yet softness and hardness are qualities sometimes untethered to stable gender moorings. While anti-effeminate language is present in the *Education,* dancing—a practice often considered "softening" and effeminate, even in this period—emerges there as a means of tying masculinity to civility. Locke sees dance training as useful not for imparting aristocratic elegance, a quality often equated with effeminacy from the Restoration onwards, but for something different: "I know not how," he ruminates, "[dancing] gives children manly thoughts and carriage more than anything" (sec. 67). Characteristically, Locke tempers this observation by emphasizing that he means not to "have little children much tormented about the punctilios or niceties of breeding" (sec. 67), an attempt, perhaps, to get parents to take dance training seriously by seeing its place in a larger scheme of a complete moral education. In this vein of keeping dance in perspective, he asserts the primacy of mind over body, and concludes that "want of well-fashioned civility in the carriage, whilst *civility* is not wanting in the mind (for there you must take care to plant it early), should be the parent's least care when young" (sec. 67). Still, it is notable that such planting occurs through dancing, and notable that, throughout the *Education*, training the body can "give" thoughts to children, complicating Locke's prioritizing of mind over body.

Moral education thus emerges in the Education as a rather enigmatic process of development where the training of the mind occurs in tandem with that of the body. Locke asserts the interdependence of mind and body, but in the Cartesian register of the "mind-body split" that privileges mind over body. Yet, while he states at the outset that "our main care should be about the inside," i.e., the mind, he is concerned about the "clay cottage" that houses the mind: "He whose mind directs not wisely will never take the right way; and he whose body is crazy [unsound] and feeble will never be able to advance in it" (sec. 1). By noting this emphasis on the body we can interrogate the received view of Locke as furthering the separation of mind from body that Descartes initiated. This is apparent even in the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689), Locke's most well-known epistemological work, widely considered a foundational text of rationalist philosophies. There, as he considers the workings of the mind as separate from those of the body, Locke posits the *interaction* of body and mind, and establishes a thoroughly corporeal basis for the understanding. While both sensory experience and interior mental processes of reflection serve to inscribe the "white paper" of the mind, the physical senses constitute the source "of most of the *Ideas* we have" (*Essay* II.i.2, 3). In the beginning of Book II, furthermore, Locke contends, "If it shall be demanded then, *When a Man begins to have any Ideas?* I think, the true answer is, When he first has any *Sensation*," and posits that "*Ideas* in the Understanding, are coeval with *Sensation*; which is such an Impression or Motion, made in some part of the Body, as produces some Perception in the Understanding" (II.i.23). Even our other source of ideas—the process of reflection—is seen as a kind of "internal Sense" (II.i.4); that is, interior reflection is seen in analogy to physical processes of sensation. The *Essay*'s primacy of mind, in other words, is built on the priority of the body.

Despite the sometimes complex and contradictory nature of what he proposes about mind and body in the *Education*, however, Locke's aim there is not to engage in philosophical deliberation. He strives to make practical the precepts of his moral education, and to that end recommends a course of mental and physical *habituation*. This introduces other complications, to be sure, as noted by other commentators who have remarked on the difficulty of reconciling Locke's promotion of pediatric habituation in the *Education* with his celebration of individual rationality and moral autonomy in his other writings. A characteristically problematic example is the following advice for the instilling of habits in children: "When constant custom has made any one thing easy and natural to them, and they practice it without reflection, you may then go on to another" (sec. 66). This does not sound like a promising way to develop self-conscious autonomy. As Locke refines his views, however, he shows a commitment to a careful process in which mind shapes body through the thoughtful emulation of others: "If [children's] minds are well disposed and principled with inward civility, a great part of the roughness which sticks to the outside for want of better teaching, time and observations will rub off as they grow up if they are bred in good company" (sec. 67). But emulation alone is not enough. It depends first on a mind that is "well disposed and principled with inward civility"—a rather enigmatic requirement from a theorist of the mind as a *tabula rasa*—and must be helped along by mental and physical habituation. Children "should be shown what to do and by reiterated actions be fashioned beforehand into the practice of what is fit and becoming," but not have "rebukes misplaced upon them which neither do nor can give them graceful motions" (sec. 67). Dance training, a practice full of reiterated actions, fits well if not perfectly into Locke's moral education. Ideally, it too relies on thoughtfully instilling "mindless" behaviors through repetition, not retribution.

The concept of habituation makes evident the myriad, sometimes counterintuitive ways mind and body are connected in the *Education*. It can be seen at work in a pair of terms Locke opposes that are intrinsically linked to dance: *affectation* and *gracefulness*. Through these terms, Locke shows that what appears to be a problem with the body may actually be a problem with thinking or reasoning. Affectation might seem to be the fault of corporeal bad habits or even unalterable conditions of the body, while gracefulness would seem to be a natural physical quality, bestowed by birth and perverted by thought. But affectation, Locke asserts, is not "the product of untaught nature." It is instead the conscious result of education, if a "perverted" one, an "acquired ugliness, owing to mistaken education" (sec. 66). Affectation is habituation gone wrong, and Locke sees its manifestations in the social world as nothing more than "studied ways of being ill fashioned": affectation is habituation that reveals itself as such. Affectation's initial motivations, such as "to correct natural defects," are "laudable," but affectation is flawed in that it tries too hard "to put on gracefulness," since the determining quality of gracefulness is precisely a lack of effort (or, enigmatically, such a lack made visible).

Gracefulness, though, is equally complicated for Locke. It is, as Nathan Tarcov points out, "an apparent though artificial naturalness" requiring a "free" and "easy" congruence of action and mind: "Gracefulness is natural only in the sense that it does not depend on memory or reflection . . . and is therefore above suspicion of being deliberately deceptive, since deliberate deception requires reflection" (Tarcov 110). Gracefulness is implicitly linked to sincerity, but what is counterintuitive is that the "natural coherence" Locke praises, of behavior and the proper "temper of mind," arises through a process of conscious habituation. So while gracefulness is evidence of "a well-formed mind," such a

mind is no guarantee of gracefulness. That is a quality attained only when

> by a constant practice, [graceful people have] fashioned their carriage and made all those little expressions of civility and respect, which nature or custom has established in conversation, so easy to themselves that they seem not artificial or studied, but naturally flow from a sweetness of mind and a well-turned disposition. (sec. 66)

Gracefulness is effected through a physical habituation that does not merely reveal an already sincere mind, but guides the mind into a sincere disposition. For Locke, the habituated body allows the "civil mind" to operate gracefully in the world of sociability even as it allows that world to shape the mind.

If gracefulness is to flow from a civil mind into the world of conversation, then the body must be attuned to the mind through training, specifically through attention to deportment or *carriage* (a word that appears often in the *Education*). Carriage reveals much about a person's affectation or gracefulness. A "forced carriage" is evident when people affect emotions they are not really feeling. While such effort may be laudable as an attempt towards sociability, individuals who express their dispositions "by a carriage not suited to them," are

> in conversation are all constrained motions, actions, words, or looks, which though designed to show either their respect or civility to the company or their satisfaction and easiness in it, are not yet natural nor genuine marks of the one or the other, but rather of some defect or mistake within. (sec. 66)

For Locke, the inner defect that carriage reveals is by implication the product of outside forces; that is, the habit of gracefulness has not been instilled through proper moral education. As always with Locke, the reading of a fault can point the way to reformation rather than condemnation: carriage is not a quality fixed by destiny, but one that is correctable through physical habituation or training. In order to carry out the appropriate kind of habituation, however, such training must respond to needs of the larger social world rather than merely to those of its own narrow, pedantic considerations.

Locke uses the term *practice* to indicate more precisely the repetitive pedagogical means of instilling good habits, and the *Education*'s conjunction of practice with carriage to produce gracefulness suggests precisely the utility of dance training in this regard. Before he endorses dancing, however, Locke warns of the dangers of enforcing rules at the expense of engaging practice when employing habituation to overcome affectation:

> [Affectation] has often its rise from the lazy admonitions of those who give rules and propose examples without joining practice with their instructions and making their pupils repeat the action in their sight [so] that they may correct what is indecent or constrained in it till it be perfected into a habitual and becoming easiness. (sec. 66)

While he is speaking of the actions of tutors here, he is also effectively describing what the end of

a dancing master's instruction should be. To a greater degree than a tutor, the dancing master must attend to the inherent dangers of affectation in his training if he is to pay heed to Locke's admonition to tutors that "plain and rough nature, left to itself, is much better than an artificial ungracefulness." While dancing, "being that which gives *graceful motions* all the life, and above all things manliness and a becoming confidence to young children" (sec. 196), should be learned early by them, the dancing master must be chosen with care as to his reliance on pedantry and propensity towards affectation. Because dance training is structured around practice and observed, repeated motions, a parent must be attentive to a dancing master's particular sensitivity, not only to the dangers of affectation but to the shortcomings of his own profession in regard to it:

> you must be sure to have a good master that knows and can teach what is graceful and becoming and what gives a freedom and easiness to all the motions of the body. One that teaches not this is worse than none at all, natural unfashionableness being much better than apish, affected postures.

Locke goes on to urge parents to hold genteel virtues above the gloss of dancing-masterly affectation: "I think it much more passable to put off the hat and make a leg like an honest country gentleman than like an ill-fashioned dancing-master." But he also makes a sweeping dismissal of what we would consider the aesthetic dimension of dance, warning of the art's inherent tendency toward what he sees as frivolity: "For as for the jigging part and the figures of dances, I count that little or nothing farther than as it tends to perfect *graceful carriage*" (sec. 196).

Despite these qualifications, dancing in the *Education* still holds the promise of instilling corporeal self-confidence, a habituated ease of manner that translates into verbal self-assurance. Locke praises dancing masters for their ability to refine manners in a male child and "wipe off all that plainness of nature, which the a-la-mode people call clownishness" (sec. 67). Locke insinuates here that correcting defective manners, commonly characterized as "bashful rusticity," is not a surrender to modish sensibilities but a way to eliminate barriers to conversation and sociability. Taught at the earliest possible age, Locke believes, dancing participates in a corporeal pedagogy of polite social interaction and mobility, and imparts a confidence that can "raise [children] to the conversation of those above their age" (sec. 67). And a dancing master can help the process along or pervert it.

Locke's caveats about dancing, focused through the ambivalent figure of the dancing master, a dubious yet necessary professional, are echoed in the *Spectator*. While Eustace Budgell asserts that it is "the proper Business of a Dancing Master to regulate" matters of manners, he warns that "unless you add something of your own to what these fine Gentlemen teach you, and which they are wholly ignorant of themselves, you will much sooner get the Character of an Affected Fop, than of a Well-bred Man" (*Spectator* 67). In this sense, then, it is vital that the carriage of the body reflect the superior influence of one's own amateur knowledge rather than the work of the dancing master's practiced hand. The *Spectator* goes further than Locke in separating dancing from its practitioners, to show that dance training is inherently valuable but limited by its current-day practices.

This puts the dancing master into a difficult position. The aim of his training must be to improve

carriage or deportment, but his efforts must be effaced even as their results are made evident. In the realm of the *Spectator*, discussions of dance and the appearance of John Weaver recapitulated this difficulty: how can one argue the social effectiveness of dancing without advocating that one lie with the body? This tension is evident in the *Spectator*'s appropriation of Weaver, a dancing master who in his writings was not always sensitive to the rhetorical effect of his claims for dancing. One way the Spectator managed Weaver's contradictions was to cast him as what Habermas calls a "sanctioned expert," one who was "permitted and supposed to educate the public, but only inasmuch as [he] conceived through arguments and could not [himself] be corrected by better judgments" (259 n32). The *Spectator* utilized this "specialized" expertise by making direct and implicit reference to Weaver's *Essay towards an History of Dancing*. In that work, Weaver turns to Locke's *Education* to bolster his case for the cultural pertinence of dancing, citing its sections on dance as "a Domestic Authority." He employs Lockean language to defend dance, stating that it "regulates the Carriage; invigorates the active Motion of the Limbs; fashions the Body with a just and graceful Position, and enlivens and unbends the Mind" (Weaver 425). In deploying Locke, Weaver attempts nothing less than to correct the philosopher's admitted ignorance ("I know not how...") of the developmental workings of dance training. Ultimately, since he is not interested in limiting himself to dancing in the social sphere, Weaver focuses primarily on theatrical dance. Nevertheless, his reading of Locke on dancing and dance training and, as we will see, the *Spectator*'s handling of Weaver's ideas, reveals much about the ambiguity of the body's place in the print culture of early eighteenth-century England.

Weaver cites Locke's praise of the "becoming confidence" dance training can instill but misreads this quality as consciously performative, self-serving, and even duplicitous. He omits the nuances of Locke's "thoughtless" gracefulness—its lack of reliance on memory and reflection, its guilelessness—and instead describes with relish the social maneuvering that dancing makes possible. He states that a "Modest Assurance" (which Locke says dancing can instill in children),

> plays the jugler so with other men's understanding, that it palms upon 'em Men of very indifferent Parts for Prodigies. This has often made a Smaterer in Rhime, pass for a DRYDEN, a sign-dawber, for a VANDIKE; or KNELLER; a Petty-fogger, for a COKE, or HARCOURT; a Pedant, for a BACON; a Sophister for a MATCHIAVELL; a Quack for a WILLIS, or RATCLIFF . . . . (Weaver 432-33)

Weaver may ultimately mean to be critical of the protean possibilities for dancing here, since his surmise that "it is the Audacious, pushing Man only [who] thrives, and carries his Cause" (433) could be read as ironic. The irony is weak, however, since this potentially mitigating language comes late in his argument; instead of mounting coherent objections against audacious pushiness, Weaver frames the problem as one of not being pushy enough. As long as the "Man of exquisite Intellectuals, and unbias'd Probity" lacks "this so necessary Accomplishment, *Assurance*," he can never compete with "the pressing Knave, or Fool" who, despite his inferior intellect, "shoulders him out, and gets the Prize" (436). He is deaf to Locke's criticism of overaggressive masculinity or warnings about the dangers of conversation. What he hears, perhaps, are the needs of the new rich, who will "take dancing lessons in the hope that they will pass for gentlemen born and bred" (Sparshott 64)—and, perhaps, hire dancing masters like Weaver. Weaver may disregard Locke's admonition against "a forward pertness or any

little arts of shifting" (sec. 70), but when Weaver asserts that "for want of this Qualification [modest assurance], many a Man of Sense, thro' an habitual and dastard shamefacedness, lies unregarded in misery, without hope of redress" (433), he registers a real anxiety in the period about how merit is to be recognized in a world in which marks of status and class are less certain than ever.

While the *Spectator* solicited Weaver's expertise, it notably steered clear of publishing anything from the *History* that could be construed as advocating "any little arts of shifting," that is, lying with the body. The periodical follows Locke more closely than Weaver does, and asserts its own nuanced extensions of Lockean concerns about sociability, negotiating cultural anxieties with its own characteristic urbanity. The *Spectator* differs most sharply from Weaver in never affirming a direct causal relationship between corporeal behavior and material reward. Instead, it recommends dancing only insofar as it "belongs to the Behavior and an hansom Carriage of the Body" and can provide confidence through imparting "a moderate Knowledge in the little Rules of Good-breeding"; the result of inattention to the lessons of dancing is social awkwardness, not material loss: "I have seen a Professor of a Liberal Science at a Loss to Salute a Lady; and a most excellent Mathematician not able to determine whether he should stand or sit while my Lord drank to him" (*Spectator* 67). (Budgell's choice of professions here parodies those who would too readily elevate mind over body, and defuses the seriousness of status improprieties even as it inscribes the importance of manners.) Weaver, by contrast, frames the effects of social impotence engendered by a lack of dance training in crudely direct and material terms: "I have known men, who have reason'd admirably in their Chambers, and with their intimate Friends, who have not been able to speak a Word in either an Assembly, or to a Man of great Post and Dignity, tho' their Fortunes depended on it" (Weaver 436-37). He misreads Locke's claims for confidence in children, as he speaks of improving children's opportunities for social mobility with the hard language of making them "inur'd to Company," and of using dance to develop them as "Masters of Assurance" who can claim their fortunes. Assurance in the *Spectator* inculcates not brutish mastery and direct material gain, but instead helps to make a man "easie in all Companies," to the end of making those around him more comfortable. Dancing in the periodical contributes to a more subtle bodily performance that is always linked to improving sociability.

So in the *Spectator*'s direct citation of Weaver, the dancing master's expertise is circumscribed by careful framing: even as they are solicited, his moves are held up to scrutiny. An excerpt from the *History* is construed in *Spectator* 334 as a letter from a reader who happens to be a dancing master who has "attempted a small treatise" on dancing. Weaver's "sanctioned expert" status comes into play as he knowledgeably bemoans the intellectual neglect of dance, provides an outline of dance's historical foundations, and points to its future as a legitimate area of scholarly, even scientific, inquiry. He alludes to dancing's claims for social improvement only by saying, "I have advanc'd some Observations on . . . that part of it so absolutely necessary for the Qualification of Gentlemen and Ladies." There is nothing about giving children confidence; no advice about how to improve one's fortune with one's body. Weaver's omitted words, such as those about juggling "other men's understandings," highlight once again the role of dancing in the *Spectator*: to foreground sociability against a background of expanding possibilities for individual achievement, some of which the periodical actively encourages.

The *Spectator,* anxious about presenting Weaver's theatrical values and aesthetic appropriations,

nonetheless eagerly "puffs" his work. While dancing is important in the periodical only in moral-didactic contexts, as with Locke, Steele's relationship to the theater reveals a material interest in dancing behind the seeming objectivity of the *Spectator*'s discussions. As a man of the theater who managed Drury Lane for a time, Steele employed Weaver as dancing master there during the theater's rivalry with Lincoln's Inn Fields. While the realities of Steele and Weaver's relationship are not elaborated in the pages of the *Spectator*, the periodical's disinterested, moral-didactic stance reveals its materially interested background in telling moments. In *Spectator* 370, which describes how theatrical performances may be augmented by dance training, Steele suggests that observing the stage can illuminate both how we see and how we act:

> It is, with me, a Matter of the highest Consideration what Parts are well or ill performed, what Passions or Sentiments are indulged or cultivated, and consequently what Manners and Customs are transfused from the Stage to the World, which reciprocally imitate each other.

Steele's reworking of the *theatrum mundi* metaphor is also a subtle invitation for readers to attend performances—at Drury Lane, of course—and to judge for themselves: to compare characters with real people and test moral-didactic intent (as expressed on stage) with its effectiveness in the world.

Through this "interested disinterestedness," then, dancing is implicated in the periodical's self-consciously careful efforts to read people—and to teach its readers to read people—since watching dance involves reading bodies. *Spectator* 66, which illustrates ways that bodies can be read and misread, is self-conscious (and, in being so, indirectly critical of Weaver) in that it recognizes that trying too hard to connect particular gestures to specific meanings can result in unreasonable expectations. Steele frames his epistolary account by lifting it into the register of ironic detachment: "The two following letters are upon a Subject of very great Importance, tho' expressed without any Air of Gravity," a tone Weaver failed to assume to cover *his* interests. Steele enacts an exchange between three voices: "Celimene," who writes that she is charged with the care of a "young country kinswoman" whose "Person and Education are to be her Fortune"; a self-described "rough man" employed by Celimene to execute and deliver her letter; and the final word of Mr. Spectator himself, whose response includes suggestive references to dancing.

Celimene's diagnosis of her kinswoman, who "comes to my Hands just as Nature left her, half finished, and without any acquired improvements," alludes to both Locke and Weaver and the problems and promises of corporeal habituation. Locke's disparaging remarks on affectation, particularly on assuming a "forced carriage," as well as those on the "little arts of shifting" are evoked: "She knows no way to express her self but by her Tongue, and that always to signify her Meaning. Her Eyes serve her yet only to see with, and she is utterly a Forreigner [*sic*] to the Language of Looks and Glances." While Celimene has worked hard to "[teach] her to sigh when she is not concern'd, and to smile when she is not pleas'd," she implores Mr. Spectator's help "to make her comprehend the visible Graces of Speech, and the dumb Eloquence of Motion."

Celimene's crass, single-minded focus on reshaping her charge to secure a marriage evokes more specifically the imagined rewards of "modest assurance" Weaver lays out in the *History*. There, his large claims for dancing in the context of marriage assert first the benefits for men. He states that "The Ladies are of easier access to a Man" who is a good dancer and that "women to whose hands Custom has often deliver'd . . . the Disposition of considerable Estates" (439) may be charmed by the confidence dancing provides a man. A man whose merit might consist solely of having the means to afford a dancing master could dance his way into "Advancement in Marriage." Further underscoring the dissembling aspect of dance training, Weaver adds the idea of gracefulness to the repertoire of qualities dancing offers men, especially when there is a goal in view. (Locke's notion of sincere gracefulness is lost on Weaver here.) When Weaver finally addresses women, he advises that they, like men, can benefit from the "modest Assurance" dancing provides, which "strengthens and confirms the Conquest of [their] Eyes" and can empower a woman to "Converse with Advantage with Man"—precisely what Celimene wants for her kinswoman. He adds that, as with men, dancing can erase the bodily signs of bashful rusticity which may hold a country-bred woman like Celimene's charge back from individual gain in the city.

Celimene, like Weaver, is blind to the dangers of the trained body, seeing only its advantages in securing the girl's fortune. Mr. Spectator's response to Celimene, pointing out these blindnesses, is prefaced by the dissenting voice of the "rough man," which expresses the period's ambivalence towards the utility or decadence of aristocratic values and manners (which include dancing). Taking issue with Celimene, he worries about spoiling the girl with "this fine thing called *Fine Breeding*" which, he fears, "differs too much from that plain thing called *Good Breeding*." Mr. Spectator's response aims to pave a middle ground between these two voices in a way that patronizes neither; both, after all, represent the views of his heterogeneous readership. Celimene may be coarse and superficial in her methods of habituation, but her goals of "improvement" are laudable (as were the motives of affectation in Locke). And, while it is clear that the man's commonsense perspective is respected, his complaint about the excesses of "fine breeding" does not end the discussion. Celimene observes that Mr. Spectator is known as "a Judge of fine Breeding," but she may not want to hear his last word.

Mr. Spectator begins his corrective with a formulation that both recalls and extends Locke, and criticizes Celimene: "in our Daughters we take Care of their Persons and neglect their Minds; in our Sons, we are so intent upon adorning their Minds, that we wholly neglect their Bodies." This recalls Locke, of course, in asserting the importance of training the male body, and goes beyond him by reporting on the excesses of such training on young women. It does the latter, furthermore, in terms of *dancing* and the dancing master. Celimene never mentions dancing in her letter, but Steele easily associates her efforts towards corporeal habituation with dance training, and then extends the association by linking the dancing master with abuse: "When a girl is safely brought from her Nurse, before she is capable of forming one simple Notion of any thing in Life, she is delivered to the Hands of her Dancing-Master; and with a Collar around her Neck." As he continues, he takes issue with a corporeal training that encourages undue material expectations; in this case, marriage:

> the pretty wild thing is taught a fantastical Gravity of Behaviour, and forced to a particular Way of holding her Head, heaving her Breast, and moving with her whole Body; and

> all this under Pain of never having an Husband, if she steps, looks, or moves awry.

Here, corporeal shaping is sharply criticized, and with the added rhetorical force of gender inequity. Any ideas that certain bodily behavior will render material results are shown to be no more than the inculcation of "wonderful Workings of the Imagination" in a vulnerable young woman who places too much faith in the social efficacy of the dance-trained body (as Weaver does). In Lockean terms, such physical-intellectual pedantry will instill affectation, not gracefulness. While "the Management of a young Lady's Person is not to be overlooked," Steele concludes that the goal in dance training is "To make the Mind and Body improve together." Reflecting Locke's notions on habituation in regulating the mind and carriage, where thought has the upper hand, Steele asserts that "the Erudition of her Mind is much more to be regarded," and aphorizes that the ideal is "to make Gesture follow Thought, and not Let Thought be employed upon Gesture." Thought should lead gesture and not have to look back.

Just prior to wrapping things up in this neat rhetorical package, however, Steele offers the image of a woman dancing for her admirers:

> *Cleomira* dances with all the Elegance of Motion Imaginable; but her Eyes are so chastised with the Simplicity and Innocence of her Thoughts, that she raises in her Beholders Admiration and good Will, but no loose Hope or wild Imagination.

Steele enacts here Locke's dictum that one should instruct by example, not precept, even if the example he offers is an idealized image. He sophisticates Locke's straightforward pedagogy with a visual didactic, that offers instruction while appealing to his readers' shared pleasures of figuration. He recapitulates the stage in the public sphere of print and, in turn, moves it into the privacy of his readers' literary imaginations. In a complicated act of emulation, they then reflect on their reading, and on themselves, and share their interpretation with the world at large. They are provided a "counter-education" in morals, to use Michael G. Ketcham's words—Cleomira serves "as a way of bringing moral reflections back into a realm of social communication" (57) rather than participating in the mere coerciveness of pedantic moral education.

In conclusion, it is worth revisiting *Spectator* 334, where Weaver's *History* is excerpted. Steele's introduction there is another aspect of the periodical's careful framing of Weaver. In a passage that recalls Locke's notions of habituation and pediatric development, Steele makes a provocative analogy between dance and literacy:

> When we read we do it without any exerted Act of Memory that presents the Shape of the Letters; but Habit makes us do it mechanically without straying, like Children, to recollect and join these Letters. A Man who has not had the Regard of his Gesture in any part of his Education, will find himself unable to act with Freedom before new Company, as a Child that is but now learning would be to read without Hesitation.

In addition to recalling habituation's effect on pediatric development in Locke, the analogy is wonderfully expressive of the *Spectator*'s ethos of literacy. It implies that Locke's notion of a natural

gracefulness can be read in movement and, by being read, learned and practiced. Why, though, is the metaphor about learning to read and not learning to write? Perhaps, like the imagined community of readers isolated in their private closets yet brought together in the public sphere of print, the dance-trained body is seen as bringing the individual mind into the social realm through an indirect process of productive imagination. The gracefulness of reading resides in habits of mind that do not preclude thought: indeed, they make it possible. Locke and the *Spectator* imagine that the body also, through the habituation provided by dancing, can engender thoughtful civility and an unforced cohesion in the social body. What is at stake for them is nothing less or more than "the Advancement of the Pleasure we receive in being agreeable to each other in ordinary Life."

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THE MUSE OF TERPSICHORE, OR "THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE MIND" IN LOCKE'S *SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION**

RICHARD KROLL

The *Lacedemonians*, the bravest people of *Greece*, having learnt the custom of... Dancing from *Castor* and *Pollux*, in all their Feasts and publick Ceremonies us'd Dancing.

Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim,
The Vanity of Arts and Sciences

I will not ascend up amongst the Gods to shew you them Dancing to assuage *Saturn's* Melancholie; nor will I lead you unto the *Curetes*, and *Curibantes* to seek the first invention thereof; nor will I stay to tell you of *Proteus* his Changings, or *Gelos* his fable; nor will I perswade you to imitate *Apollo's* Priestess in offering at *Delos*; nor the *Indians* in saluting the Sun; nor to heare the Harmonical motion of the Celestial Spheares with *Plato*; nor will I shew you to make war in Dansing, as the old Inhabitants of *Aethiopia* did; nor to Daunce about the Cittie, as the *Romane Salii* did; neither wil I represent unto you the Maiestie of Princes by *Eumelia* a kinde of Daunce; nor the wanton and dissolute motion of base people by *Cordax*. But as *Socrates* did unto the *Grecians*, and *Lycurgus* unto the *Lacedemonians*, I recommend that forme of Dauncing unto you, called by the Ancients, *Hormus*, which of all others is most like our sort of Dauncing named *Numbers*, Wherein daunced both men and weemen: which with our Diuvines permission . . . I think it one of the best exercises that a Noble man can learne in his young yeares, and that fashioneth the bodie best.

James Cleland, *HĒRŌ-PAIDEIA*, OR
The Institution of a Young Noble Man

True Ease in Writing comes from Art not Chance, As those move easiest who have learn'd to dance.

Alexander Pope, *An Essay on Criticism*

> Language is one of the embodiments of social or mental life. Much that can be observed in the way language is molded is also evident in other embodiments of society. For example, the way people argue that this behavior or this custom at table is better than that, is scarcely distinguishable from the way they claim one linguistic expression to be preferable to another.
>
> Norbert Elias, *The History of Manners*

I. THE PROBLEM

Even with the publication of increasingly synoptic appraisals of Locke's intellectual career—like John Marshall's *John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility* (Cambridge, 1994) —I believe that Locke studies still suffer from a major constitutional difficulty. Whereas a number of intellectual historians have argued that the seventeenth century did not think—or, more to the point, behave—in terms of the post-Romantic division of disciplines, Locke's enormously diverse *ouevre* is still largely divided up amongst various modern scholarly specialities. With little exaggeration, I think it fair to say that the *Essay* usually goes to professionally trained philosophers, often with an analytical bent (as in Michael Ayers's huge commentary in 1991); the *Two Treatises*, to political scientists like Richard Ashcraft or James Tully; the physics, to specialists like Michael Alexander; the theology, despite its weight within Locke's final output, almost inevitably to an odd assortment of intellectual historians like myself; and, most pressingly for my topic here, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, to educational historians.[1]

This tendency towards a form of intellectual alienation is further exacerbated by enormously overdetermined institutional commitments, which, usually unconsciously, affect not only how we see Locke, but, more disturbingly, what we see of him at all. Once we enter the realm of Locke studies—and a similar observation might obtain for intellectual history in general—the presumption is that since philosophy is the queen of the sciences, the truth about a given author must ultimately be read by reference to his status and aims as a philosopher. What to us are ancilliary interests (relative to philosophy) —theology, medicine, education—receive altogether less attention, only deemed significant for the light they throw on the philosophical project conceived systematically. Thus in *The Cambridge Companion to Locke* (1994), Vere Chappell correctly states that Locke "did not think of himself as any kind of intellectual specialist. He rarely even used the word 'philosophy,' as many seventeenth-century thinkers did, to signify the whole domain of intellectual endeavour: his favorite word for that was 'science.'" But at the same time, that position has already been compromised by Chappell's need to justify his choice of essays. He asserts that, in effect, Locke also practiced "philosophy in the current academic sense of the term," philosophy conceived of as "a special field of inquiry, marked off, even if not very clearly, from other fields and in particular from the various empirical sciences."[2] Symptomatically, Chappell raises the possibility of reorganizing the internal economy of Locke studies, in which philosophy might be beholden to or belong to other disciplines, only to dismiss it.

One of my central contentions in this essay is that this all marks a way of thinking about doing philosophy about which we tacitly agree, but which in fact does not typify the role of philosophy in the Western tradition, especially as it was (whatever we think today) beholden to rhetoric, the realm of

paideia in Greek education, or the realm of *humanitas* as Cicero and Quintilian translated the ideal. Both the institutional and conceptual hurdles to a corrective view are virtually insurmountable. On the one hand, the self-conceived legitimacy of different departments in the modern university depends on some perceived uniqueness of method or aim. On the other, the value of systematicity as such (in philosophy departments), or of forms of empirical research (in history or the hard sciences) are paradigmatic. The self-doubt currently expressed by language departments stems in part from their having imbibed those prejudices, which seem to give no quarter to the teaching of languages and literature, unless we have recourse to a defense of the literary as a dimension of the aesthetic. I would argue that this paradoxically reinforces the problem, since that conception is itself, historically, the product of the modern divisions of the sciences as they finally hardened at the end of the eighteenth century. And in the current theoretical climate, those departments seem intent on believing, by and large, that philosophy-especially of the post-Romantic continental variety—is indeed the queen of the sciences, and that it has always operated in some mutual hostility to rhetoric.

This is a narrative rigidly reinforced by our teaching practices. The anthologies and textbooks given over to the history of criticism convey the distorted impression that discussion of literary values in the ancient world is epitomized in Plato's attack on the poets in the *Republic*, the *Ion*, perhaps an excerpt from the *Cratylus*, Aristotle's *Poetics*, Horace's *Ars Poetica,* and Longinus's *On the Sublime* (which had no significance until the seventeenth century, though Locke recommended it in *Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman*).[3] Like the ancients themselves, who had an elaborate mythology about *paideia*, and like the humanists from Petrarch on, who rightly saw *paideia* or *humanitas* as a discussion about the totality of knowledge (the *encyclopedia*) that makes us humane political and ethical agents, Locke knew perfectly well that this was simply not the case.

There are yet further difficulties, many of which derive from Locke's perceived status as an "enlightenment" or pre-enlightenment figure. That is, the late seventeenth-century Locke is often rapidly collapsed into a shadow Locke, a Locke fabricated by the reception and inevitable hardening of ideas deemed to be his, a figure, in short, looming large in the Whig tradition. That Locke is indubitably enmeshed in the emergence of Whig self-congratulation produces, in this context, the strangest effect, as if by osmosis. This makes it all the harder to attend to Locke as a strictly historical figure, located in a very specific place and time. Rather, since the fate of Locke is often associated with the fate of liberalism, however conceived, Locke tends to attract a strongly partisan kind of reading, prompted more by the specter of his reputation than the demonstrable form and contexts of his views.

This teleological drift has influenced both specialized Locke scholarship and general histories of education. Thus established Lockeans like Nathan Tarcov and John Yolton approach *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* with a degree of trepidation: their barely disguised determination is to justify attention to this minor tract by reference to more central and putatively authoritative aspects of his career, either the epistemology of the *Essay* (Yolton), or the liberal politics of the *Two Treatises* (Tarcov).[4] In both cases the tendency—massively amplified in histories of education—is also to observe how the hints that attach *Some Thoughts* to serious philosophical tracts like the *Essay* and the *Two Treatises* anticipate modernity, especially, in this context, the progressivism associated with Rousseau, who famously cited Locke as an influence on *Emile*. This drift is epitomized in Tarcov's recent

and useful edition of *Some Thoughts*, in which he writes that "the *Thoughts* is an early articulation of some of the most important presuppositions of modern education" and, moreover, that "they highlight both the foundation for and the problems of education in a liberal political society."[5]

Histories of education, on the other hand, have by and large been even less troubled by the idea that Locke is the first of the moderns. This is explicable partly because education departments have often been curiously segregated from the assumptions and methods of more traditional research departments, so that Locke appears as a figure detached from other kinds of histories or even his other works. And it also seems that twentieth-century histories of education have responded to the proximity of education departments to issues of public policy, in the first century in history in which mass education has seemed both desirable and feasible. In them, it is not always easy to distinguish between the hortatory and descriptive or critical functions of history. The predominant tone is celebratory; the unexamined historiography markedly Whig; and the attitude to educational practice essentially technical, a matter of subjects taught in the schools. I do not mean to imply that those histories are unaware of ancient and Renaissance educational ideals, admirable in their own right; but they almost invariably locate Locke on the cusp of a distinctively modern approach to educational ideals and practice.[6] Locke, as so often, symbolizes a new rationalizing, secularizing, and democratizing, not to mention "psychologizing" thrust associated with the eighteenth century read as "enlightenment." Ellwood P. Cubberley, in a standard study published in 1920, declares that he wishes to chart "the rise, struggle for existence, growth, and recent great expansion of the idea of the improvability of the race and the elevation and emancipation of the individual through education."[7] The nakedness of Cubberley's progressivism may cause us embarrassment, but despite our distance from the 1920s, educational history has not entirely purged itself of similar, if more carefully camouflaged assumptions.

More broadly trained historians seem equally keen to register how exactly Locke is modern and therefore preferable to what went before. Thus Peter Gay, in his edition of *Some Thoughts* for the series "Classics in Education" hails Locke's contribution to "the dawning Enlightenment." We learn that "Locke was the true innovator" because he stressed "the crucial significance of education for the total physical and psychic economy of the human being."[8] And Lawrence Stone, in a somewhat carping review of the Yolton edition of *Some Thoughts,* writes that "Locke was radical, even revolutionary, in his attitude to much of the standard content of elite education [and] he was equally radical about the methods used."[9]

Because they remain inadequately attuned to Locke's profound debt to ancient and humanist ideals of education, part of my thesis is that such views of Locke are substantively incorrect. We will see that Locke's emphasis on physical training recalls archaic Spartan education, which was variously revived in the *paideia* of Isocrates, Xenophon, Cicero, and Quintilian, the central quadrumvirate of all educational theory from the fourth century B.C. until the end of the eighteenth century; and those points where Locke is hailed as progressive almost invariably rehearse an ethical commitment to the highest ideals of ancient and humanist pedagogy. He is nevertheless distinctive in his proposals, but not for the reasons usually educed.

It is also important to recognize that we are talking about educational ideals, not practice. Part

of Stone's false position issues from his view that Locke's radicalism emerges in the contrast between Locke's announced ideals and actual late-seventeenth-century practice. This contrast would make radicals of all the educational theorists since ancient times, precisely those theorists who comprise the canon of educational history, as well as the arsenal on which, directly or otherwise, Locke draws so centrally: Cicero, Quintilian, Erasmus, Vives, Castiglione, Elyot, Agrippa, Montaigne, Mulcaster, Hartlib, Comenius, and a host of others. Stone has partly misconstrued the point of Grafton and Jardine's book on humanist education, since they point to the discrepancy between the ideals of humanist education, and the ossified regime of instruction in classical languages that served, already in the fifteenth century, as a poor substitute. Grafton and Jardine's central argument—which is hardly original to them—is that humanist education acted as an ideological buttress for historically local institutional aims, and that medieval education was no weaker in serving the needs of an earlier regime. But they also remark on the centrality of Cicero's *De Oratore* to the humanist program, a fact that can hardly be overemphasized.[10] In fact, to fail to account for that dialogue in histories of either ancient or modern education amounts to a failure to account for the actual history—as well as self-conception—of rhetoric in the West since the late Hellenistic period, or for the prevailing conceptions of literacy that accompanied it.

If one tradition of seeing Locke celebrates his modernity, an equal and opposite interpretive tradition also elides his debts to Cicero, the single most significant author—along with William Chillingworth—that Locke recommends in *Some Thoughts Concerning Education.*[11] In the suspicions entertained by this essentially Romantic tradition, Locke and all who sail in him harbor a resistance to "literature" or "imaginative writings."[12] This assumption—fully alive in literature departments today, as well as, in its crudest form, popular attitudes—is grounded on a category mistake, where literacy (as understood in the classical and humanist tradition) is segregated from a specialized activity called "literature." It promotes the view that rational and imaginative thought are distinct stances towards the world, and act invariably in mutual competition; and that the late seventeenth century represents a fall away from an earlier, more imaginatively apprehended culture, whether we think of T.S. Eliot's famous dissociation of sensibility, Wordsworth's dismissal of eighteenth-century poetry as mere "Poetic Diction," Matthew Arnold's mockery of the "Age of Prose and Reason," Christopher Hill's belief that English Literature suffered irreparable damage from the defeat of the Good Old Cause, or, in education history specifically, T. W. Baldwin's *William Shakspeare's Small Latine and Lesse Greek*, an enormously influential book for our knowledge of sixteenth-century education in Britain. Capitalizing on the hypercanonization of Shakespeare that is even more a feature of today's academic climate than in 1944, Baldwin bemoans the collapse of humanist pedagogy in the eighteenth century, complaining that, with educational reformers like Brinsley, Hoole, and Clarke, "grammar was again supreme. Teaching was now a dead 'methodical' formalism. The literary spirit of Erasmus had departed. The Renaissance was no more. The Eighteenth Century stood on the threshold."[13]

II. LOCKE AND PAIDEIA AS CIVILIZED DEPORTMENT

In their various ways, all the above accounts of *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* proceed (by comparison to ancient ideals) from a limited idea of education as such. And they effectively insist on a divorce between intellectual history and sociology, reflecting the post-Romantic reorganization of disciplinary knowledge, as well as the primarily technical and logistical cast of modern educational

institutions and planning. What seemingly applies for us from the history of education are ideas about ideas or syllabi themselves, not the complex patterns of behavior, the entire *disposition* of the institution and teachers towards their pupils, which I believe Locke held rightly to form the core of the educational process. Missing in our accounts is something of Clifford Geertz's thick description of cultural attitudes at the end of the seventeenth century, in which behavior, read as a cultural symbology, is philosophy, and in which philosophy belonged to a total reading of human activity which we might denominate *paideia*, *humanitas,* or even civilization as such.[14] The central motives of this assumption about humans in the world are the creation of an ethical and civic person capable of orchestrating, down to the minutest details, a relation to the wider world that constantly re-expresses the moral force of that commitment. That expression is neither a matter purely of a series of learned propositions ("philosophy"); nor is it a purely affective and gestural science ("rhetoric"). In other words, it isn't something we can parse by reference either to the Sophists, who (as Jaeger remarks), though they made Greeks selfconscious about education as an activity, tended to treat it, precisely, as an instrumental acquisition (technical, rather than a matter of *technē*); or by reference to Plato, for whom the ideal philosophical life operates in some considerable (if critically productive) tension with the realm of the contingent.

Rather, it treats education exactly as the ancients ultimately conceived of *paideia*, to which the Sophists and Plato contributed but did not define: acculturating individuals so that they are both civil and civilized. Jaeger's epic account of *Paideia* reveals that what we now call the "literary" produces, in Homer and Hesiod, the very possibility of *paideia* at that almost magical moment when the Greeks invent the idea of education; but it is clear that this is a notion of literacy uninflected by that very recent invention of literature as a specialized and privileged way of knowing, which has also succeeded in making it ancillary to, or a mere decoration for the serious business of life. As Jaeger already makes evident, and as Eric Havelock shows in minute detail, "literature" was the font of all knowledge worth having in the archaic Greek period.[15] Thus the humanists, also seeing human expression of all kinds as artificial, cultivated, the product of scrupulous and sustained human effort, treated all literate expression as having exactly the same heuristic function (poetry, philosophy, history), a function that they saw as exemplary, and as a matter of imitation.[16] The other arts, including politics, medicine, and science, could be said to be posterior to this commitment. The presiding genius of this entire attitude to culture is Cicero, who never tires of remarking that Plato's excellence as a poet renders the distinction between rhetoric and philosophy nugatory. And the recurring icon in almost all the texts that Locke certainly consulted is Alexander, the great man of action, who, having studied with Aristotle, modeled his military exploits on Achilles. Like Xenophon's Cyrus, Alexander's claim to our attention is that he acts only in the public realm, the *vita activa*, which secures the value of the philosophical and literary life too, since they have centrally contributed to the making of such a person.

Because this is a largely forgotten posture towards the integral value of literate training to the entire person, considered as an unaliented private and public agent, most of the work on *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* begs the very questions that we need to ask. What, according to Locke, is "education"? By what means is it achieved, and what does—or should—the final product look like? And, perhaps most crucially, what constitutes rationality as such, and what are its instruments and symptoms in the minds and behavior of pupils as well as in programs for instruction?

First, we must remember something about Locke's own education. Like his great peer at Westminster, John Dryden (born only a year before in 1631), Locke occupies a special place in cultural history, since the degree to which either author appears to anticipate modern attitudes and values is invariably mapped onto an historical re-reading, a mythologization of the ancients. At the methodological level, that is, Locke and Dryden represent a version of the problem of history that constantly resurfaces in Marx's *Capital*, and is also the subject of an hermeneutical conundrum that occupies Thomas Kuhn and Michael McKeon. Archaic languages and possibly incommensurable complexes of attitudes and forms of behavior often reach an historical juncture where they are palpably engaging in some internal syntactical reorganization. In so doing, they can appear to anticipate ways of thinking and acting that define the terms mediating our lives. This double consciousness, so to speak, is always more evident in Dryden than Locke, since the *Essay* in particular, for all its historical plain method, tends to disguise its morphological debts to ancient thought, though these are intellectual and literary habits that Locke would have understood well from Gassendi, whose neo-Epicurean corpuscularianism inspired his mentor Robert Boyle. Put another way, it is because Locke, in crucial areas, is so imaginatively an ancient that he can look so modern. This is a point he himself makes.[17]

Some Thoughts reveals this argumentative and mythical economy more clearly than the *Essay*, since Locke presents it in different ways. It begins with a quotation from Juvenal's tenth satire (which Dryden brilliantly translated), explicitly refers to corpuscular physics, and recommends Chillingworth and Cicero as the pegagogical arbiters of epistemology, style, and ethics. Moreover, in its prescriptions against corporal punishment and the meaningless rote learning of ancient grammar, it is rehearsing one of the most basic *topoi* of humanist educational treatises.[18] But it also probably represents a reaction in part to the most famous whipping headmaster of the seventeenth century, Dr. Busby of Westminster, who caned Greek and Latin almost physically into the backsides of his pupils. Much of what Locke says about the teaching of languages must be read at least in part as a reaction to that experience; but however much he may have suffered, it is obvious that Westminster boys were intellectually marked, as well as psychologically scarred, for life.

To know what Locke means by education in *Some Thoughts* (both as method and product), we need to engage a number of distinct but closely related considerations. The first is almost purely empirical and formal. For all its appearance of randomness, I believe that we should take the structure of the treatise seriously because it clearly calls attention to Locke's priorities and aims. Most commentators seem to approach *Some Thoughts* with some hesitation because they all note that Locke's ideas about educating a young gentleman emerged from his discussions and correspondence with the Clarke family, as Locke's dedication to Edward Clarke itself makes clear. Unlike intellectual historians, however, literary historians of this period are less inclined to see the occasional quality of the piece as compromising its conceptual and argumentative integrity, on the recognition that almost all great neoclassical literature is occasional in impulse. Moreover, the posture of the occasional is endemic to humanist treatises on education in general: Vergerius's *De Ingenuis Moribus* is addressed to Ubertinus of Carrara; Lionardo D'Arezzo's *De Studiis et Literis*, to Baptista Malatesta; Aeneas Sylvius's *De Liberorum Educatione*, to Ladislas, King of Bohemia and Hungary; Battista Guarino's *De Ordine Docendi et Studendi,* to Maffeo Gambara; Samuel Hartlib's *The True and Readie Way to Learne the Latine Tongue,* to Lord Philip, Duke of Stettin; Milton's "Of Education," to Hartlib; and Della Casa's *Galateo*

indulges in the fiction of an older man instructing a younger.

Nor should *Some Thoughts* suffer by comparison to the *Essay*, whose very title, in alluding to Montaigne, legitimates an antisystematic and somewhat associative method. Furthermore, Locke's calling attention to the occasion—like his description of the friends in conversation in the *Essay's* Epistle to the Reader—is a well-worn rhetorical *topos* in humanist treatises like Castiglione's *The Courtier,* which echo the strategy of the single most important text in humanist pedagogy, *De Oratore*, and which itself bespeaks a subtle though real measure of verbal mastery.

Both dialogue and address, which typify the conditions of so many humanist treatises, as well as so much neoclassical literature, including Locke's *Essay,* Dryden's *Essay of Dramatic Poesy,* and Boyle's *Sceptical Chemist*, represent a desire to demonstrate that learning of any kind belongs at the center of human activity, conceived of, properly, as conversation, a form of language-in-action. In this conception of things, education, rather than lurking in the margins, demands the center of attention. It is no belated discipline; it is *par excellence* the discipline that predicates the possibility of any culture recognizable as such. And this is one reason why we must treat superficially different kinds of Renaissance treatises as belonging to the same genre, whether we refer to proposals for school curricula (Erasmus, Sturm, Ascham, Mulcaster, Comenius, Hartlib), for re-examining the nature of knowledge as such (Agrippa, Montaigne), for developing manners in general (Erasmus, Della Casa, Guazzo), or for cultivating ideal courtly or princely virtues (Castiglione, Elyot).

A simple breakdown of the 217 paragraphs of *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* reveals a great deal about Locke's place in this tradition. The tract divides neatly into three sections, the first (paras. 1-30) given over to the importance of bodily health; the second and much the longest (paras. 34-146) given over to what we can only call the government of the child, centrally involving cultivating civility, a good disposition, and a repertoire of desirable social habits; and the final one (paras. 148-216) discusses the actual subjects in the syllabus. The order in which these are presented is itself significant, because fifty of the final sixty paragraphs discuss recognizably academic subjects like reading, writing, geography, mathematics, history, and languages. But paragraphs 196 to 199 discuss, respectively, dancing, music, fencing and riding, and move through a carefully managed transition emphasizing the centrality of virtue and wisdom as educational aims, to a series of final paragraphs (201-211) recommending practical crafts like manual trades in general, as well as gardening and keeping of accounts.

This last transition is only the third of three carefully placed moments in *Some Thoughts*, all of which harp on the same theme. The first (paras. 31-33), echoing similar sentiments in Montaigne, stresses the mutuality of body and soul in the human apprehension of things and capacity to acquire knowledge and virtue (Montaigne writes, in "Of the Education of Children," "I want his outward behavior and social grace and his physical adaptability to be fashioned at the same time with his soul. It is not a soul that is being trained, not a body, but a man; these parts must not be separated").[19] The second transition serves a similar function to the others because, sandwiched between an emphasis on civility and sketching the academic syllabus, it warns, "Learning must be had, but in the second place, as subservient to greater Qualities" (147), values epitomized in the terms "Manners" and "good

Habits" (147).

Given the arrangement of *Some Thoughts,* and the dramatic role of the transitions, it is no accident that we begin the entire treatise with Juvenal promoting "A Sound Mind in a sound Body" (1) and that Locke concludes it with the word "Custom" (217), which connotes the constitutive and acculturating force of habit which Montaigne had earlier anatomized in "Of Custom." Locke has carefully chosen a key moment in Juvenal's tenth satire, in which Juvenal ends the poem by asking the gods for this one benefit in life: as Dryden translates it, "Forgive the Gods the rest, and stand confin'd / To Health of Body, and Content of Mind" (548-49) ("*Orandum est, ut sit mens sana in corpore sano*" [356]). That this represents the kernel of Locke's cultural rather than academic program in *Some Thoughts* becomes clearer when we compare Locke's tract to earlier educational treatises in general as well as to Milton's "Of Education."

In emphasizing physical exercise and comportment, Locke is hardly as modern as Peter Gay imagines. For physical self-regulation is at the very heart of both ancient and humanist notions of virtue. Moreover, the tripartite structure of *Some Thoughts* follows the standard emphases of humanist educational treatises as described by Kenneth Charlton.[20] To stress—as many commentators do—that Locke is as interested in cultivating virtue in the young gentleman as teaching him Greek and Latin is to indulge in a strange half-truth. It can imply that "virtue" is a mental or spiritual attainment merely, and one obtained despite, or separate from, the acquisition of classical languages. But because Locke's notion of virtue is in fact classical, it seeks absolutely to harmonize and integrate physical and mental training.

There are several ways to think of this impulse, which is constantly realized in the humanist treatises too. First, there is the recognition that the single most harmonious moment in Greek education was in early Sparta—more so, according to a myth described both by Jaeger and Marrou, even than fifth century Athens-in which physical and intellectual training ran hand in hand with the creation of Spartan citizens, ready at any moment to serve the state in war. (This ethic, in weaker form, also became the cult of Cincinnatus.) Before she became what Marrou (writing in 1948) depicts as a proto-fascist state, "Sparta was a great cultural centre open to strangers, to the arts, to beauty, to everything it would later pretend to reject."[21] The knightly Homeric ideal had been personal; it now became collective, in which "the *polis* was everything, turning citizens into men." According to Marrou, "It was a moral revolution, in fact, giving rise to a new conception of 'virtue', of spiritual perfection, an *aret'* very different from the Homeric quality of the same name." Marrou expands on the content of this *paideia:* "As in Homeric education, there was the essential Homeric element of music, which was central to the whole culture and acted as a link between its various parts, connected with gymnastics through dancing and through singing with poetry, the only form of literature known to archaic times."[22]

The overwhelming success of Isocratean training in the face of the Platonic challenge is an essential part of the story.[23] For Isocrates, like Cicero his greatest Roman exponent, treated rhetoric and philosophy as one and the same, the language arts as uniformly literary—philosophy or rhetoric, prose or poetry, none enjoyed a singular status in this regime—and the purpose of *paideia* or *humanitas,* as the creation of ethically effective individuals contributing to the health of the body politic.

Epistemologically, the departure from Plato is marked, since the Isocratean assumption is that humans only inhabit the realm of the contingent, such that effective comportment becomes a matter of constant, ethically motivated adjustments to circumstance. Isocrates indeed responds to the Platonic charge that Sophistic rhetoric is a merely formal art, since no solely formal training, of the kind associated with Gorgias, can adequately or responsibly accommodate the fluctuations of experience. For the same reasons, the Isocratean tradition—which remains the central conception of education until the eighteenth century—inasmuch as it incorporates an active ideal, remains suspicious of the sense in which Greek education had become increasingly bookish and academic. It is this narrowly academic potential in Platonic philosophy to which Socrates's two other great disciples object, namely Isocrates and Xenophon. According to Jaeger, the force of Isocrates's criticism prompted Plato to adjust his aims, in the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws*, to something closer to that broader ideal; so that it is possible to treat Plato's praise of Isocrates at the end of the *Phaedrus* as unironic.[24] Like Isocrates, Xenophon treats as empty all learning that remains unactualized in public life, and so his *Cyro-Paideia* and *On the Spartan Constitution* represent glorifications of an ethical program that Cicero tried to realize in Roman culture.[25]

For the purposes of this essay, and for their consequences for humanistic educational treatises, the Isocratean, Xenophonic, and Ciceronian ideals have distinct implications for ideas about physical comportment, about all of which Locke is perfectly cognizant. For in gearing *paideia* to a Greece in the process of self-mutilation, Isocrates wished in the *Panegyricus* to recall Greeks to their common national past by creating a parallel between Greek athleticism and the intellectual life; and in the *Aereopagiticus* he reminds his audience of early Athenian education, in which personal excellence is expressed in a combined program of "riding, gymnastics, hunting, and intellectual exercise (*philosophia*)."[26] Jaeger summarizes the Isocratean ideal, to which Xenophon was also finely attuned:

> Isocates assumes that all higher education of the intellect depends on cultivating our ability to understand one another. It is not an accumulation of factual knowledge in any sphere; it is concerned with the forces that hold society together. These are summed up in the word *logos*. Higher education means education to the use of speech in this sense—speech full of meaning, about essential affairs of the life of society, which were called by the Greeks 'the affairs of the polis, ta politika' or 'politics.' Man is a being composed of soul and body. Both his soul and body need care. That is why bygone generations created a dual system, gymnastics and intellectual education. Here Isocrates does not call the latter music, as was customary, but philosophy, 'the love of wisdom'—for, as a Greek, he naturally understood the relation of poetry and the other 'musical' arts to the formation of the spirit. Both of them naturally consist of *gymnasiai*, exercises. The trainer teaches the positions which have been worked out for wrestling. The teacher of philosophy explains the fundamental patterns used by the logos.[27]

If we simply take the three most important sixteenth-century English educational theorists—Thomas Elyot, Roger Ascham, and Richard Mulcaster—we will find that it is precisely this Isocratean and Xenophonic description of the harmonious, graceful, ethically persuasive personality to which they are

committed. The gymnastic account of education follows Castiglione closely, also inasmuch as Castiglione constantly reminds his readers of the ancient genealogies authorizing the aesthetic he recommends, especially in Book I of *The Courtier*. In fact, we could say that the graceful individual, who (in Hoby's translation) "ought to accompany all his doinges, gestures, demeaners, finally all his mocions with a grace [which] he put for a sauce for every thing, without the which all his other properties and good condicions were litle worth,"[28] combines gymnastic education with a rhetorical conception of agency that, like Demosthenes, Cicero, and Quintillian, regards *actio* or delivery as the crown of oratory.

This combination of *actio* with (specifically) dancing becomes the object of Agrippa von Nettesheim's encyclopedic, sceptical, and satirical survey of knowledge which in so many ways anticipates Montaigne's similar project.[29] Here dancing is read meta-poetically, in effect, in that too exaggerated a physical display is to be avoided as hyperbolic, but that an appropriate and apt attention to bodily motion helps to orchestrate a total ethical effect. Thus Agrippa considers four kinds of dancing: "Dancing at Balls," which he condemns as being overly artful; "Gladiatory Dancing," which he dismisses as too violent; "Stage-Dancing," which was design'd for Imitation and Demonstration, whereby to explain things conceiv'd in the minde, by the gestures of the body; so cleerly and perspicuously representing manners and affections, that the Spectator shall understand the Player by the motion of his body, though he say not a word."[30] And, finally, "Rhetorism," which Agrippa describes as follows:

> There was also a Rhetorical Gesticulation, not much differing from Stage-Action, but more careless, which Socrates, Plato, Cicero, and Quintilian, and most of the Stoicks have deem'd most necessary and commendable in a Rhetorician, and an Orator; as teaching a graceful gesture of the Body, and Composure of the Countenance: seeing that the vigour of the Eye, the sound of the Voice, accommodated to the signification of Words and Sentences, together with a decent motion of the Body, and management of the Countenance, adde much to the force and efficacy of Oration.[31]

Speech only becomes real in its enactment in and through the human body; so that to train the body harmoniously from youth is to refine the central discursive medium by which we express ourselves. As James Cleland puts it in *HĒRŌ-PAIDEIA* (1607), "I adde unto the Theoricke of your studie a particular practice of good manners; without the which al that you can learne, seemes to be no better than a faire and beautiful Image without life and motion," and for this reason, he avers, Agesilaus sent Xenophon into Sparta, "not to learne *Rhetoricke*, or *Logicke*, but the best science in the world, which is to knowe how to obay, and to have skil how to commande."[32] Ruth Kelso remarks in summary that "the renaissance ideal of education combined training of the mind with training of the body," creating a gentlemanly ideal that was still intact in Burke's description of 1791.[33]

Thus the gymnastic grounds of education appear early and often in Elyot, Ascham, and Mulcaster. Almost half of Book I of *The Book Named the Governor* (1531) is given over to the proper exercises for a gentleman, including four chapters on dancing. That Elyot moves from hunting to dancing should already imply the influence of Xenophon, whose book on hunting was reported Varro's favorite, and should prepare us for Elyot attaching dancing to Spartan virtue:

> Licurgus, that gaue first lawes to the Lacedemones (a people in Grece), ordayned that the children there shulde be taught as diligently to daunce in armure, as to fight. And that in time of warres, they shulde meue them in bataile againe their enemies in fourme and maner of daunsinge.[34]

Dancing is accordingly the pastime that best refines our prudence:

> Now by cause ther is no passe tyme to be compared to that, wherein may be founden both recreation and meditation of vertue, I haue amonge all honest passe times, wherein is exercise of the body, noted daunsinge to be of an excellent utilitie, comprehendinge in it wonderfull figures, or, as the grekes do calle them, Ideae, of vertues and noble qualities, and specially of the commodiouse vertue called prudence, whom Tulli defineth to be the knowldge of all thinges whiche ought to be desired and folowed, and also of them whiche oughte to be fledde from or exchewed.[35]

Similarly, profusely citing Cicero, Isocrates, and Xenophon (as well as Johann Sturm), Ascham's *The Schoolmaster* (1570) devotes almost as much space to the general conditions favoring education as he does to the learning of Latin. "The bringing up of youth," is the subject of the first part, and clearly a matter of comportment in general, one summed up in Isocrates's maxim: "Ean ēs philomathēs, esē polumathēs, which, excellently said in Greek, is thus rudely in English: 'If thou lovest learning, thou shalt attain to much learning'."[36] Later, Ascham paraphrases the Areopagiticus thus:

> ...it may be a greater wonder, but a greater shame, to us Christian men to understand what a heathen writer, Isocrates, doth leave in memory of writing concerning the care that the noble city of Athens had to bring up their youth in honest company and virtuous discipline; whose talk in Greek is to this effect in English:
>
> > The city was not more careful to see their children well taught than to see their young men well governed, which they brought to pass not so much by common law as by private discipline. . . . Therefore in schools of singing and dancing, and other honest exercises, governors were appointed, more diligent to oversee their good manners than their masters were to teach them any learning.[37]

Finally, Richard Mulcaster's *Positions Concerning the Training Up of Children* (1581) devotes chapters six to thirty-five (out of forty-five) not only to proper exercises for young gentlefolk but treats them as a similar order of training as learning decorously to govern speech. These proportions also characterise Della Casa's *Galateo*, though it is most often cited in histories of manners alone. As a symptom of how far educational historians until quite recently have failed to appreciate the constitutive role of gymnastic *paideia* in the ancient and humanist conception of personality, we have only to look at the edition prepared for the "Classics in Education" series, published in 1971. For there, the editor has simply excised the very chapters in which bodily exercise is so minutely discussed.[38]

III. LOCKE'S SPECIFICITY

I have been arguing at some length that, in his emphasis on manners and virtue achieved largely through a gymnastic regime, Locke in no ways departs from established precedent. For his recommendation that children should not be coddled, and that teachers need to attend to the particular condition of their charges, Locke is equally indebted to earlier prescriptions (this is the significance of Locke's language of husbandry, for example). But nevertheless, there are clear indications, in what Locke recommends, and how he recommends it, of his historical specificity: it is not as if *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* simply typifies humanist education. So I will close by pointing to two ways in which Locke is unusual.

First, it is worth considering Locke's relationship to Milton's "Of Education," which it is difficult to believe he did not know.[39] Milton's essay certainly stands in some family relation to Locke, because it is itself presented as an occasional epistle, and because it is addressed to Samuel Harlib, himself a close friend of Milton, Robert Boyle, and John Evelyn, as well as one of that indefatigable trio of seventeenth-century educational reformers which included Jan Amos Comenius, whose works Locke knew and owned.[40] What is at stake is starkly revealed both by Locke's reordering of the discussion and the relative emphasis given to physical exercise and bodily health. As a good humanist, and like Locke, Milton stresses the centrality of virtue as the ethical aim of education. But this is, for him, a disposition achieved as fully by the academic syllabus to which he devotes two-thirds of his energy, as by the regimen of exercise with which he concludes, and in which the explicitly Spartan arts of fencing, wrestling, and riding figure prominently.

Comparing Milton and Locke in this way, I would argue, helps us to calibrate what is at stake for Locke, because we witness a subtle but proportional reordering of the relations between physical activity and the academic syllabus. That ratio clearly carries with it a tremendous symbolic and ethical charge for both writers. John Marshall remarks that Locke is centrally engaged in the education of a gentleman: that is, his focus is not on general views of childhood as such, but on the creation of a specific social type, towards which all of his recommendations are geared.[41] Indeed, Locke remarks at the end of *Some Thoughts* that he would propose different courses of education—or "Breeding"—for a king, a nobleman, and a gentleman, and none at all for a peasant [217].

And Locke's vision for gentlemanly conduct is what locates it precisely in its moment. This is a vision that we can interpret by reference to three aspects of Locke's argument: his re-reading of classical *paideia*; his appropriation and revision of conduct and educational literature for young gentlemen; and his own specifically post-Harveian interest in bodily health. Three different traditions of molding character for social and political action come together in this text, and signal a critical juncture in what Norbert Elias calls the civilizing process. Indeed the shift from Milton's educational priorities to Locke's reveals a number of shifts of the order described by Elias, in that Milton's views are strictly republican and minimalist, on the one hand, and yet bound up with a residually aristocratic and intellectual ideal of virtue, on the other. Like Marrou, Elias (writing between 1936 and 1939) regards German *Kultur* as focussed on the individual achievement of certain intellectual properties which also tend to express national rather than cosmopolitan values. *Civilité,* on the other hand, is an Anglo-French invention

denoting something more broadly dispositional, a quality of comportment or deportment which neither advertises nor depends on technical training, yet must be acquired, and reinforced by the network of behavioral assumptions, cues, and pressures that Locke, like Montaigne and Hume, describes as "habit" or "custom."[42] Locke, in short, marks a very specific moment when the eighteenth-century ideal of the gentleman, whose relations to the military origins of the gymnasium are highly mediated, is being invented.

The ancient presiding genius of this program in training civil gentlemen is of course Cicero, and not only because, as John Marshall writes, *De Officiis* becomes the gentleman's ethical primer.[43] It is also because Cicero stands as the central Roman—and not accidentally republican—figure whose rhetorical treatises are the means by which we, like all the great humanists, can cultivate style; and who also remains the greatest single Roman theorist attached to a specific Isocratean vision of Greek education. This tradition calculatedly harmonizes physical with intellectual training, the arts of speech and the craft of ethics and politics. It eschews at once the idealism implicit in Plato, and the "cynical pragmatism" of the Sophists.[44] This is a coherence aimed at in theory in Greek education, but only briefly enjoyed in Sparta. The Romans, on the other hand, never valued that conjunction, so that Cicero's hopes for a practical revival of the Greek gymnasium were stillborn. Like the later Spartans, the Romans only valued physical training if it served military excellence, and regarded Greek athletics as decadent not least because they were conducted in the nude, and were associated with a paedophilic culture. Thus Locke's implied disagreement with Milton occurs exactly at the point where his valuation of Spartan life differs from the older and more openly militant radical.

Throughout *Some Thoughts*, Locke is recommending a balance between a sensitive masculinity, and a rugged but unsadistic physical discipline. Too great an emphasis on polish, on mere style consistently courts the twin vices of luxury and effeminacy; a purely Spartan regime brutalizes the sensibility of the young gentlemen. So that Locke recommends throughout a physical regime that we would today think of as Spartan, but much like the masculine minimalism of English public schools, the purpose being to create an athletic relationship between bodily and mental exercise. He explicitly rejects, however, the Lacedemonian model as normative, for, having admitted that "the Example of *Sparta* does sufficiently shew" "How much Education may reconcile young People to Pain, and Sufferance," he insists that "I am not so foolish to propose the Lacedaemonian Discipline in our Age, or Constitution" (115).

It is the ancients' and humanists' profoundly rhetorical view of culture as a whole that Locke is here attempting both to renew and revise. When realized in the comportment of the young gentleman, this Locke defines as "a due and free composure of Language and Looks, Motion, Posture, Place, &c. suited to Persons and Occasions, [which] can be learn'd only by Habit and Use" (93). So that for him, dancing is always preferable to music, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other. Dancing harmonizes intellect, sensibility, and the body. Music idealizes and abstracts our experience of ourselves, or privileges the mental faculties over the rest of what makes us human. Dancing orchestrates and polishes our somatic consciousness without militarizing it, and for that very reason, children should be disciplined by stern countenances rather than the rod.

His objection to romance is similarly grounded, and has nothing to do with its "imaginative" quali-

ties, since such a means of valuing art is a more recent historical invention. Locke nevertheless values music as a way of thinking about the harmony of "civil Conversation," a "genteel Carriage," and "manly Thoughts," (70) because he speaks of this coherence in classical terms, as expressing a character "*in tune*" (74; 75). He elaborates: "the Carriage is not as it should be, till it is become Natural in every Part; falling, as Skilful Musicians Fingers do, into Harmonious Order without Care and without Thought" (93).

Second, Locke's medical training reveals itself not only in obvious concerns with the internal economy of the body, but more interestingly in the view that the body in some sense expresses the state (a view found of course in the advice and conduct literature too). This accompanies the notion that in governing or managing the body, we directly shape the mind, for the body and the mind share constitutions that are analogically and causally connected. To train the body into elegance is also to form an elegant mind: the one "constitution" affects the other; and also secures the possibility of a constitutionally elegant society.

The analogy between the human body and the body politic is of course ancient; but what again makes *Some Thoughts* a creature of its own time is that Locke reads the relation between body and mind through his specifically post-Harveian training. Dancing renders the mind elegant partly because the Harveian model allows body and mind to be imagined as mutual, coherent, and phsysiologically linked systems. Locke seems to be inhabiting an imaginative space somewhere between analogy (in which disparate images bear some purely heuristic relation to each other), and mechanical causality (by which bodily activity could have some direct and immediate effect on the postures of the mind). *Some Thoughts* begins by announcing its Harveian pedigree, since the first paragraphs think of health through metaphors of fluid processes; paragraph eight alludes to the blood and pulse; and paragraph twelve specifically introduces circulation. And not only the title, but much of the argument *Of the Conduct of the Understanding* presses home the mutuality of body and mind. Locke writes, for example:

> . . . the faculties of our souls are improved and made useful to us just after the same manner as our bodies are. Would you have a man write or paint, dance or fence well, or perform any other manual operation dextrously and with ease; let him have ever so much vigour and activity, suppleness and address naturally, yet nobody expects this from him, unless he has been used to it, and has employed time and pains in fashioning and forming his hand, or outward parts, to these motions. Just so it is in the mind: would you have a man reason well, you must use him to it betimes, exercise his mind in observing the connexion of ideas, and following them in train.[46]

Some Thoughts Concerning Education is evidently one arena within which Locke is trying to overcome or reimagine the mind-body problem. Committing himself to the effectiveness of the gymnastic regime in education, an ancient tradition, he never questions that physical dressage will render the mind both fit and elegant. Because the challenge here is just as much imaginative as philosophical, we see him experimenting with various ways of thinking about how bodily and mental training must be one and the same, reaching for alluring but only half-conceived metaphors, which seem just as much literal as heuristic. Thus because they both seem to promise some means of ensuring that what occurs at

the surface of the body will penetrate into the consciousness—itself almost imagined as a space slightly below the skin or tissue—Locke chooses the language of "imprinting" and of "tincture." The first of course populates the *Essay*, and works as one means of describing how corpuscular action, which is physical, can produce ideas, which are mental: in printing, we all know, words "arrive" on the page by passing into, almost through the membrane of the paper. Printed words themselves also inhabit a happy junction of the ideational and physical.[47] "Tincture" seems to serve a similar purpose, but via pharmacology, which itself bears a close relationship to ancient conceptions of *paideia*.[48] In *Some Thoughts*, Locke writes that "the tincture of Company sinks deeper than the out-side" (146). Johnson's definition of this term emphasizes its pharmacological resonance, to which Locke, as doctor, is clearly alive, since he speaks, in *The Conduct of the Understanding* about how we might "imbibe" a tincture.[49]

A brief glance at Jean Gailhard's *The Compleat Gentleman: Or Directions for the Education of Youth, As to their Breeding at Home and Travelling Abroad* (1678) reveals the exactness of Locke's place in time, for Gailhard's recommendations are, like Locke's, strongly indebted to the humanist tradition. The difference emerges exactly at the point of physiology. Gailhard's conception of the body is still fully Galenic: for him the effect of exercise is not so much to create coherent habits, as to adjust the various humors in the body. Both Locke and Gailhard desire to fashion an elegant product, but each sees differently the physiological process by which this is achieved. It is thus difficult to imagine a writer schooled in an Aristotelian and Galenic tradition writing, as Locke does, of the "Physiognomy of the Mind":

> . . . the distinguishing Characters of the Face, and the Lineaments of the Body grow more plain and visible with Time and Age, but the peculiar Physiognomy of the Mind is most discernable in Children, before Art and Cunning hath taught them to hide their Deformities, and conceal their ill inclinations under a dissembled out-side. (101)

And last, that Locke ends his course of education with references to travel, a lifelong interest, reveals the relationship between *Some Thoughts* and his other works. For this treatise is premised on two of the foundational devices of the *Essay* and *Two Treatises of Government*, namely the conventional and contractual nature of human life, and the role of labor. In the *Essay*, the mind is more a workshop and storehouse than a blank slate, one in which mental labor creates those artificial and conventional media of knowledge like complex ideas and subsequently words. In the *Two Treatises* we are the product of God's labor, which is why we cannot alienate ourselves into slavery, and by analogy, we possess those things we make with our own bodies, so that Locke begins his account of property with a distinction between use and exchange value. Finally, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* supposes the central value of labor, which Locke characterizes as the forming of habit and disposition, or of husbandry whose first object of reform is the human body.

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NOTES

* This essay is in memory of Carol Kay. Those who knew her will recognize the aptness of the subject, for Carol embodied an extraordinary intellectual, moral, and personal coherence. In this sense, she was a true Ciceronian. I also have debts to Larry Green, Bob Montgomery, and Myron Simon for pertinent suggestions.

1. See for example, John Marshall, *John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994); Michael Ayers, *Locke*, 2 vols. (London: Routledge,, 1991); Richard Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's "Two Treatises of Government* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1986); James Tully, *A Discourse on Property* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1980); Michael Alexander, *Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles: Locke and Boyle on the External World* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985); William Spellman, *John Locke and the Problem of Depravity* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988). Obviously, this is a highly selective list.

2. Vere Chappell, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Locke* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994), 1.

3. John Locke, *Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman*, in *The Works of John Locke*, 10 vols. (London: T. Tegg et. al, 1823), III: 293. Citations from *Of the Conduct of the Understanding* are also from this edition.

4. See John Yolton, *John Locke and Education* (New York: Random House, 1971), published for the series, "Studies in the Western Educational Tradition"; as well as John and Jean Yolton's introduction to their edition of *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); Nathan Tarcov, *Locke's Education for Liberty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

5. John Locke, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education and The Conduct of the Understanding*, ed. Ruth W. Grant and Nathan Tarcov (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), vii.

6. See for example, Ellwood P. Cubberley, *The History of Education: Educational Practice and Progress Considered as a Phase of the Development and Spread of Western Civilization* (Cambridge, MA: Riverside, 1920), 433, where Cubberley writes, "Locke was essentially the founder of modern psychology"; John William Anderson, *A Short History of Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), 206, where Anderson stresses Locke's effect on Rousseau; Paul Monroe, *A Text-Book in the History of Education* (New York: Macmillan, 1923), 522: "The sensationalism of Locke became the philosophical basis of the naturalism of Rousseau"; James Mulhern, *A History of Education: A Social Interpretation* (New York: Ronald, 1959), 341, where Mulhern argues that Locke initiates a secular, utilitarian, and naturalistic strain. This is not to say that a number of histories do not respect the internal economy of Locke's argument and aims, among them William Boyd, *The History of Western Education* (1921; 6th ed. London: A. C. Black, 1952), 273ff.; Luella Cole, *A History of Education: Socrates to Montessori* (1950; rpt. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), 626, though Cole sees Locke as typifying a "disciplinary" approach to education; H. G. Good, *A History of Western*

Education (1947; 2nd ed. New York: Macmillan, 1960), 184ff. Good nicely traces Locke's debt to Comenius, but still asserts that he "devoted more than half his *Thoughts* to learning" (198); S. E. Frost and Kenneth P. Bailey, *Historical and Philosophical Foundations of Western Education* (1966; 2nd ed. Columbus: Merrill, 1973), in which the authors judge Locke very sensitively (see 292-97); James Bowen, *A History of Western Education. Vol III: The Modern West. Europe and the New World* (London: Methuen, 1981), 176-78. Bowen's is the most anthropological account of Locke to date.

7. Cubberley, *History of Education*, viii.

8. Peter Gay, ed. *John Locke on Education* (New York: Teachers College, 1964), 10; 4.

9. Lawrence Stone, "Radical Wisdom for Elite Boys," *Times Literary Supplement*, 535, (2-8 March 1990), 229.

10. Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, *From Humanism to the Humanities: Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth-and Sixteenth-Century Europe* (London: Duckworth, 1986). For the discrepancy between theory and practice, see Boyd, *History of Western Education*, 211; and for the ideological function of humanist education, see Kenneth Charlton, *Education in Renaissance England* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), 81-84. Much of what Grafton and Jardine argue can be found in William Harrison Woodward, *Vittorino da Feltre and Other Humanist Educators* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921)and his *Studies in Education during the Age of the Renaissance, 1400-1600* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1906). Woodward remains the standard work on early Renaissance education.

11. Cicero reappears throughout *Some Thoughts concerning Education*. In the text, I cite paragraph numbers from the Yolton edition of Locke's *Some Thoughts*, cited above. For example, Locke writes, "if you would have your Son *Reason well*, let him read *Chillingworth*; and if you would have him speak well, let him be conversant in *Tully*, to give him the true *Idea* of *Eloquence*" (188). In *Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman*, Locke writes that "the art of speaking well consists chiefly in two things, viz. Perspicuity and right reasoning." To cultivate right reasoning, Locke again recommends Chillingworth, who epitomizes the realm of probability and contingency that so defines the *Essay*; and to cultivate perspicuity ("the using of proper terms for the ideas or thoughts [a man] would have pass from his own mind into that of another man"), we should read Tillotson. "But if any one hath a mind to consult the masters in the art of speaking and writing; he may find in Tully De Oratore, and another treatise of his called Orator; and in Quintilian's Institutions, and Boileau's Traite du Sublime, instructions concerning this and the other parts of speaking well" (*Works*, III: 294-95).

12. See for example, Boyd, *History of Western Education*, in which Boyd assesses Locke fairly, except to say that his curriculum "is narrow, as judged by the standards of culture, in excluding literature and the other great aesthetic interests" (277). In "John Locke's Images of Childhood: Early Eighteenth-Century Responses to *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*" (*Eighteenth-Century Studies* 17 [1983-84]: 139-55), Margaret J. M. Ezell makes a similar charge. Locke, we hear, distrusted the "fine arts," music, and "imaginative writings" like romances (143). Following Raymond Williams,

Culture and Society, 1780-1950 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), one of my main contentions is that these alienated and specialized approaches to art and "culture" are the consequences of post-romantic and post-industrial ideology and institutions, which have also crated the shape of modern disciplines in the academy. The rhetorical ideal of culture to which Locke belonged presents, I would argue, a completely imaginative attitude to human activity as a whole. This is the pervasive force of *paideia*.

13. T. W. Baldwin, *William Shakespeare's Small Latine and Lesse Greeke*, 2 vols. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1944), I: 454. Elsewhere Baldwin continues his polemic against what he calls the "ultra-modern" (I: 463): "the eighteenth century had no rhythm, only metre; no ears, only fingers. . . . the sixteenth century . . . planned a renaissance and attained it. The eighteenth century planned what it considered to be Classicism and attained it" (I: 462).

14. As Jaeger puts it, anticipating Elias: "Culture [as opposed to education conceived narrowly] is shown in the whole man—both in his external appearance and conduct, and in his inner nature. Both the outer and the inner man are deliberately produced, by a conscious process of selection and discipline which Plato compares to the breeding of good dogs" (*Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, 3 vols. [New York: Oxford University Press, 1965], I: 3-4).

15. See Jaeger, *Paideia*, Vol. I, for the chapters on Homer especially, but in particular I: 35-37; also Eric Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963).

16. The point can be made time and again by looking at the implied organization of knowledge in the catalogue of topics dealt with in educational treatises and conduct books, and in the order in which they are presented. The point is particularly clear in Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim's sceptical and fideistic appraisal of all human knowledge in *Of the Vanitie and Uncertaintie of the Arts and Sciences* (London, 1569). In *The Compleat Gentleman* (London, 1678), Jean Gailhard writes, "Amongst *Grecians*, when Sciences first of all came out of *Egypt*, the bravest wits suffered to be called *Magi sōphoi* Wisemen; then after some proficiency with *Pythagoras*, they took the name of *philosōphoi* Philosophers, friends or lovers of Wisdom; and when they were come to a higher pitch of learning, they could with *Socrates* be called *Rhetores*, Speakers, or men discoursing of Wisdom: that is, the more learned they did grow, the better they knew their ignorance" (26).

17. In *Of the Conduct of the Understanding*, Locke writes:

> There is another partiality very commonly observable in men of study;and that is a fantastical and wild attributing all knowledge to the ancients alone, or to the moderns. This raving upon antiquity in matter of poetry, Horace has wittily described and exposed in one of his satires. The same sort of madness may be found in reference to all the other sciences. . . . Others, with a like extravagancy, contemn all that the ancients have left us, and, being taken with the modern inventions and discoveries, lay by all that went before, as if whatever is called old must have the decay of time upon it, and truth, too, were liable to mould and rottenness" (*Works*, III: 246).

18. See Woodward, *Vittorino da Feltre*, 34-36. Also James Cleland, *HĒRŌ-PAIDEIA*, Intro. Max Molyneux (New York: Scholar's Facsimiles, 1948), xxxix: "Both [Montaigne] and Cleland considered the development of a pupil's judgement of much greater importance than the cramming of his memory."

19. Donald Frame, trans. *The Complete Essays of Montaigne* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 122.

20. Charlton, *Education in Renaissance England*, 82: "The new education as outlined in the literature of the day had, in fact, three parts to its curriculum. First were the 'exercises,' . . . the carry-over of the knightly ideal, horsemanship, skill in the use of arms, wrestling, dancing and so on. Second came the predominantly Italian emphasis on 'manners,' and third, the newest aspect, were the 'studies,' in moral and political philosophy, history, law, modern languages, mathematics, astronomy."

21. H. I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity* (1948; rpt. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956), 15. Or as Jaegr puts it, "Sparta has an unchallengeable place in the history of education. Her most characteristic achievement was her state; and the Spartan state is the first which can be called, in the largest sense, an educational force" (*Paideia*, I: 79).

22. Marrou, *History*, 16-17.

23. See Marrou, *History*, 79: "there is no doubt that Isocrates has one claim to fame . . . as the supreme master of oratorical culture, the literary kind of education that was to become the predominant feature of the classical tradition."

24. Jaeger, *Paideia*, III: 184.

25. See Stanley F. Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome: From the Elder Cato to the Younger Pliny* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); and Aubrey Gwynn, *Roman Education from Cicero to Quintilian* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1926). Gwynn writes, for example, "the educational purpose of Isocrates demands closer attention: partly for its intrinsic interest, partly because of its immense and abiding influence on Graeco-Roman education" (46). He also reports that Xenophon remained Scipio's lifelong favorite (42).

26. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I: 121.

27. *Ibid.*, 144.

28. Count Baldassare Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier*, ed. Virginia Cox (London: Dent, 1994), 51.

29. We have no record of Locke's owning many of the standard educational treatises and guides for gentlemen, but he did own Agrippa. See John Harrison and Peter Laslett, *The Library of John Locke* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), Item #39.

30. The standard sixteenth-century translation of Agrippa seems to be Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim, *Of the Vanitie and Uncertaintie of the Arts and Sciences* (London, 1569), but I quote from *The Vanity of Arts and Sciences* (London, 1676), 63.

31. Agrippa, *Vanity*, 65.

32. James Cleland, *HĒRŌ-PAIDEIA, Or, The Institution of a Young Noble Man* (London, 1607), 163; 62.

33. Ruth Kelso, *The Doctrine of the English Gentleman in the Sixteenth Century* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1929), 149; 161. Woodward records that the early humanist Viitorino da Feltre practiced gymnastic himself: "The careful practice of gymnastic had given him a peculiar suppleness and grace of movement" (Woodward, *Vittorino da Feltre*, 20).

34. Sir Thomas Elyot, *The Boke Named the Governour* (London: Dent, 1907), 90.

35. *Ibid.*, 96.

36. Roger Ascham, *The Schoolmaster*, ed. Lawrence V. Ryan (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1967), 29.

37. *Ibid.*, 47.

38. Compare: Richard Mulcaster, *Positions For the Training up of Children* (London, 1581), with Mulcaster, *Positions*, Abridged and ed. Richard DeMolen (New York: Teachers College Press, 1971).

39. Locke owned three different Milton volumes. See Harrison and Laslett, *Library*, Item ##1993-1994a.

40. For Comenius and Hartlib, see Harrison and Laslett, *Library*, Item ##819-820; 1392-1395.

41. Marshall, *Locke*, 317.

42. Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 3-7; 56-64.

43. Marshall, *Locke*, 303-15.

44. The depiction of the Sophists I borrow from Marrou, *History*, 51.

45. See Boyd, *History of Western Education*, 68: "Gymnastics, dancing, music, science and philosophy, in so far as they were cultivated at all, were either reduced to mere side pursuits incidental to the study of literature and oratory, or were taught privately outside the schools."

46. Locke, *Works*, III: 219-20.

47. It is probably for this reason that Locke adopts the humanist view that Latin can be best learned in its early stages by using Aesop, which encourages a strangely physicalized idea of language. This is very much the drift of Samuel Hartlib's *The True and Readie Way to Learne the Latine Tongue* (London, 1656).

48. See for example, Jaeger, *Paideia*, III, Ch. 1, "Greek Medicine as Paideia."

49. Locke, *Works*, III: 270. Interestingly, in her proposals for female education, Bathsua Makin uses "Tincture" in just this way. She writes:

> So great is the force of the first Tincture any thing takes, whether good, or bad. As plants in gardens excel those, that grow wild; or as Brutes, by due Management (Witness the Philosophers Dogs [referring to Xenophon]) are much altered: So Men, by liberal Education, are much better'd, as to intellectuals and morals.Bathsua Makin, *An Essay to Revive the Antient Education of Gentlewomen* (London, 1673), 7.

50. Jean Gailhard, *The Compleat Gentleman* (London, 1678), 64-65. This is also true of Henry Peacham's *The Compleat Gentleman* (London, 1634). Discussing a gentleman's carriage," Peacham comments: "And albeit true it is that *Galen* saith, we are commonly beholden for the disposition of our minds, to the Temperature of our bodies, yet much lyeth in our power to keepe that fount form empoisoning, by taking heed to our selves" (221).

II

WOMEN OF ACHIEVEMENT

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RECOLLECTIONS OF CAROL KAY

CLAUDIA L. JOHNSON

Like everyone who admired and loved Carol Kay, I am haunted by her voice—intense, animated, melodious in its way, and often admonitory. My first personal encounter with Carol's voice dates back to a conversation about fat. Her eyes widened as she nodded with an emphatic vigor that seemed to implicate her entire body, and she expanded with a sense of the importance of a subject which, as the next twenty some years taught me, could always call forth her eloquence and her high humor. "There is no decent pastrami in Princeton," she complained. "It's the fat, the fat. Good pastrami needs the fat, it's that simple. Don't you agree?" she asked, wheeling from the steamy slices at the sandwich counter and turning upon me with her wide and piercing eyes. Although I was not without opinions on this subject, I was dumbstruck by her definiteness—opinion, opinionation being categories of lively interest to her. She did not wait for my answer, but launched into spellbinding talk—part harangue, part rhapsody—that touched by turns upon the glories of food, movies (Carol recited *Sleeper*'s hilarious lines with gusto), politics, and eighteenth-century literature, particularly about that shockingly great talker and eater she loved so much, Samuel Johnson.

It did not matter that I could scarcely get in a word. The brilliance and the elegance of her talk put me in the grips of the sublime: passionate, irregular, nervous in the eighteenth-century sense, perverse, boundless (her voice coursed irrepressibly over endstops) and utterly distinctive, utterly her own. I was arrested, dazzled, elated all at once. Far from wanting her to pause so that I could add something, I simply wanted to hear more of this strange, compelling, invigorating talk. And like everyone who admired and loved Carol, I want to hear more of that talk now too. I sometimes hallucinate her voice, revisiting her book, papers and our marathon telephone conversations—so many of which (about feminism, secular Jewishness, about eighteenth-century scholarship, about chronic illness, about political action, about the death of parents, about the history of the novel) were real events in my life—in the sad effort to recover some new stash of words overlooked or half-forgotten, as if these could conjure the brave and trenchant intelligence of her living voice once again.

The peculiar cruelty of Carol's final illness was that she could not speak for so long.

I met Carol when I was a young graduate student and she a young Assistant Professor at Princeton University in the mid 1970s, and I never stopped to look at her as a teacher, a counselor, and a mentor. I doubt whether people who knew Carol solely as a colleague or peer can fully appreciate the warmth and generosity that marked her as a teacher. In this relationship, everything that could seem formidable about her conversation was mollified by solicitude. All of her students recollect that having a teacher so

exacting and so engaged was a little scary; and precisely because of her interest in the work of her students was so genuine—I never before or since encountered a teacher who talked about her students' projects so often or with such respect—the prospect of disappointing her was terrible. But Carol was very willing to be pleased. She challenged you to be rigorous, and the sinewiness of her arguments and the pithiness of her commentary showed you how you might begin to be so. But she also knew that good work takes time, and she ceded you the time and space necessary to work through your mistakes, defensiveness, or dullness until you could be rigorous on your own terms. And her approval felt like a munificent gift on which one could subsist for months: "Yes, yes, yes," she would say in crescendo when one was lucky enough to have hit the mark. That accomplished, she unstingingly loyal and kind, and one felt protected by her regard. I am not the only one who owes her very presence in English Studies to Carol's accomplishment as a teacher, advisor, and colleague, to the singular accomplishment of *Political Constructions*, and to the countless interventions she undertook and encouragements she proffered. Carol's lucidity spurred the kind of productive competitiveness her moral philosophers called "generous emulation," but it was not really imitable; her deep personal and professional decency was.

We all associate Carol with the hard writers, the masters of non-fictional, philosophical prose such as Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Burke, Johnson. But she was also an indefatigable reader of novels, and especially loved Jane Austen's. Of course she was drawn to the way they represent our complex sensitivities to the approval and disapproval of our neighbors, and she had a special affinity to the mordancy of a narrative voice, which, like her own, oscillated between exuberant garrulity when ventriloquizing the chatter of absurd characters and reticence when honoring painful subjects with abrupt and palpable silence. But Carol also admired the virtues and affects Austen holds up: candor, exertion, esteem, judgment, vivacity, self-command, wit, and reflection, behaving well. Of Austen's characters, she recurred most to Emma Woodhouse. She relished Austen's nerve in creating and discernibly enjoying a heroine whose self-love took the form of, among other things, a determination to expect the best and to tolerate nothing less. Carol shared that expectation, and she was relentless in it. This was not always convenient, nor was it always gratifying to others or to herself. But the alternative was not imaginable.

The eighteenth century has a name for the position Carol occupied with such distinction: monitor. Many of us fortunate enough to have studied the eighteenth-century literature with Carol think of her as a sort of feminist Sir Charles Grandison (she relished such oxymorons)—as someone to whom we turned for responsible advice, admonition, and reflection—proffered out of duty, honor, and love; as someone who in the process created around her an ever-enlarging community of sharers in the pleasures and rigors of responsible converse; and not least as someone whose political action on behalf of our presence in the profession took the form of countless acts of conversation and persuasion with institutions that did not want to listen but could not credibly refuse to do so. The way was never easy for Carol, not at Princeton where she began her career not long after it had begun with such poor grace to admit women, nor anywhere else. But Carol possessed fortitude to a remarkable degree. The conviction that she was making the way easier for those who would eventually follow inspirited and inspired her. And as we now contemplate the new president of Princeton University publicly and proudly declaring herself a feminist and a liberal, it is fitting to remember that Carol was very prominent among those who actively worked to make this transformation possible. She would take great satisfac-

tion in witnessing this extraordinary turn of events, and in a similar way I think it would please her to know that she had created the ongoing community of contributors assembled here to keep up other conversations she started.

Princeton University

SCARS OF THE SPIRIT

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST INAUTHENTICITY

GEOFFREY HARTMAN

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

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WORKING WOMEN: ELIZABETH I AND THE COUNTESS OF PEMBROKE

MAUREEN QUILLIGAN

I can think of no more fitting tribute to Carol Kay than the following essay, focussed on the topic of work shared among women. As co-directors of the Graduate Women's Organization at Harvard, in 1972-73, Carol Kay and I were handmaids together in the collective task of bringing the University to recognize its responsibilities to its women graduate (and undergraduate) students. Carol Kay's elegance in her approach to this work has long been a model for me in my continuing academic work.

Much discussion of Queen Elizabeth has focussed on her absolute uniqueness, her status as a virgin, and her position as a female ruler who managed to be successful because she surmounted the limitations placed on her sex both by becoming an honorary man, an ungendered "prince," and also by inhabiting simultaneously all three of the Elizabethan positions possible for a woman, virgin, wife, and mother becoming, herself, a tanstemporal icon.[1] The cult, which grew up around her, as Eliza and Gloriana, was in part aimed at keeping the example of Elizabeth contained, so that her agency would be applicable to no other women. Her very uniqueness worked to continue the traditional suppression of women. If she was allowed to be the unique exception among the "Monstrous Regiment of Women" rulers of the period inveighed against by John Knox, it was only because she was uniquely chosen of God.[2] The very unnaturalness of her reign, a woman ruling men, indicated God's special miraculous choice of her. Such an understanding of Elizabeth's historical reign—which denies her as an empowering example to other women—has long helped to occlude our understanding of the remarkable female cultural activity that there was at the time she ruled. In *A Room of One's Own* Virginia Woolf has famously imagined the impossible life of Shakespeare's fictional sister, Judith, who dies in penury and scandal, an unfulfilled writer because Woolf does not seem to have known there were, in fact, a number of women writing at the time.[3]

In order to undo this coercive emphasis on uniqueness, it will be helpful to trace the impact Elizabeth's own writing had on the writing of other women—in particular, a very prominent poet, Mary Sidney Herbert, the Countess of Pembroke, who not only edited and published her brother Philip Sidney's work and finished a full translation of the Psalms, but also wrote a number of original poems. One of the most interesting of these is the poem dedicating her Psalms to the Queen herself. That this key poem written by the countess in 1600 seems to harken back to work the Queen did when she was an eleven-year old girl reveals how empowering Elizabeth's example could be to other women writers. The poem itself was reprinted at least four times throughout Elizabeth's reign, and so it formed

an enduring (but often overlooked) language for her agency. That the poem uses holy incest as its major trope is, as we shall see, most helpful in articulating the specific positioning of the Countess of Pembroke's poem as part of her brother's corpus.

When she was eleven years old, the Princess Elizabeth translated a French poem by Marguerite de Navarre, and copied it out in an elaborate manuscript, which she presented to Henry VIII's last wife, Queen Katherine Parr. Elizabeth covered the manuscript volume presented as a gift to her stepmother with an embroidered sleeve or chemise, for which she, apparently, had done the needlework.[4] Embroidered in bright turquoise blue and decorated with an interlaced design picked out in still-shiny silver thread, the volume makes an elaborate gift, with Katherine's initials, "K.P." raised up in cotton-batting-stuffed relief in the center of both back and front covers. Raised-work embroidered silver flowers are at each of the four corners, indicating a nice French pun, for they are pansies, similar to the French word for "thoughts"— *pensées*. The same batting is used to raise cord-marks on the book's spine, as if the embroidered cover were part of the manuscript's actual binding. Elizabeth's needlework on a textile thus, here, mimics the work of textual production, *another* pun on textile and text.

The pen and needle are usually opposed in the proto-feminist discourse of the Renaissance, of course, but in Elizabeth's first production, the pen and needle go together in a first gesture of intra-familial authorship. Ann Jones and Peter Stallybrass have recently argued that far from confining women, embroidery and sewing, especially in an aristocratic setting, were means for artistic display:

> Whatever repressive and isolating effects sewing as a disciplinary apparatus might have been intended to produce, women used it both to connect to one another within domestic settings and to articulate public roles for themselves in the outer world.[5]

Lisa M. Klein has argued that 1544 was the year Elizabeth had been established in the succession by an act of Parliament, although she was still illegitimate.[6] As a gift to a female member of her father's family—in which Elizabeth now had a slightly more secure place—the woven nature of the object calls attention to its status as a gift from one female family member to another. It is clear from the dedicatory letter to her stepmother that eleven-year old Elizabeth expected Katherine to keep the volume private, at least until its faults had been corrected:

> But I hope that after having been in Your Grace's hands there shall be nothing in it worthy of reprehension and that in the meanwhile no other (but your highness only) shall read it or see it, lest my faults be known of many. (p. 112)

In essence asking for collaborative correction, Elizabeth fearfully expects that many will read the volume and, while not exactly assuming "publication" thereby, she reveals her concern for the performance as one by which she will be judged. Elizabeth's brief letter to Katherine is notable also for the emphasis it puts upon the trope of holy incest in the text she translated. The only thing she has to say about the actual content of Marguerite's poem insists upon the centrality of the trope of simultaneous

familial relations:

> The which book is entitled, or named, The *Mirror or Glass of the Sinful Soul,* wherein is contained how she (beholding and contemplating what she is) doth perceive how of herself and of her own strength she can do nothing that good is, or prevaileth for her salvation, unless it be through the grace of God, whose mother, daughter, sister, and wife by the scriptures she proveth her self to be.
> (p. 111)

The slipperiness of the familial positions, which Elizabeth makes the central point of the poem, is predicated on a metaphorical elision, which sacrifices no sense of concrete affect to the metaphorical nature of the position. Like the reforming position on the eucharist, which made it a metaphorical rather than a physical feeding on God, the metaphor of holy incest finds no mediator between the soul and God. Marc Shell has very powerfully argued that in claiming herself to be both mother and spouse of the nation of England that the "mature Elizabeth . . . institutionalized that collapse [of familial relations] on a national plane at once secular and chaste" which she had first essayed in her translation (Shell, p. 66). And it is indeed very probable that Elizabeth learned the effectiveness of such multiple positions—so useful for preserving her virgin autonomy—from her experience with such discourse in translating Marguerite's poem.

This translation was printed five times throughout Elizabeth's career, the penultimate version bringing it to a most interesting context for our understanding of its impact on the work of the Countess of Pembroke. Printed as the "Second Lampe of Virginitie," that is, the second of a five-part, multivolumed, elaborately produced book titled The *Monument of Matrons* put together by Thomas Bentley in 1582, the text by Elizabeth becomes one among a number of other female-authored texts. Bentley's dedicatory epistle places Elizabeth's work within the context of literally voluminous female authority: where the first printing by John Bale in 1548 had merely listed famous women, Bentley collects and publishes a massive number of female authors, as if he were attempting to provide a thousand testimonies to match the thousand wise virgins of his biblical text. His list of famous women runs to two pages; he places asterisks by the names of those whose writings are represented in the volume. This placement amid a welter of female voices gives Elizabeth's translation a fundamentally different context from the earlier printings, which insist upon Elizabeth's royal and unique status. Either this printing works to limit the potential power of her voice by submerging it among other women's prayers, or, as I shall argue, it empowers those female voices in the aggregate.

After printing numerous prayers specifically by women recorded in the Bible in the "First Lamp," Bentley prints Elizabeth's translation in the "Second Lamp" followed by Katherine Parr's "Lamentations of a Sinner." He also includes short prayers by Elizabeth on her imprisonment and her coronation, and also by Lady Jane Grey Dudley at the time of her imprisonment and death, plus various prayers by Elizabeth Tyrwhit (pp. 103-138), Lady Frances Auburgavennie's prayers at death committed to her daughter May Fane (pp. 139-213) Mistress Dorcas Martin's prayers (pp. 221-46), adding a catechism for children, and sundry prayers made by an anonymous "Gentlewoman." The first four lamps run to 479 pages in the first volume (two more "lamps" were printed in subsequent years).

While the frontispiece puts her in the company of three other queens, Katherine Parr, Q. Hester, and Marguerite de Navarre, the surrounding prose context submerges Elizabeth's uniqueness among women in a massive demonstration of articulate female piety and learning, across classes and from the standpoint of the many different social roles which women play, as mothers, daughters, queens, housewives, and so on. In the dedication to Elizabeth, Bentley explains his sense of his task, to "bring profit to the mysticall bodie, whereof I trust I am a member":

> out of the admirable monuments of your own Honourable works and some other noble Queenes, famous laides and vertuous Gentlewomen . . . to address and make readie these seven Lampes of your perpetuall virginitie, to remain unto women as one entire goodlie monument of praier, precepts, and examples meet for meditation, instruction and imitation to all posteritie. [He offers them to] your maiestie the most natural mother and noble nurse thereof; the cause of a virgin to a Virgine, the works of Queenes to a Queene, your owne praiers to yourself.

In turning Elizabeth herself into the church, the church which is the "sweet spouse" of Jesus Christ, and Bentley's own "deer mother" and a "virgin," Bentley appropriates the metaphor from Elizabeth's own text: Thus he prays that God may intend—

> as your spiritual spouse to set your Maiesty (a most worthie and mightie gouernor of the same) ever as a seal upon his hart, to tie you as a bracelet upon his arm . . .to set his eie over you continuallie for your health, wealth, and prosperitie, to bend his desires alwaies towards you.

Louis Montrose's argument about the special quality of Elizabeth's cult emphasizes her unique license to inhabit the three different roles of an Elizabethan woman simultaneously—"Maiden, Matron, and Mother."[7] But in Bentley's collection we see Elizabeth's language in the poem on holy incest—itself authorizing if not instigating this simultaneous inhabitation of roles—leading off a truly impressive amount of eloquence raised in praise and supplication for the often daily round of women's activities—eating, speaking, working, teaching, at church and at home.

In the context of *The Monumnent of Matrons,* the Countess of Pembroke's decision to finish the Psalms she and her brother Philip Sidney had begun translating together does not seem so strange for *The Monument* prints numerous psalm paraphrases by women. To have undertaken metrical paraphrases is, of course, unusual and it is the remarkable experimentation with verse form for which the Countess's work is now becoming known. Although she had published her brother's sonnet cycle and prose romance, she never took the trouble to publish her translation. Samuel Daniel clearly did not expect non-publication to have any effect on the fame of Pembroke's Psalms; Daniel prophecies that they will know her name:

> So long as Sions god remained honored;
> And till confusion hath all zeale bereaven.,
> And murderd Faith. . .

Here thou surviv'st thy selfe, heere thou art found
or late suceeding ages, fresh in fame:
This monument cannot be overthrowne,
Where in eternall Brasse remains thy Name.[8]

The Sidney Psalms had an immense impact on the forms of both religious and secular verse in the seventeenth century. The Countess also wrote two original poems to accompany the Psalms, both of dedication, one to her brother and one to Queen Elizabeth to whom she presented an elaborate manuscript presentation of the volume. The poems exist in a single manuscript, with an earlier version of one appearing in Daniel's papers. When the two poems are read together they provide a remarkable sense of the Countess's own sense of her poetic vocation. In her poem to Elizabeth, she makes of her presentation of the translation of the Psalms a monument remarkably similar to the translation Elizabeth had offered to Catherine Parr, a translation to which, in fact, she may refer at the close of her own poem. More crucially, the importance of the brother sister tie in both poems resonates with the metaphor of holy incest in Elizabeth's own translation.

Although it is addressed to Queen Elizabeth, the lyric which begins "Even now that Care which on thy Crowne attends," is as much about Sir Philip Sidney as it is about the Queen. The incomplete nature of his part of the project due to his death and thereby to the Countess' need to complete the translation of the Psalms, owes much to Elizabeth's notorious neglect of Philip during his lifetime.

Then these the Postes of Dutie and Goodwill
Shall presse to offer what their Senders owe;
Which once in two, now in one Subject goe,
The poorer left, the richer reft awaye:
Who better might (O might ah word of woe.)
Have giv'n for me what I for him defraye.
How can I name whom sighing sighes extend
and not unstopp my teares eternall spring?

As Hannay points out, the poem is an admonition to the Queen to continue the activist Protestant war for which Philip had sacrificed his life and for which he had undertaken the translation of the Psalms.[9] Her prodding of the queen takes the form of her apologetic realization that Elizabeth will have little time to read the humble verse she sends:

One instant will, or willing can she lose
I say not reading, but receiving Rimes,
On whom in chiefe dependeth to dispose
what Europe acts in theise most active times? (4-7)

Pembroke is willing to risk offense because, as she deploys the traditional contrast between *otium* and *negotium*, Elizabeth's special election by God to be queen has also graced her with a special ability to make rhyme-receiving part of her "exercise." Reading the Psalms, of course, in metrical translation

à la Marot, was a very activist Protesant thing to do. It was the reason Bale had granted the princess Elizabeth authorship of the translation of the Psalm he included in her translation of Marguerite's *Miroir.*

> What heav'nly powers thee highest throne assign'de,
> assign'd thee goodnes suting that Degree:
> and by thy strength thy burthen so defin'de,
> To others toile, is Exercise to thee. (13-16)

One of the most influential aspects of the Sidneian Psalms, recognized by contemporary poets and scholars alike, is the remarkably various experimentation with verse forms within it. While the Sidneys were copying Marot's metrical variety, they managed to assemble a vast compendium of English metrical form. In view of this metrical emphasis, it is strange to see that Pembroke writes her poem to Elizabeth in ottava rima while she writes the poem to her brother in a modified seven line rhyme-royal stanza. Spenser had used the rhyme royal stanza for his elegy on Sidney in the volume he dedicated to Mary, Countess of Pembroke in 1591, *The Ruines of Time*, so while it is likely that the countess chose the form for its elegiac nature rather than as a pointed contrast to her poem to Elizabeth, it is still a very interesting choice. She privileges her brother with the more august form and silently derogates the queen.

Especially when we compare it with a letter she sent to Elizabeth a year later thanking/asking her for taking care of her son William at court, the tone of her address to Elizabeth is remarkably critical. As Hannay points out, her stress on Elizabeth's royal duties in the service of Protestantism insists upon Elizabeth's neglect of Philip's cause. Perhaps even more pointedly, the very offering of the translation as feudal rent calls attention to how little financial support Elizabeth had ever offered to the Sidneys; the poems are a—

> small parcell of that undischarged rent,
> from which nor paines, nor paiments can us free.
> And yet enough to cause our neighbours see
> we will our best, though scanted in our will:
> and those nighe feelds where sown'n thy favors be
> unwalthy do, not elce unworthie till. (35-40)

The Sidneys work hard to repay their sovereign's bounty as good tillers of the field: their neighbors know how hard they work to make this rent. They only seem to fail in that one particular field where her favors are sown; however hard they work, the field remains unwealthy even though their tillage is not unworthy elsewhere.

Pembroke's main metaphor for the text she sends Elizabeth is cloth; not only is the text a textus, a woven thing, the English translation provides a different "dress" for the Hebrew King David. In presenting the translation as woven material, or "stuff" Pembroke includes her brother in the process of weaving, although she differentiates between the two.

but hee did warpe, I weav'd this web to end;
the stuffe not ours, our worke no curious thing,
Wherin yet well see thought the Psalmist King
Now English denizend, though Hebrue borne,
woold to thy musicke undispleased sing,
Oft having worse, without repining worne; (27-32)

Pembroke rings a quite particular change on the metaphor, however, when she specifies that it is to be made into a "liverie robe": "And I the Cloth in both our names present,/ A liverie robe to bee bestowed by thee." If the two translators pay their feudal "rent" by giving their overlord the raw cloth, they expect her to make it into a livery robe to be given to her other servants. The cloth, however, is stranger than this, for it makes "holy garments" which "each good soule assaies,/ some sorting all, all sort to none but thee." Individual Psalms will apply to everyone, but the entire set of poems only apply to Elizabeth, she being, like their author, royal.

A king should onely to a Queene bee sent.
Gods loved choice unto his chosen love:
Devotion to Devotions President:
what all applaud, to her whom none reprove. (53-56)

This woven text (like Elizabeth's own woven gift to Catherine Parr) is like the woven textiles circulating among women, articulating the closely interlocked social hierarchies among interlocking families.[10] The complicated language of rent and repayment, debt and bestowal, defrayal and discharge all mark a densely hierarchical relation which is gendered explicitly female only at the end of the poem, when Pembroke becomes the single, female offerer of the gift, just as Elizabeth is a single, female ruler. Pembroke's final compliment to Elizabeth is that she outstrips even King David in a few things: first, she is ruler over two (rather than simply one) hemispheres; second, God protected her directly when "the very windes did on thy partie blowe"— a reference to the Armada. But more specifically in contrast to David, who was visited by the Queen of Sheba, kings wait upon Queen Elizabeth, a paradoxical state as strange as mainlands doing obeisance to an island:

Kings on a Queene enforst their states to lay;
Main–lands for Empire waiting on an Ile;
Men drawne by worth a woman to obay;
one moving all, herselfe unmov'd the while: (81-4)

A strange conflation of terms makes it difficult to see just what task is finally the subject of the poem, as Pembroke seems to collapse the task of her translating the Psalms and Elizabeth's own activities as ruler and poet herself. Speaking to her muse (which has been enjoined not to fly as high as Eagles), Pembroke cautions "But softe my muse":

Thy utmost can but offer to hir sight
Her handmaides taske, which most her will endeeres; (89-90)

"Her handmaides task" may be Pembroke's own offering of the poems as a gift to a mistress from her handmaid. But Pembroke may also be saying that her muse can only outline what Elizabeth must do as handmaid to God, while the poem prays for her longer life. Both sing like David, if only Elizabeth can do what men will praise aftewards. In that longer life, outstripping even David, Queen Elizabeth may be even more triumphant in rule and in her own praise of God:

> and pray unto thy pains life from that light
> which lively lightsome Court, and kingdome cheeres,
> What wish she may (farre past hir living Peeres
> and Rivall still to Judas Faithfull King)
> In more then hee and more triumphant yeares,
> Sing what God doth, and doo what men may sing. (91-96)

Hannay suggests that the last line of reference to Elizabeth's own "singing" what "God doth," may refer to the *Glass of the Sinful Soul*, which had been included, as we have seen, in the *Monument of Matrons*, the compendium of Psalm-inspired meditations dedicated to Elizabeth.

The prayer that Elizabeth might do more than David, of course, is another plea for the activist intervention in the Protestant cause for which her brother had died. The poem to Elizabeth then is notable for its constant circling about the family project: as Hannay points out, it is also notable for what it leaves out. There is no praise of Elizabeth's beauty, her chastity, no compliment by way of mythological reference; instead the poem insists upon duty, upon the time-consuming and arduous task of ruling over a Protestant realm, as if this were a poem above all about work: "Truthes restitution, vanitie exile, wealth sprung of want, warr held without annoye." The economics of dutiful achievement are the same for both Elizabeth and the Sidneys. They manage to till their fields and pay their rent as best they might just as Elizabeth has managed to make restitution of Truth and created wealth out of want. Elizabeth is so capable that she transforms "toile" into "exercise." The language of shared work again insists upon the shared political project. It is a political project, which outstrips even King David's honors. Two whole hemispheres honor Elizabeth: the project is not merely Protestant but global, and it is a project of which, the Countess claims, not only her brother, but both she and the queen also share in the work.

Duke University

NOTES

1. Leah Marcus, "The Political Uses of Androgyny," *The Renaissance Woman in Print*, ed. Ann Haselkorn and Betty Travitsky (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990). Louis A. Montrose, "The Fantasies of Elizabethan Culture," in *Rewriting the Renaissance*, ed. Margaret Ferguson et al (Chicago University Press, 1986), pp. 80-81: "Because she was always uniquely herself, Elizabeth's rule was not intended to undermine the male hegemony of her culture. Indeed, the emphasis upon her *difference* from all other women may have helped to reinforce it."It may be useful to point out that the three roles

of maiden, wife, and mother corespond closely to the roles of daugher, wife and mother of the incest metaphor Elizabeth uses in her translation of marguerite de Navarre's poem.

2. John Knox, *First Blast of the Trumpet Against the Monstrous Regiment of Women* (Edward Arber:London, 1989).

3. Virginia Woolf, *A Room of One's Own* (Harcourt Brace: San Diego, 1957). For both English and continental women poets, see Ann R. Jones, *The Currency of Eros* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990); Barbara Lewalski, *Jacobean Writing Women* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983); Naomi Miller *Changing the Subject* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1996). For the Sidney women, see Mary Ellen Lamb *Gender and Authorship in the Sidney Circle* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).

4. Margaret H. Swain, "A New Year's Hift from the Princess Elizabeth," The *Connoisseur* 36 (1973), 258-66. I am indebted to Martin Kauffman, Department of Western Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, for this reference and for aid in handling the volume.

5. See Ann R. Jones and Peter Stallybrass, "The Needle and the Pen," in *Worn Worlds,* (Cambridge University Press, 2001).

6. Lisa M, Klein, "Your Humble Handmaid: Elizabethan Gifts of Needlework," *Renaissance Quarterly* (1997), 459-493.

7. Montrose, p. 79.

8. Cited, Gary F. Waller, *Mary Sidney, Countess of Pembroke: A Critical Study* (Salzburg, 1979), p. 277.

9. Margaret Hannay, et al ed., *The Collected Works of Mary Sidney Herbert, Countess of Pembroke* (Oxford University Press, 1998), 2 vols; hereafter cited in the text.

10. For a full discussion of the revision of Marcel Mauss's gift theory which focuses on the circulation of cloth among women, see Annette Weiner, "Why Cloth? Cloth, Gender and Power," in *Cloth and Human Experience, ed.* Annette B. Weiner and Jane Schneider (Washington and London, Smithsonian, 1989), pp. 33-77.

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REMEMBERING CAROL KAY

PENELOPE LAURANS

"A frame of adamant, a soul of fire"
Samuel Johnson, *The Vanity of Human Wishes*

From the first I was transfixed by Carol. We met in the second floor seminar room in Warren House at Harvard, that creaky old yellow house with small rooms and skylights near the Faculty Club that served as the English department offices. Jack Bate, the masterful biographer of Johnson, Keats and Coleridge, who dominated the politics of the department for several decades and whose power was sufficient to guarantee him the one designated classroom in the house, convened the group, a seminar on The Age of Johnson. Bate took the old fashioned, Oxbridge approach to teaching, sitting back, cagey and fidgety, with an ironic smile, as week after week nervous graduate students formally read aloud their papers, which were then genteelly critiqued by other students. Bate himself, despite his legendary dramatic powers in lecture, seldom had too much to say.

In this tense setting, where everyone was intent on impressing everyone else, Carol was the star. I can shut my eyes and hear her clear, musical, relentlessly analytical voice cutting through the heavy, after lunch air. It wasn't just her love of ideas or her tenacious gift for argument that made her stand out, or even the depth of her knowledge. It was rather the level of her engagement. She was immersed enough in the world of the eighteenth century to start a discussion on a different plane from the rest of us. She talked about Johnson as if he were her contemporary. Her didactic power was evident. I had a feeling that if Johnson were there, she would soon be evaluating what he was thinking in the same way she was evaluating arguments from the rest of the class.

Since "the more time the better" was always Carol's motto, she had signed up to give her paper last. She had chosen as her topic the truth about Johnson's religious belief. It was the one subject Bate actually had some genuine interest in, since it was the one subject he hadn't yet decided everything about for himself. When the day arrived, Carol's paper was not finished. People stared in hushed horror and disbelief as instead of opening a neatly folded paper, she emptied a large brown satchel full of notecards and books onto the Warren House seminar room table, allowing as how "she hadn't quite finished formulating her ideas yet." Then she began speaking, slowly mesmerizing the class with a nuanced, inspired articulation of the complicated case of Johnson's spirituality that had no real beginning or end but was nothing short of brilliant. Bate sat at fixed attention the entire time, peppering Carol with questions as the hours ticked away and ultimately thanking her in his nasal whine for "a most inspired performance, Miss Kay."

When the afternoon was over, I walked Carol home to her Mass. Ave apartment, trailing her like an acolyte, and for the first of many times came up to tea. There in the living room with the bare floors and old glass-fronted bookcases filled with books, amongst the chairs covered with books, I sat on a packing case (filled with still more books) as the kettle boiled and Carol served up tea in her flowered Victorian dress. I marveled at everything about her. The way she looked, with her shiny square hair cut and sparkly eyes. The way she dressed, with her long high necked dresses. Her gesticulating hands. That clear beautiful voice with the musical laugh that had a seductive charm. And mostly the way she talked, in long whole sentences with wonderful words, never finally finishing with a topic but on the other hand managing in her unfinished discourse to pin things down with a precision I had never heard before.

That was the beginning of our friendship, which was enriched a lot also by our work for the Graduate Women's Association, that association of remarkable women (Caroline Bynum, Ann Michelini, Ann Bergren Chrisman, Phyllis Jones, Maureen Quilligan, Ethel Higgonet) in league against the running dogs of the (as we saw it) patriarchal Harvard administration.

I will never forget the hilarious day when Carol and I, as representatives of this organization, were granted an interview with the Dean of the Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences, none other than the great John Dunlop, that imposing and forbidding presence whom I remember as at least seven feet tall. The talk was to be about "goals and timetables" for bringing women onto the Harvard faculty at a moment when this was beginning to simmer as a real political issue at Harvard. Instead of meeting us in his office Dean Dunlop saw us in the Harvard Faculty Room, a room which seemed to me as imposing as the throne room at Versailles, and which was certainly as large, with a dozen or more portraits of former Harvard deans stiffly lining the walls.

There, with the three of us sitting eyeball to eyeball at a table in a corner of the vast space, this old pro labor lawyer proceeded to jolly us, quiz us, and then finally to lecture us, banging his fists on the table for emphasis. I sat there totally terrified, completely intimidated by the size and formality of the room and by the aura of power exuded by Dean Dunlop, my tongue utterly tied, having forgotten every point we wished to make, stuttering even to remember my name.

Carol, however, was not phased in the least. She was in her element. She had irrefutable facts and statistics at her command as to why only goals and timetables alone could ensure a critical difference. The percentages were appalling—there were under five tenured women on the Harvard FAS faculty. Good will and good intentions on the part of well-meaning people had never produced results. How else to explain the English department, which had educated hundreds of women towards Ph.Ds and never as yet had a single tenured female member? Goals and timetables were not the first choice, but they provided the kind of pressure that worked. Her voice had directness, strength and authority. She wouldn't be charmed and she wouldn't be frightened. She just kept maddeningly on track, making the case, explaining it with her fierce, unremitting logic, and articulating it with such eloquence and rigor, in such a clear and musical voice that it was very difficult to get a word in edgewise.

By the end of the hour, as I remember it, Dean Dunlop was once again jovial, but also mopping

his brow and harrumphing. The meeting had been a forecast of things to come, and he knew it. When we left the office, I heard him grumbling to a secretary. Perhaps he wasn't in too good a mood.

As we stumbled out into the daylight of the Yard, I was giddy with relief and so grateful to Carol I was beside myself. But Carol was oblivious to any triumph. Utterly and completely her same self, she was still arguing her points as we walked across the busy Yard, so involved in the truth of her case that she was not even cognizant of the feat she had accomplished.

Carol was an eighteenth-century intellectual in nineteenth-century dress in a twentieth-century world. In another century she would have run a salon where all the great and powerful of London or France would have gone for the highest intellectual wit, accompanied by proper refreshments. She would have been the wittiest of all, surrounded by her minions, focusing and directing the conversation. In our century, her gifts were not always properly rewarded, though I do think it is fair to say they were properly appreciated, at least by those who had the capacity to appreciate them.

I hadn't seen Carol in several years when she died, but she had always been present to me. I incorporated a vision of her into my being—her fearlessness and her determined pursuit of the truth— and carried it around, and it created a mutation in my own self. I don't see how one friend can give more to another in life than that. I miss terribly that I am not going to see her again, alone, or with Jonathan, or to experience their joint pleasure in social intercourse and their joint gift for it. Alone each had individuation, what Hopkins called "haeccitas." Together they were an example of how people can be a complete pair without swallowing what is distinctive about the other. They were complimentary forces and where they were there was high intellectual discourse mixed with food and drink and company and good talk and laughter.

I will grow old with this wonderful memory — sitting in a room experiencing a voice which I valued even more for the sheer beauty of the timbre and the intellectual purity it conveyed than for whatever specific was being discussed, argued or proposed by it. Those were halcyon days of awakening for me, and Carol was one reason why.

Yale University

CAROL KAY: THE PRINCETON YEARS

DAVID BROMWICH

"Let's see," I remember Carol saying late at night in the back seat of a car. It was moral philosophy. "I know I should bake a cake for my mother's birthday. But if I don't do that, I might have time to visit my friend in the hospital, who is suffering from a serious, but not a debilitating or a mortal, illness. But"—at this point Carol begins laughing. It is a huge laugh that shakes her and carries you with it. "But I know that one of the effects of baking the cake will be that I eat a piece of it myself, which will give me a non-moral pleasure; and I have no such extraneous pleasure in discharging the duty of visiting my friend. But for other reasons, baking the cake seems the more urgent obligation, and the one whose neglect will cause more pain. How to solve this *moral dilemma*?" More laughter. "It's the sort of example the people in philosophy departments love. You know, you have to put up with it."

The book may have been a collection of essays on Aristotle edited by Amelie Rorty—one of Carol's readings about this time, among so many others, books you would think nobody except the specialists and their graduate students read, until you met Carol. The laughter was keen and infectious. It did not come with a trill or a giggle or an ingratiating chortle. More like a splash in a standing pool that sent its waves out to the farthest edge. It was a generous laugh (though ridicule and a rich feeling for absurdity could be in it)—completely sociable, but never giving itself a thought. Probably it was her laugh that won me over to Carol completely. Others, who admired her wit and learning but didn't come the whole way, were brought up short by the fierce tenacity of Carol in arguments—a quality (by the time I met her) that I had seen in older generations but never yet in a person of roughly my age. We talked about this occasionally.

"Always hold the important question," said Carol, "till the others have worn themselves out. You have to wait unless you have the numbers. The communists knew how to run a meeting and they understood this." The last sentence would have been a joke meant specially for me, since Carol knew some of my family had been fellow travelers: *run* meant *take over*, or less euphemistically *run away with.* Her open profession of the importance of tactics was always striking— a trait or article of faith that readers of *Political Constructions* may deduce from her admiration of Hobbes. But I am getting ahead of the story.

It was a discussion at the end of a lunch at the Prospect Club in Princeton that made me want to see more of Carol Kay. One's contemporaries are hard to sort out in the first few weeks of a new job, but she caught my attention with a string of questions and responses. What had I written my dissertation about? I had just finished it, on Hazlitt, and more of it than anyone could justify dealt with his *Principles of Human Action,* a book I greatly admired and had learned not to count on other people

having read. Carol's response amazed me. She knew the book and admired it. When I said the only anticipations of the argument, that I could see, were in Hume's treatment of identity and the preface to Butler's *Sermons*, she spoke a clear paragraph that tightened the connections. She also knew Hazlitt's criticism well, and preferred it to Coleridge's—the first person I found to agree with me about this. She said of Coleridge: "After a while, you lose respect for him." "For his inconsistency you mean?" "Religion, metaphysics, politics, poetry. The way he wants everything to be different and everything the same." It put me in a good mood about my new job, and the mood lasted for months.

I came into teaching in the mid-seventies. By the early eighties, all the clever young people sucked up to theory, while the more conventional ones, who mostly followed the itinerary their advisers had laid out, felt marooned, and conversations with them were apt to be inexpressibly gloomy. Carol was one of the few people I met in those years who clearly belonged to neither group. Her theorist was Hume. There was too much nonsense to be talked down for her to have the time to be depressed. Among recent or living scholars, she had a personal and idiosyncratic canon. Sheldon Wolin's *Politics and Vision* was in it, and Norman Kemp Smith's book on Hume. I found her once in her basement office with that look of choice satisfaction which meant, "Oh, have I got something to show you." It was a copy of Pocock's *Machiavellian Moment*, just published, which she had brought back from the university store—a book whose interest was plain to Carol, though hardly known yet to the run of literary scholars.

The Princeton English department in those years had a lively and energetic junior faculty. And warm, and conversible: Jonathan Arac, Judith Wilt, Jeffrey Spear, Maria DiBattista, Dan O'Hara, Winifred Hughes, Andy Fichter, Julia Holloway, Steven Shankman, Ron Levao—these people and how they talked and listened were a large part of my getting my bearings in intellectual life; and I have wondered, looking at the rapid turnover that is now the trend among younger faculty, with the professional habit that sets in early of treating a school as a place to go to and come from and not a place to work, whether a life of teaching can have quite the same interest without something like this incitement somewhere near its start. It feels now as if in those first few years, Jonathan and Carol were the people I saw most often. Or was it that I thought most about them? Jonathan at that time (I don't know how it may have changed later) sometimes positioned himself as the gentle interpreter of Carol to the world. I recall a particularly testing occasion when Carol took a placid dinner almost onto the reefs—a forced march of polemic making the Hobbesian case for statehood as a foundational act by whatever violence necessary. The state under discussion was Palestine, and Jonathan I suspect partly agreed, but he must have wondered how we got there from the drinks and idle gossip. "Carol, surely even you would concede that..." —"No, Carol, a defender of statehood doesn't need to say that, he only needs to say..." —and so on. Carol's unconcessiveness at such moments was wonderful to behold; so was the by-play with which Jonathan kept her simmering between a sacred rage and triumph at too high a cost.

Jonathan and Carol were so inseparable, and so separately interesting, I wonder if either of them realized how steadily the ingenuity of their friends was taxed with the game of compare and contrast. Jonathan had the more comprehensive mind and a synoptic view of literature, but from Carol you could learn your indefeasible right to mock a fallacy two centuries old just as if it had been concocted yesterday. Nobody would call her a concise explainer—her strategy was to surround a subject—but in that

immense and assured and always lucid flow of words I never heard a particle of cant. She wouldn't say things in the phrases people were used to; the principle seemed to be that no thought could be packaged. The capacity for standing outside other people's formulae of largely verbal satisfaction made Carol a natural appreciater of satire. At the same time, she was one of those people so planted on their own convictions that they become a strengthener of one's own. She was worth stealing from and I took two phrases from her whose original context I can still recall. "All the talk about the politics of interpretation, the politics of theory, the politics of gender. What about the politics of politics?" After translations appeared of Foucault's books on punishment and the history of sexuality, there followed a spate of American books and articles in which critics expounded, with an apparently irreducible literalness, the inward laws and workings of an entity called the body. Carol had been reading some of this new writing. "The *body*, the *body*. They keep on saying the body and after a while you realize what they mean is the soul."

The finely shaded skeptical voice that rang the changes from imperiousness to a familiar raillery was drawn partly from Bette Davis. This was a conscious attitude and likeness, and went with a gravity that could be assumed to be on, unless she told you otherwise. It was also part of a dramatic self-presentation—speech in full periods, every word in its place. I tried to unmask her with a discovery once. "Carol, I think I have the movie. It's *Marked Woman*." But of course she was imperturbable. "I must have seen that movie half a dozen times." Her beliefs like her manners, it strikes me now, were part of a self-knowledge that had been thoroughly meditated. They suited her as a free mind without complication—subject to the usual constraints of temperament, milieu, physics, and politics, which like Hobbes and Hume she considered a necessary garment and not an infringement of her liberty.

Like some other brilliant teachers of fiction, for all her humaneness and concern for the fortunes of her students and friends, Carol was oddly indifferent to the peculiarities of personal conduct in everyday life. (If you fished up an aperçu about someone, she would either be politely amused or give you the look that said "Don't be insipid.") Yet she was a sharp observer of what people did with their talents and imagination, always prepared to announce that an act or gesture had left her pleasantly surprised, or had confirmed her worst suspicions. A chanteuse at a surf-and-turf restaurant in Kingston, New Jersey, thickened the air with a dreary second half-hour full of languid riffs. "She should stick," muttered Carol, "to the fast heartless songs. She's better at those." In the faculty lounge one afternoon, Carol sat down and said about Lionel Trilling, not her favorite critic, that she had been rereading his introduction to *Emma*. "He says that Emma has the moral life of a man. It's interesting. And interesting to think of him having that thought." This was a way many people must have felt about Carol, too. Not that in her case there could ever be a surprise that she had exceeded some self-imposed restraint; but it was fascinating to think of her arriving at her thoughts.

People so definite are rare. Their expressive marks are scattered all over one's memory and language, in phrases that become a kind of signature. Samuel Johnson once dismissed with scorn a friend who was deserting his company for some "*unidea'd* girls" —an invisible disqualification from an invisible club, but though nobody else has ever used his word, nobody has failed to know exactly what he meant. Carol, who had this in common with Johnson, that she talked for victory and claimed to be able to outlast any normally capable holder-forth, was frankly proud I think of just one other public

excellence. On being told of a future colleague she would certainly like, of whom a sad and righteous anecdote was offered to prove the colleague's moral credentials, Carol said with a serious smile: "Well, she better not try to outpure me." That word now belongs to Carol Kay, as far as I am concerned. How could anyone ever try? She was a brave thinker, a completely dedicated teacher and scholar, and to me a friend whose conversations go on, though I cannot see her across the table; and if purity of heart is to will one thing, her purity was to will the unusual, the really and entirely original person she must from an early age have decided to become.

Yale University

THE PITTSBURGH YEARS: CAROL KAY'S IDIOM OF POLITICS

RASHMI DUBE BHATNAGAR

Tributes to a beloved teacher and friend are necessarily incomplete. They are fragmentary promises and tears-blinded rewritings of the past. My tribute lies in the future, in the dedication of my future book on Jonathan Swift to Carol Kay.[1] For the present moment I would like to dismantle, piece by piece, the erroneous impression that Carol Kay's politics was essentially the politics of elitism. This impression is unwittingly fostered by an under-emphasis on her Pittsburgh years and an over-emphasis on her Harvard and Princeton years. Tributes to Carol sympathetically and respectfully represent her as a political agitator for women's rights, in particular women's right to education at the American universities. Nevertheless it would be a mistake to assume that her conception of politics and political agitation was feminist without, however, containing in its feminist understanding an awareness of class, race, and postcoloniality. In my view, it would also be unfair and inaccurate to unconditionally recuperate Carol Kay in the hallowed images of the liberal American professor in the exclusive club of eighteenth century British studies in America.

For my part, I place her in an academic tradition that has powerful historical resonance in this country: the secular Jewish intellectuals, college professors, school teachers, and artists who traveled to remote cities and towns in America in the earlier part of the twentieth century and practiced desegregation inconspicuously. A recent PBS television series interviewed a number of eminent African-American men and women who graduated from black colleges in the early days of the civil rights movement, to record their impressions of the legendary Jewish professors on their campus.[2] I particularly recall the interview of one man: his teacher called him into his office and asked him to apply for a prestigious fellowship. He looked askance at the teacher, as if to say "You think they will give me, a black man, the fellowship. Are you crazy?" The professor's persistence won the day, the man received the fellowship and went on to forge a successful career. It is precisely this pattern of anonymous, unglamorous, undramatic, other-directed day to day activism for students that characterized the politics Carol shared with Jonathan Arac during the Pittsburgh years.

When Carol reached Pittsburgh in 1988 her political philosophy had crystallized. It would probably be inaccurate to say she was different from the political being she had been in the Harvard and Princeton years. It would be more appropriate to say that, in Pittsburgh, Carol was more clearly and fully the person she had always been. I offer two slight anecdotes to mark the difference—as I perceive it— between the political idealism in the earlier phases of her life, and the politically seasoned phase

of her work as teacher, scholar and activist at Pittsburgh. I remember the night when, after dinner, she regaled my sisters, daughter, Jonathan and me in telling us how she joined a mass walkout in protest from a class while licking an ice-cream cone. There is an effervescence in that story: the sunlight was always playing on her face in the Harvard years; the joy of discovering her intellectual self, her political beliefs, and her sensual self all fuse together in the licking of the cone. She punctuated with a similar note of exuberance the narratives of her Princeton years. I received a glimpse of that rich period of her life when, as a newly appointed assistant professor on my visit to my sisters' house at Pittsburgh, I asked her if there was any advice they could give me about the pit-falls and traps awaiting an assistant professor. Carol said: "No more than two meetings in a day." It took me a long while to decode the political idiom in which she spoke, the idiom that had great vitality and strength in the era in American academia when political meetings, committee meetings and department meetings were forums for acrimonious debate and social change rather than empty ceremonies of power.

The political idioms for academic activism may not have changed too obviously by the time Carol arrived at Pittsburgh, but the everyday practices in which those idioms were articulated had been altered in infinitesimal ways. Feminists have tried to describe the complex processes that occur in a woman who has acquired survival knowledge. Carol had become tough, war-wounded, a guerrilla fighter who practiced the notion that the most important battles for admitting and nurturing students of color in academia were to be fought in guerrilla fashion. I wish to dispel the notion that these were dark years for her. Carol's Pittsburgh years were also some of her most contented. I recall a dinner which took place upon the return of Carol and Jonathan from a trip to China. My sister, Reena Dube, was studying Satyajit Ray's film *Ghare Baire* (*The Home and the World*) with Jonathan.[3] Throughout the dinner and film Carol and Jonathan displayed that special look of two people who were in love and whose minds were in constant dialogue. Yes, Carol was often happy, not the least because she had a steady dialogue during those years with her friend and political ally Paul Bové. Yet there was a special quality to those years. With perspicuity, Reena makes the following observation: "She was a woman with a lot to do and not enough time." Guerilla fighters do not have time for the linear unfolding of the political plan. They must attack and run for cover in a terrain that is familiar to them. That is why Carol often spoke in shorthand and in riddles and preferred the condensed gesture to the elaborated idiom for articulating her vision.

It is necessary to say a few words about the historical determinants, the referents of time and place for Carol's guerrilla politics. In the mid- nineties the left-wing, liberal and Democratic political project for the coming together of the American working classes and immigrant South Asian communities remained an unrealized possibility. The city of Pittsburgh had suffered the demise of the steel industry, while the urban renewal program had still to take shape in the streets and minds of people. In those days it was often the poorest and most powerless members of the city through whom the idiom of racism articulated itself. It is appropriate that as graduate students, my two sisters and I imbibed important lessons about teaching at the University of Pittsburgh, for in our undergraduate classes we met the young men and women who were trying to change their conditions of powerlessness by turning to college education to secure a better job.

Despite the waves and waves of European immigrants that compose the city's remarkable history

and mark its neighborhoods, it emanated a palpable hostility mixed paradoxically with curiosity and attraction for its new immigrants and minorities. An elderly lady would ask in the city bus, "How long have you been here? When are you going back?" Despite the much vaunted economic boom of the Clinton era, and the signs of globalism in fashion, music, clothes, food habits and restaurants in the last years of the twentieth century, the children of the working class as well as the out of work mining communities and the several groups of underclasses in America feared the newly arrived immigrants as rivals. Nor was the Indian community exempt from intra-minority racism: an Indian restaurateur declared that, "God gave Americans this great country and then spoilt it by the African-American problem." A black woman poet at the university read the words "Die n..." on a paper left in her mailbox. The term hate crimes entered the English language.

It is in this climate of overt and subterranean fear and insecurity that Carol forged her guerrilla politics to enable three women of color— my two sisters, Renu Dube and Reena Dube, and myself— to find our way through the academy. If Carol had interacted exclusively with me, one might be forgiven for dismissing those interactions in the discourse of personalism and personal liking. When Carol went out of her way to interact with three Indian women scholars who were working in areas as diverse as Swift, Aristotle and postcolonial cinema, then the entity that took shape began to seem more like a female community than a clique or cabal.[4] Carol never mouthed platitudes of political correctness. Her way of creating a space of commonality was to practice a politics that did not draw attention to itself. Most of her significant acts of political intervention cannot be written into the public discourses of the academy. For example she gave Renu concrete advice about her teaching.[5] Moreover like a political strategist she suggested that Renu should construct texts of her improvement as a teacher, enabling her to see that it is not enough to be a good teacher, one must be perceived as a good teacher. Indeed her political advice and her interventions behind the scenes were the offices of love for her students.

Carol divested the word politics of its grandeur and high drama, she deployed it without its proper name. How does one describe the political valence of those ephemeral moments that will barely be contained in language because they are slight, everyday, lacking in grandeur, and momentousness? The vocabulary that springs to mind is the human connectedness that E.M. Forster suggests can exist between people of different cultures, a Mrs. Moore and Aziz perhaps. One day she and I were busy discussing J.G.A. Pocock, Swift's *The Examiner,* and the problems in the traditional Marxist interpretations of the English eighteenth century. The venue for the Independent Study was her Spartan office. Suddenly she stopped and began to admire my jewelry. I was thrown off my stride. She was interfering with my camouflage. In the year that I arrived in the United States, I had heard the dreaded name of Dotbusters (Indian women were identified by the dots they wore on their foreheads and assaulted in the New Jersey area). I had learnt to wear a workshirt instead of a sari, keep my head down and walk cautiously on the streets. In short I was trying to be invisible.

The only sign of our country of origin that we still carried in our dress lay in the silver jewelry that we wore occasionally. So I tried to nudge Carol away from her demolition job, back into the safe realm of ideas. Everyone knows that Carol could not be nudged if she did not wish it. I tried to move her forwards to another topic, backwards to re-examine something we had discussed, and even sideways by making movements of departure. And all the while Carol was allowing me to see that in her eyes,

in her office, I was a human being, even a woman. The sun was shining outside, we did not have to be terrified of moving away from our intellectual selves into our sensual selves as intellectual women.

I met and studied with Carol at a difficult period of my life. Dissertations are harsh rites of passage for Indian women, earlier selves are burning out, and new selves have not yet formed. In those days, and for a long time afterwards, I was composed in unequal parts of fear, rage, and ambition. Our meetings were dogged by these circumstances. In my view there is no greater testimony of Carol's willingness to take risks as a teacher than that she overcame these circumstances. She secured my invitation at the 1992 Notre Dame conference on Swift and Ireland. At the conference I had the first inkling of the affinity between us. As we climbed the stairs of the hotel foyer on the way to our respective rooms, Carol was a little behind me. I remember turning around to find her looking me full in the face and saying, "You don't really know what I'm like." And Carol was right. It was in those two days at Notre Dame that I came to realize that Carol treated a student in a way that is so rare as to be virtually unknown in the academy. It came simply to her to treat me as nothing more nor less than a fellow human being.

Carol's approach to her graduate student's work was ardent, passionate, contentious, demanding and extraordinarily generous. Everywhere in my work on Swift, and his critique of toleration, there are marks of Carol's ardor and belief in the work. I never had the time to tell her how and why my perspective on Enlightenment toleration was shaped by the secularism debates that were then taking place among the Indian intellegenstia. She never had the time to tell me how much my critique of toleration put into crisis her own secular tenets. As often happened with Carol, after a while in the teacher-student relationship it ceased to matter that those bits and pieces of cultural information were never exchanged. Carol was a child of the Enlightenment. Yet she stretched her mind and re-thought her own cherished assumptions for my work. Can an intellectual and political being do more? We both admired the unsentimental toughness of eighteenth century literature and agreed that the toughness did not come from an absence of emotion, rather the reverse.

I circle and approach the significance of Carol's political practice by focusing on a genre that Carol re-invented, and in which the quality of her mind came into its own, the genre of intellectual conversation. Our conversations were by no means idyllic. I often disagreed with Carol. It took Renu to explain to me that Carol asked for, invited, dignified, and negotiated with intellectual disagreement. At one of my dissertation meetings, she essayed a political practice that I did not recognize at first. She began with the well-founded premise that at such meetings there is always a subject position for the bad girl or the bad boy. In academic discourse the bad girl or boy disrupts consensus by drawing the fire towards herself; she enacts the disorderliness of genuine intellectual exchange rather than the spurious order of the disciplined and regimented meeting. The bad girl's political agenda is not apparent, she may seem to discredit the candidate, although in reality she pays her the compliment of taking her ideas seriously. Readers of Swiftian satire will readily recognize this as an effective rhetorical technique.

In line with this rhetoric of indirection, Carol marched into the room and launched into a blistering attack upon my analysis of Feuerbach's critique of religion. Understandably I had a good deal to say on the subject. However the meeting ended, as it often happens, without everyone saying all that they wanted to say, and without my having the opportunity to defend that part of my work. Later that day I

saw Carol at the stairwell. She looked tired and worn out, and gave me a long tragic look. Without even knowing how it happened, I was at her side. We spoke quietly about inconsequential things until she seemed to revive and looked almost cheerful. I was not quite sure why my simmering resentment had evaporated, although I was more determined than ever to reason with her.

I bided my time until weeks later, Carol was striding towards the parking lot and seeing me, signaled that I should accompany her. I complied, and along the way, carefully and concisely, demolished her position on my analysis of Feuerbach. Carol was a handsome loser, no-one could make her concede defeat unless it was her own analytical mind. I noticed with some amusement that Carol had quickened her pace, conceded the point, and roared off in the car. I stood in the middle of the car-park and threw my head back to laugh. It dawned on me that Carol had just demonstrated that as an Indian woman I was neither excluded nor given a special status. I had just been handed that rare thing- intellectual respect and membership.

Women's friendships and women's conversations are generally imagined in the literary ideal of Helen Burns talking to Miss Temple in *Jane Eyre*:"They conversed of things I had never heard of: of nations and times past: of secrets of nature discovered or guessed at: they spoke of books: how many they had read!" Our realities are post-modern and fractured. Friendships between academic women— real friendship I mean— are perhaps best described in a scenario that follows. Imagine two women who board different trains. The trains are on parallel tracks and all of the sudden they move in opposite directions. The two women have put their heads out of the window and are shouting words of support and encouragement to one another meanwhile their respective train pulls away. The noise and din of the railway station make the words indistinct, distorted. The image of trains on parallel tracks represents the experience of women meeting women in a world and an academy that was not designed for them. Consequently tragic collisions, sudden turnings away, misunderstandings, and hustle and bustle often mark the transmission of knowledge between women within the academy. There is a lot of static between women in a patriarchal society that keeps them divided against each other. Carol Kay imparted to me—this is one of her several gifts— that men and women as teachers and students must "raid the inarticulate" and keep shouting those conversations in order to foster the magical and subversive in civic-political life.

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NOTES

1. Carol's arrival at the University of Pittsburgh caused ripples of interest among students in Philosophy and Rhetoric Department as well as in the English Department. Stephen L. Carr suggested that I meet and talk to Carol as I had already begun work on Jonathan Swift. Everywhere in my dissertation, "Jonathan Swift's anti-colonial critique of the emergent discourse of toleration and secular learning" there are marks of Carol's ardor and belief in the work

2. The program titled "From Swastika to Jim Crow" was aired in 2001 on Jan 25, and Feb 1 at 10.00-11.00 ET as part of the PBS series for black history. The television program narrates the moving story of the college professors, refugees of German-Jewish descent, who found new lives and careers at historically all-black U.S. colleges in the South. More information is available at the PBS website: http://pbs.org/fromswastikatojimcrow/

3. The academic-intellectual and emotional-spiritual interactions between Carol and my two sisters highlights the breadth of her scholarly interests and teacherly gifts. Carol's participation in the academic work of my sister Reena took place through non-institutional as well as institutional channels. She participated in our lives as a faculty member of the English department and as a member of our female community. Reena speaks of Carol's interest in, and meditation on, issues of ethics. In her words,"literature enjoined for Carol a praxis of ethics in daily life." In her view Carol's preoccupation with ethics suffused her life. Here I quote Reena again:"she had the beauty of women who are consumed by the ideas of the mind, the ethical quality in their beauty comes from a life lived by uncommon rules, and a determination never to reproduce patriarchal violence on women students and colleagues."

4. Carol helped students name their work identity. Her feminist politics translated into the modes of representation she brought to a myriad of interactions with Renu and Reena. She never used the word "family" to describe us, but referred to us as a female community. Thus she emphasized that we worked together by choice and commitment rather than emotionalism, kinship or need.

5. Carol Kay's association with my sister Renu illuminates a significant and neglected aspect of her pedagogy, namely her academic-intellectual appeal to students from the departments of Philosophy as well as Rhetoric and Communication. As a member of the Rhetoric and Communication department at Pitt, Renu was putting together in 1992 a dissertation proposal on the rhetorical study of the emotions in the works of Aristotle and Hobbes. She enrolled in Carol's 1992 fall course on eighteenth -century British social thought, and promptly fell in love with Carol's exposition of Hobbes' *Leviathan*. Renu deemed it "brilliant, detailed, and rigorous." Carol became part of Renu's dissertation committee in the spring of 1992. As a labor of love, Jonathan joined Renu's committee in Jan 2001 until she completed her defense in December of that year. In my sister's view, "Carol taught philosophy as literature." Their conversations about rhetoric, their mutual passion for Hobbes, and Carol's unfulfilled desire to read Aristotle with Renu, were some of the intellectual milestones in their relationship. Renu points out :"Carol endeared herself to me precisely because she refused to be intimidated by the barriers of status, culture, age, and disciplinary affiliation, barriers that people stumble over and defeat them." Renu also adds: "In all those years I never met her or saw her without experiencing an irresistible and unconditional love for Carol's way of interacting with the world and the academy."

JANE AUSTEN AND THE WORLD WARS

CLAUDIA L. JOHNSON

Carol never read the essay printed here, but it is still an appropriate tribute to her. Ever since her early childhood, by all reports, Carol was an omnivorous reader, but she was a particularly fine and committed reader and re-reader of canonical literary texts. She excelled as a teacher of English Literature Surveys, and considering again and again classic texts by Shakespeare, Milton, Fielding Wordsworth, Austen, George Eliot, Virginia Woolf, among others, was an intellectual exercise that was extremely important to her. The project from which the essay below is drawn addresses the literary culture of readers and re-readers whose love for and understanding of Jane Austen develops and accretes over a lifetime, and ponders how the contingencies of their historical moments mingle with their literary appreciations and author-love. Living thoughtfully with classic texts and authors, compounding the meaning of one's own life and social history with theirs over an entire career of reading was something Carol exemplified and approved as a subject of study.

In 1938 Eric Linklater published *The Impregnable Women*, a novel imagining a second World War breaking out first between England and France. For my present purpose, what is most significant about this is that it features the doddering Prime Minister, Lord Pippin, a gentleman given to Country Life pleasures, whose utter incapacity for vigorous political leadership is signaled by the fact that he "passes from surreptitious to abandoned reading of [Austen's] novels as a national crisis deepens,"[1] first hiding volumes of *Emma* in chair cushions, relishing them only in private, and later reading them brazenly during Cabinet Meetings, paying scant attention to military reports, and heaving a sigh of relief when adjournments let him turn from war to "the pleasanter company of Jane Austen," "Miss Woodhouse and Mr. Knightley."[2]

To modern Austen scholars, Linklater rings true: of course Janeites are etiolated, dotty, and pacific. I learned all about this of reading D.W. Harding's "Regulated Hatred: An Aspect of the Work of Jane Austen" – delivered first as a lecture in 1939 and published in 1940, at the outset of the real WWII – which quotes Linklater with approval, and ridicules Janeites for regarding Austen as "a refuge . . . when the contemporary world [grows] too much for them."[3] Harding is anti-Janeite, but pro-Austen, and the stakes of this distinction are high. During wartime especially, liking Austen in the right way entails a proper sense of national identity and a properly virile ideal of English manhood. He censures Janeites because they prefer the cozy domesticity of country life to the tough realities of the "real"

world, especially as that world includes World War, retreating to the former out of their irresponsible fear of the latter.

Harding's claims sound intuitively true, but they are demonstrably false. Maintaining that Austen "penn[ed] satires against her neighbors whilst the Dynasts were tearing the world to pieces and consigning millions to their graves."[4] Frederic Harrison indeed scorned Austen's apparent insularity on the eve of WWI, when the Dynasts of our own century were consigning millions to their graves, and his contempt seems to foretell the satire in Linklater's later novel, where gentlemen discuss "fox-hounds and gundogs" and "gardener's topics" because they do not want to discuss how "people in large numbers were being killed."[5] But when we encounter Reginald Farrer celebrating Austen for passing over the "tyrannies and empires" that "erupt and collapse" here below, and for turning instead towards a "new kingdom of refuge from the toils and frets of life," a kingdom of "Art" existing "outside and beyond daily life," it is critical to recollect that he is writing this centenary essay in 1917, that he has read her in "a water-logged trench" and that the "cataclysms" of WWI fundamentally condition his tribute, particularly his claims about her capacity for "intense vitalization" and her remorseless iconoclasm.[6] Soldiers commonly love Jane Austen. Even Linklater's Janeite Prime Minister has no distaste for war; he *loves* to make sonorous speeches about the "English character . . . especially as it revealed itself in times of peril or difficulty."[7] Significantly, Harding omits to tell us that Linklater's novel is a modernization of *Lysistrata*. It is the sex-strike, not ordinary war, that drives Lord Pippin to *Emma*. If Janeites are alarmed by anything, it is by carnality, not carnage. Clearly, cults of Jane during this century were more warlike and more absorbed in the task of creating national character than Harding allowed, and we have inherited his high-handed dismissal. Harding's essay put criticism on a new course by wresting Austen away from Lord Pippin and his ilk. But putting Austen in the camp of a robust dissenting middle-class, he misrepresented her earlier significance. In this paper, I will attempt to recover what Harding occluded —the diverse ways in which Austen was a war novelist who mobilized national pride and national identity.

Austen's novels and movies are now marketed for women. Earlier, she was a man's novelist, and a soldier's. As I have elsewhere shown, Kipling's story "The Janeites" dramatizes a secret reading club of British soldiers, hopelessly and absurdly doomed in the trenches along the front lines. This story is typically understood to be about people who want to "escape" to a pre-war world in which everything was as unlike the front as possible. Yet Kipling's Janeites turn to Austen not because she helps them forget the front, but because she is all about living in a confined, narrow, and bruising place — a neighborhood — and thus helps make sense of trench warfare and hold its pain at bay. The shell-shocked Humberstall christens the canons after Austen's characters, chalking the names of Collins, Miss Bates, and Lady Catherine De Burgh along their casements, discussing his choice of names afterwards with Janeite officers over glasses of port. The only Janeite of his battalion to survive, Humberstall remains a Janeite after the war not because Austen's novels recover a life unshaken by war, but because they help him relive the Janeite fellowship in the trenches: "it brings it all back—down to the smell of the glue-paint on the screens. You take it from me, Brethren, there's no one to touch Jane when you're in a tight place."[8]

This attachment to Austen emerges not from an isolation from the world of mind-boggling car-

nage, but from an engagement in it and its aftermath. Discussing how the Great War left his generation with a "bitter cynicism" that transformed reading tastes, Hugh Walpole observed that while the "catastrophies [sic] and disappointments of the War left us with a deep contempt for what seemed to us a naive and desperately complacent idealism" of Victorian writers–such as Tennyson, Carlyle and Eliot — "it was very natural and significant that the one novelist of the nineteenth century who expressed in her work no philosophy at all, whose observation was ironic, whose genius was mainly in the humour of little things, was our own Jane Austen, who might, in spirit at least have belonged to our post-War time."[9] Austen is adopted as "our" contemporary because her skeptical and ironic "spirit" accords with a generation whose beliefs and ideals have blown up, a generation which respects the humor of little things not because they are darling, but more tragically because big things seem a sham.

Austen's presence on the fronts of WWI does not mean that she was never read elegiacally. In essays R.W. Chapman wrote during his own WWI duty, it is clear the isolation and alienation of the war motivate and intensify his sense of cultural stewardship: "To restore, and maintain in its integrity, the text of our great writers is a pious duty."[10] Writing from the front in Macedonia, he remembers "a series of summer evenings in Perthshire, when a lady read *Persuasion* to admiration," and this recollection confirms him in placing Austen alongside Samuel Johnson, whom he also edited, as a monument to the glory of England's bygone days.[11] Several reviewers of Chapman's 1923 edition of Austen's novels fixed her nostalgically in similar ways: *The New Statesman* notes how the illustrations and historical apparatus make Austen's novels "a *refuge* from present realities;" while *The Edinburgh Review* sighs, "It is something to have escaped, if only for a moment, from this 'world' that is 'too much with us' to that other world, the leisured, 'country-featured' and homely world of Jane Austen."[12]

Although a yearning for a lost past animates these readers' love for Jane Austen, she was the preferred novelist for many of the WWI generation because her reticence seemed continuous with the present. Arthur Quiller-Couch's lecture "Patriotism in English Literature I" addressed young men about to go to war. It celebrates "the cheerful irony of the English private soldier, now fighting for us on the Belgian border" by opposing the ironic implicitness of his patriotism to the "loud-mouthed" bombast of the German soldier, whose noisy *Deutschland uber alles!* he dismisses as the shrill demagoguery of false patriotism. To Quiller-Couch, understatement and implicitness are the values of the English soldier, whose patriotism is holy and true because it emerges not from politics or conquest, but from the "true source that feeds them" (283): is "home," the "green nook of his youth in Yorkshire or Derbyshire, Shropshire or Kent or Devon; where the folk are slow, but there is seed-time and harvest and 'pure religion breathing household laws'" (p. 284). Quiller-Couch's rhapsody on English character and English patriotism singles out Wordsworth. But the qualities he admires are compatible with the then-dominant reception of Austen's novels. He explains why the silence we think of as so distinctively Austenian —silence about national affairs during times of national crisis, about war in times of war— must be heard as eloquence; not as an absence, but as a presence of sentiment too deep tout. Silence is an implicitness, and implicitness as such is a positivity, as is that circumscription of purview and modesty of reference that have since been denominated and dismissed as feminine: "We do not, in our true hours—as all our glorious poetry attests—brag of England as a world-power, actual or potential. Blame it who will upon our insularity, we do habitually narrow and intensify our national passion upon the home and hearths now to be defended" (288).[13] During the Great War, I am suggesting, Austen was

the beneficiary of efforts seen as "narrowness" as a grandeur, and to define particular kinds and sites of rural life — especially as represented in villages in the south of England —as England itself, and with this to celebrate specific qualities of temper as befitting English character in general and English manhood in particular.[14]

Although Austen's manful love of the local, which is equatable with the national, played to non-English readers as well as English ones, [15] Austenian reserve and local attachment were more commonly celebrated as a distinctively English attribute and as a distinctly English national treasure. When Shakespearean scholar and Janeite extraordinaire Caroline Spurgeon–who was American born, but lived and taught in England most of her life–called Austen "a classic," she was not (merely) indulging in the ecstatic hyperbole typical of the Janeites. By classic, Spurgeon meant that "every scrap of information we can gather, every ray of light that can be thrown upon her character, her outlook, her surroundings or her methods of work, are of intense and indeed of national importance." Unlike Chapman and his approving reviewers, Spurgeon dismisses the "longer leisured vacuity of country life a century and a quarter ago" as a "matter of antiquarian interest." She is compelled rather by what remains permanent: "English character" itself. No one in Spurgeon's view "had a clearer insight" into English character than Austen: delicate perceptions and moderation in expression, along with a reserve covering very deep feeling, self-control, hatred of extremes, shams and insincerity are the "characteristically English" qualities of Austen's fiction. And because Austen excels in "the indirect revelation of character either through conversation or action, or sometimes letters" her books are full of "vistas"–large views opening out majestically onto Englishness itself, and as such constitute a national education.[16] In Austenian appreciation after World War I, characters in Austen's novels —as in the English novel generally —create what Benedict Anderson has called the "imagined political community" of the "nation,"[17] promoting fellowship across temporal and class borders, and a sense of sovereign destiny. At times, English character is displayed as a tribute to the War that was: J. B. Priestley's *English Humour* was first published as part of *The English Heritage Series*, and its introduction was by Stanley Baldwin, then Prime Minister of England and President of the English Association, and later the prototype for Lord Pippin, the Janeite Prime Minister in Linklater's novel. For Baldwin, Heritage books testify to the English spirit, like memorials to the men lying in "our graveyards in Flanders and on the Somme."[18] The Great War also underlies Priestley's discussion, but he is prospective rather than retrospective. In honoring humorous character in Austen, Chaucer, Congreve, Jonson, Hazlitt, Lamb, Dickens, Sterne, Fielding, and Shakespeare, Priestley celebrates English resistance tyranny: "The mind must be free to play to be humourous," he declares, ". . . The Englishman rarely turns doctrinaire if only because he . . . will not turn over that inner man, with his instincts and allegiances, to the drill sergeant of the intellect." This tradition of national character is a source of pride, but Priestley stresses the obligations it entails, urging readers to use it to resist threats on the horizon: "It would be better for us to be once more a small outlandish people and yet be renowned for this spirit than to bestride the earth and lose our laughter in gloom, suspicion, and hate. Shakespeare and Dickens and all their fellow humorists [sic] were once here, and we must not fail them. Just as our humour is one of our most glorious heritages, so, too, it is not the least of our trusts."[19]

In an effort to wrest cultural authority away from largely upper-class men of letters and legitimate a hard-working and tough-minded middle-class professorate, Harding represented Janeites as com-

mitted to "the gentler virtues of a civilized social order" and accordingly blind to "unexpected astringencies" of her novels.[20] But the Austen who throve in England between the World Wars was often understood to be not apart from the real world, but quite a large part of it, where that world was specifically understood to be under duress of the severest sort, and where qualities like reticence, understatement, local attachment, self-control, and an irony bordering on cynicism were understood not as decorative graces of the social club or drawing room but as constitutive elements of a national character, including national manhood, that has seen the worst and survived with a composure at once fragile and admirable.

The escapist Austen Harding deplored became more prevalent during and immediately after the *second* World War. Between the World Wars, a grandiose imperial England was replaced by the littler England of manor houses and gentility, around which a distinct form of patriotism could be formed. John Taylor writes, "At the same time as people rejected jingoism, they drew a less brittle kind of strength from the reformed sense of the nation as self-deprecating, understated, gentle and at ease with itself."[21] Seen thus, Austen's works moved towards the center of a national identity shaped by a sense of the home front's vulnerability. Austen mobilized national feeling by being linked to the experience of peaceful privacy rudely intruded upon by war. In a letter to the London New Statesman and Nation, one gentleman boasts being "the only man in London who has been bombed off a lavatory seat while reading Jane Austen. She went into the bath; I went through the door."[22] Part of the sublime and the ridiculous here is that the bombing incursions thwart the consolations of Austenian reading in the most private of places. This gentleman was not the only one reading Austen during air raids. During the second World War, newspapers frequently report that Austen's novels were in great demand and hard to come by, in part because paper restrictions halted the republication of "classic" novels, and in part because storehouses, bombed in air raids, lost their stock. Because Austen is now construed as a respite from war (rather than an exemplar of war, as for Kipling's Janeites), she becomes a precious resource. One London newspaper in April 1943 writes "It is as pleasant to be told ... that the young men and women in the Forces want to read MISS AUSTEN's novels, as it is harrowing to learn that they cannot get them." The shortages of Austen's novels thus are punishing, for soldiers deserve a reprieve: "If the best and most reviving literature for times such as these is that which gives a brief escape from thoughts of war," this writer continues, "then who should stand beside MISS AUSTEN? . . . The books are full of the drowsy humming of a summer garden which can deafen the ears even to the humming of the aeroplane overhead."[23] Such "escapism" is so proximate to what is being escaped from (the humming of imagined gardens, the humming of airplanes overhead) that it cannot be separated from it.

Books weren't the only purveyors of Austenian consolation. The MGM *Pride and Prejudice* (1940) — featuring Olivier, Garson, Gwenn, and a screenplay by Huxley —is a war piece. The Foreign Office encouraged U.S. support for the war by opposing the view of England as aristocratic and decadent with a view of England as robust and the war as the "people's war."[24] For wary U.S. audiences in 1940 , *Pride and Prejudice*—like the *Mrs. Miniver* (1942) — presented England not as entrenched in effete class structures, but as domesticated, endearing and spunky, as worthy and needful of our alliance.

Similarly, in a Saturday Review column devoted to war reading for U.S. soldiers, Henry Seidel

Canby claims that "The greatest novels (in English at least) written in wartime are unquestionably Jane Austen's," and he is thinking of her time as well as his own:

> Jane's stories are absolutely conditioned by the threats to the security of that marvelously integrated country life of England. In the lurid light coming from overseas, the character of the Englishman, the temperament of the English woman, took on a heightened importance. The English country side, which they had built seemed fairer, more desirable than ever before. The country life of parson, squire, and privileged neighborhood acquired an importance which it did not possess, because of its happy contrasts with confusion, loss, and breakdown abroad. In this provincial Utopia, bad temper, pomposity, servility, sentimentality, snobbishness, and greed were seen as especial dangers because they were the cracks which might topple down the magnificent stability of a society which had lost a new world in the West, and was standing fast when all of Europe fell.

Canby's tribute to the momentousness of English character, English gender, English landscape endeared by danger, reminds American soldiers why England is worth fighting for and with. The American war effort in Europe draws on a "reservoir" of "good will for England and the character and temperament moulded there through the centuries" and for Canby the English ought to "Thank Jane Austen as much as anyone for that."[25]

While the Austen of WWI went with English soldiers in Flanders or on the Somme, in WWII she is linked to the homeland assaulted by barbarity. The identification of Austen with the assaulted nation comes across most clearly in English propaganda efforts made in the aftermath of the Baedeker Blitzes. Provoked by British bombing attacks on civilian targets in the German town of Lübeck in March 1942, the German air command (acting, it was rumored, on Hitler's personal orders) executed retaliatory air raids on Exeter, Norwich, York, Canterbury, and Bath, towns marked with stars in the Baedeker Guide to Great Britain. These were understood as attacks not upon sites of military importance, but as attacks upon an English cultural history calculated to demoralize. The bombings of Bath were heavier and deadlier than those visited upon the other towns, consisting of three raids on April 25 - 26, and one on April 26-27, 1942, and killing some 400 people.[26] In the feature on the Bath bombings that ran in the July 4 issue of *Picture Post,* Austen is a strong inter-textual presence, as if the Nazis aimed at that aspect of England and Englishness she typified. Passing over the damage done to houses, shelters, and people in poorer parts of Bath, *Picture Post* suggests that it was "our heritage" that suffered during the blitz, a heritage coextensive with the Assembly Rooms, the Royal Crescent, the "elegant drawing room[s]," and "the walls and furniture" of Austen's time, which "people of taste" awoke to discover "we" were losing when the bombing began.[27]

Before the 1940s, accounts of Bath sometimes mention Austen among the throngs of luminaries associated with the city.[28] But during the war, the identification of the woman and the city and English heritage tout court is explicit in Lieutenant R.A. Lendon Smith's book *Bath,* written in 1943 and published in 1944 after Smith's death at 29. Smith is described in the preface as a medievalist who had "a great devotion to all English things," who "cherished . . . the high civilized traditions of his country."[29]

Smith's penultimate chapter, devoted to Austen, invites us to see the city solely through her eyes, via *Northanger Abbey* and *Persuasion*. A devout Catholic, whose trip to Bath was part of a "pilgrimage" to " the great cathedrals, abbeys, and castles of the West country," Smith saw Bath as a holy city, "a new Jerusalem built by some magic hand in England's green and pleasant land." As Smith's rhapsodic eschatology suggests, Bath occupies historical and transcendent temporalities —is both eternal and ageless, as well as embattled and endeared. Though Bath comprehends Rome and the Middle Ages, its apogee is the Regency, and is thus Austen's city. Forget that Austen did not like Bath, that she found its yellow stone glaring. The myth is the point. The Bath Austen knew is Bath perdurable. A feminine manifestation of national glory and endurance: "She remains to-day in her architecture, her history, and her tradition, a perfect epitome of our national past, a harbinger of an even greater future."

Having consolidated English history and character into the simultaneously ancient and Austenian site of Bath, Smith has it both ways when he turns to the Baedeker Raids. The bombing of the Assembly Rooms and the Royal Crescent are savage attacks on grace: photos of rubble testify to the monumental incivility of the enemy. But because Bath is eternal, it cannot be injured, and so the enemy is both atrocious and ineffectual. Smith's city is a lady of such Austenian poise that her dignity cannot be ruffled:

> In spite of the destruction of the Assembly Rooms . . .one is amazed at the smallness of the irreparable injury that the Luftwaffe has been able to inflict on the Queen City of the West. . . .Bath bears her scars bravely. Her head is proud and erect, for in her two thousand years of recorded history she has seen much of pagan hatred and fury. . . . Conscious of the greatness of her historic past, Bath can afford to endure the present and to contemplate the future with a lustrous clam born of ripe experience."[30]

The foregoing confirms John Taylor's observation that "England was transformed between the wars from the masculine, heroic nation of the late Victorian and Edwardian periods into a 'feminized' country." [31] But it also suggests that Austen is not merely *associated* with an elegiac ethos of Englishness, but materially identified with England as a place. Elizabeth Jenkins' 1938 biography opens with a tribute to Georgian England inflected in feminine terms: "The ghost of that vanished loveliness haunts us," she writes, "in every memorial that survives the age: a house in its park, a tea-cup, the type and binding of a book" —in things Austenian.[32]

The identification of Austen with the "vanished loveliness" of England brings us to the founding of the Jane Austen Society. Compared to other literary societies, it is a latecomer. The Shakespeare Club was formed in 1824 and the Shakespeare Birthplace Trust in 1847; the Browning Society in 1881; the Brontë Society in 1893; the Dickens Fellowship in 1902; the Keats Shelley Memorial Association in 1906; the George Eliot Fellowship in 1930. But though bands of private Janeites were common, the JAS was not formed until 1940, a year after the outbreak of war. At its founding, its aim was not the appreciation of Austen's novels — officers of this Society have boasted never reading them! —but the preservation of Austenian property. Even today, the stated goal of the JAS is "To obtain possession of the house at Chawton (accomplished) and to make it available to the public as a show-place and museum." [33] Until the 1940s, Chawton Cottage – where Austen lived from 1809 until 1817 – was divided into three separate tenements and in a shambles. Though marked as Austen's one-time home, it was

so far from being a shrine that there had been talk of tearing it down for road-reconstruction. Dorothy Darnell started the Jane Austen Society when she found the cast-iron fire grate from the Austen's dining-room on a heap of nettles, having been wrenched out and discarded to make way for gas fire.[34] War helped transform this egregiously ordinary fire grate into a treasure, and Darnell's efforts of local preservation into nationally momentous rescue-work.

In 1940, the handful of founding members knew the times were bleak and resources scarce: "The time for starting such a society could scarcely be worse," Chairman Hugh Curtis wrote, casting about for membership subscriptions, adding however it is "a good idea to-day to think of pleasant things like this though it may sound a little mad to you, amidst the general racket that is going on."[35] And yet more than therapeutic diversion was at stake in trying "to put Jane's house in order, " for in 1940 it was not apparent that England wouldn't end up in the same scrap heap where Dorothy Darnell found the fire grate. As elsewhere in England, lovers of England's "heritage" hid national treasures from the depredations of the feared invader, the Jane Austen Society not only started to raise money for Chawton, but also to gather and preserve the donkey cart, the bacon roller, the wash house as relics. After the war, in 1946, when more resources were available for this undertaking, the JAS appealed for contributions from "admirers of Jane Austen's works, who would like to see this house in which all of them but one were written, preserved as a national monument."[36] The *Times* printed this appeal and endorsed the project of preserving "for posterity more than a vestige: a solid monument of Georgian comfort and Georgian elegance."[37] But not even Austen's status as national treasure was sufficient to raising a stunning £5,000 worth of purchase and repair costs at an annual subscription rate of a half crown. But a soldier's Janeism came through. In 1948, T. Edward Carpenter, a lawyer outside the Austen Society circle, purchased Chawton and funded its repairs in memory of his son, Philip John Carpenter, a Lieutenant in the 1st Battalion of the East Surrey Regiment, who died in action in Italy in 1944. Chawton Cottage is as much a monument to him and his devotion to Austen as it is to Austen: his father erected a marble panel commemorating him in her drawing room.

We began with a fictional Prime Minister's Janeism, and it is fitting to conclude with the remarks of a real P.M.. Ill with pneumonia, Winston Churchill decided to follow his doctors' advice and to put aside the work of war as he recuperated. Having read only *Sense and Sensibility* before, Churchill (manifestly not, we infer, a Janeite) asked his daughter to read *Pride and Prejudice* aloud to him: "What calm lives they had those people," he observed. "No worries about the French Revolution or the crashing struggle of the Napoleonic Wars. Only manners controlling natural passion so far as they could, together with cultured explanations of any mischance." For Churchill, Austen is as far removed from WWII as she was from Napoleonic Wars, and precious on these very grounds: English soldiers fight to restore "calm lives" so that manners may once again control natural passions without the unnatural trials of war.

With Churchill, we glimpse the now familiar Austen, an author whose independence from or indifference to the world at war are the givens that enable her to turn with such intensity of discrimination to the world of manners. Churchill's words, drawn from *The Second World War*, are proudly displayed at Chawton Cottage. But they are not an unequivocal tribute. As I have shown, many earlier readers saw Austen not only as the object but as the agent of national heroism, not just what we fight for, but a fellow

soldier whose poise and disillusion were inspiring. By consigning Austen to a landscape untouched by national conflict Churchill helped to create Harding's Austen, though Harding had her hate rather than celebrate that world. For him, she is the "formidable ally," but real war has become culture war, a conflict conceived in social rather than political terms—against not Germany but against the enemy within English society, its glibness and materialism, "things and people which were to her, and still are, hateful."[38] We can recognize this version of Austen too, but if it comes at the cost of forgetting how Austen has also served as a template for an Englishness at once limitless and parochial, and as a site of consolation and reprieve as well as a site of conflict and of ordeal, then we may not have gained much on Lord Pippin after all.

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NOTES

1. This characterization comes from D.W. Harding, "Regulated hatred: An Aspect of the Work of Jane Austen" in *Regulated Hatred and Other Essays on Jane Austen,* ed. Monica Lawlor (London: Athlone Press, 1980), p. 5 Harding's essay was first published in Scrutiny 8 (1940), pp. 346-62.

2. Eric Linklater, *The Impregnable Women* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1938), pp.199, 201.

3. Harding, p. 5.

4. Harrison's letter to Thomas Hardy is dated 10 November 1913, quoted in B.C. Southam, Jane Austen: *The Critical Heritage* (London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul,1987) vol. II, pp. 87-8.

5. Linklater, p. 175.

6. Reginald Farrer, "Jane Austen," *The Quarterly Review* 452 (July, 1917), pp.1 -30.

7. Linklater, p. 170.

8. Rudyard Kipling, "The Janeites" in *Debits* and *Credits* (New York: Doubleday, 1926), p. 146.

9. Hugh Walpole, *Reading: An Essay* (New York and London, 1927), pp. 78-9.

10. Chapman, "The Textual Criticism of English Classics," in *The Portrait of a Scholar and Other Essays Written in Macedonia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1920) p. 79.

11. Chapman, "Reading Aloud," in *The Portrait of a Scholar*, p. 44.

12. *The New Statesman*, 22 (1923), p. 145; *The Edinburgh Review*, 239 (1924), p. 32.

13. Arthur Quiller-Couch, "Patriotism in English Literature I" in *Studies in Literature*, First Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923), pp. 283, 284, 288.

14. My discussion here has been much influenced by Alun Howkins' "The Discovery of Rural England" in *Englishness: Politics and Culture*, 1880-1920 (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 62-88.

15. As Richard English has shown in his recent biography of Ernie O'Malley, the classics of English literature, among whom Austen figured prominently, were dear to the hearts of many IRA rebels during this decade. Thomas MacDonagh, a poet and university professor of English in Ireland, devoted his last literature class before the Easter Uprising of 1916 to Austen. `Ah, there's nobody like Jane, lads,' he sighed while closing his *Pride and Prejudice* for the last time. Shortly afterwards, MacDonagh was arrested and executed before a firing squad for his leadership in the rebellion. A "lad's" passion for "Jane" was clearly consistent with the armed nationalist insurgency of the Irish against Jane's own England. See Declan Kiberd, "Romantic Ireland" TLS, July 31, 1998, p. 25. This article reviews Richard English's *Ernie O'Malley: IRA Intellectual* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998). I am very grateful to Jonathan Arac for calling this fascinating material to my attention.

16. Caroline Spurgeon. "Jane Austen," *Essays by Divers Hands, Being the Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature of the United Kingdom*, vol. vii (London: OUP, 1927), pp. 81, 90, 97.

17. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, rev. ed (London: Verso, 1983; 1991), p.6.

18. J.B. Priestley, *English Humour* (London and New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1929), Introduction [by Stanley Baldwin], p. vi. Part *The English Heritage Series*.

19. Priestley, pp. 11-12, 180.

20. Harding, pp. 41, 43.

21. Taylor, p. 188.

22. This brief item is reproduced in *The Baltimore Evening Sun,* October 31, 1940, under the heading "A London Diary," with a credit to *The London New Statesman and Nation.* I encountered this item among the notebooks compiled by Alberta Hirshheimer Burke entitled "References and Allusion to Jane Austen" in the Burke Collection at Goucher College. Alberta Burke collected articles mentioning Austen from 1936-1975.

23. Also from Alberta Burke's "References and Allusions to Jane Austen." This item is labeled as from a London Paper, April 1943.

24. See Susan A Brewer, *To Win the Peace: British Propaganda in the United States During World War II* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1997), esp. chapter 89 ("The Story of Comrade in Arms"); and Nicholas John Cull *Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign Against American Neutrality in*

World War II (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

25. *Saturday Review* (December 5, 1942), p 26, initialed H.S.C.: = Henry Seidel Canby. On the subject of WWII and reading, I am much indebted to Paul Fussell, *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), as well as to his earlier *The Great War and Modern Memory* (New York: Oxford University, 1975).

26. Nial Rothnie, *The Baedeker Blitz: Hitler's Attack on Britain's Historic Cities* (Shepperton: Ian Allen, 1992), p. 141. For comparison purposes: Canterbury was bombed on three different night, but reportedly suffered 49 deaths, one by accident. Exeter was raided on four nights, but two of those raids are described as "minor" or as "nuisance," and 246 deaths are recorded. What seems to set Bath apart is the fact that it was bombed three times as heavily on the first night with high explosives. Bombing the second night was also heavy, though more incendiaries rather than explosives were used.

27. John Taylor, *A Dream of England: Landscape, Photography, and the Tourist's Imagination* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1994), pp. 195-7. I am particularly indebted to Taylor's book.

28. In *The Book of Bath* (Bath, 1925), edited by F.G. Thomson, George Saintsbury comes out as a "devotee of 'Jane' and singles out scenes in *Northanger Abbey* and *Persuasion* as contributions to the "great literature" of Bath in his chapter "Bath in Literature;" and Christopher Hussey's chapter on "Bath and the Eighteenth-Century" features Austen along with discussions of gaming, Assembly Rooms, manners, etiquette, and literary figures. But Edith Sitwell's Bath (London, 1932) celebrates the fashionable 18th-century Bath of Beau Nash and Sarah Siddons and mentions Austen in passing only on the last page.

29. R.A. L. Smith, *Bath* (London: B.T. Batsford, 1944), p. vi. See also Laura M. Ragg, *Jane Austen in Bath* (London: Alexander Moring, 1938).

30. Smith, Bath, pp. 10, 112.

31. Taylor, p. 112.

32. Elizabeth Jenkins, *Jane Austen; a Biography* (Victor Gollancz: London, 1938), p. 5. For a splendid discussion of Austen's function in defining domestic national literature during this period see, Deidre Lynch, "At Home With Jane Austen" in *Cultural Institutions of the Novel*, ed. Deidre Lynch and William Warner (Duke University Press: Durham and London, 1996), pp. 159-2.

33. *The English Association Handbook of Societies and Collections,* ed. Alicia C. Percival (London: The Library Association, 1977), p.5.

34. Elizabeth Jenkins, "Introduction" to *Jane Austen Society: Collected Reports, 1949-1965* (London: William Dawson & Sons, 1967), p. ix; p. 43. In one place, Jenkins says the grate was in a heap of

scrap metal at the local forge; in another, that it was in a heap of nettles.

35. Private letter, dated July 17, 1940, from Hugh Curtis.

36. *An Appeal for Jane Austen's House at Chawton New Alton, Hampshire* (n.d. but c. 46?), published by the Jane Austen Society.)

37. *Times*, December 7, 1946. A year earlier, the *Times* observed that Chawton Cottage "deserves preservation, in an age of destruction and decay" (December 7, 1946).

38. Harding, p. 50.

III
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BURKE ON THE SUBLIME AND THE UNCONTROLLABILITY OF PERSUASION

DAVID BROMWICH

The book one encounters in modern descriptions of *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* is distinguished without being very interesting. In the field of eighteenth-century aesthetics, it is acknowledged as a beginning; in Burke's career, it is read as a clue to his writings on the French Revolution—though, as to the sort of beginning it marks, or the sort of clue it provides, there has never been even a minimal consensus. The claim for its status in aesthetics turns on the extent to which it is really a precursor of Kant's *Critique of Judgment:* Burke's argument that sublimity is to be predicated of an idea not an object counts as evidence in favor of the connection, while his refusal to separate the feelings of the sublime and beautiful from interested motives of action would seem to count as evidence against.

Political readers can see that the way Burke sexes the sublime and beautiful, with male gallantry opposed to female modesty and delicacy, ought to shed light on his discussion of chivalric morality in the *Reflections on the Revolution in France* and his rhapsody on the queen of France as a symbol of an aristocratic regime whose beauty canceled half its evil. The best commentator on the story the two books share, it seems to me, is Mary Wollstonecraft, who in her *Vindication of the Rights of Men* pointed out that if women are set apart by the virtue of passive modesty, and if society is like a woman, it follows that inertia and docility will be the pattern of all social conduct. With the ethic of the *Sublime and Beautiful* already contaminated by the doctrine that we must often acquiesce in our nature—a doctrine that takes on a political shading in the *Reflections*—both works on Wollstonecraft's analysis come out looking doubly regressive.

Wollstonecraft's is a strong perception, and deep enough to remind us how much the older and the younger Burke had in common, but the polemic that is partly implied and partly extractable from her reading also overshoots the mark, since one cannot find anywhere in the text of the *Sublime and Beautiful* a suggestion that society is like a woman. Indeed, a coherent picture of social existence is hard to coax out of Burke's few, sketchy, and (as I find them) disappointing pages on the beautiful. An even less consistent picture emerges if you try to combine the moral psychology of the beautiful with that of the sublime: a non-social way of feeling if ever there was one. Yet the more recent academic commentators, few of whom have learned what they could from Wollstonecraft, share an irritable suspicion that it should be possible to make the *Sublime and Beautiful* and the *Reflections* speak to each other. The results, from Kramnick, Paulson, De Bolla, Furnis, and others, have been sometimes obvious, sometimes counter-intuitive, and always more compelling the less you have read of Burke.

One also finds readings whose ingenuity is such as to make them obvious and counter-intuitive at once. Ronald Paulson, for instance, in *Representations of Revolution*, says the problem with the French Revolution was that, as we can see from looking back at the *Sublime and Beautiful*, clear visibility is an enemy of the sublime, while obscurity is a state conducive to sublimity, and since the revolution was made by *lumières* who wanted to light things up and actually did so, the cataclysm was bound to be lacking in sublimity. Presumably, from Burke's point of view, this was part of what was wrong with it. I omit other examples in a similar vein, though the argument I have just paraphrased is frequently and respectfully cited in the literature on Burke from English departments. Wollstonecraft was a great polemicist and Burke's equal as a psychologist, whereas the recent commentaries are mostly just suggestions by people trying to find something to say. Various as they are, they all share a teleological assumption: the germ of Burke-the-reactionary must be present in Burke-the-aesthete. In what follows, I don't intend to refute this assumption, only to show how hard it is to render coherent, in view of the argument of the *Sublime and Beautiful*.

The book has never had many real readers, as far as I can tell—readers, as distinct from active and selective borrowers from its glamorous terminology—but intellectual historians early in the twentieth century at least tried to give an unfanciful summary. They tended to dispatch the book with a condescending adjective (*empiricist, romantic*, and *eccentric* were particular favorites), but they agreed its importance lay in the attempt to fix a sensational origin for the passions and opinions we commonly exalt by higher names. In this scientific part of his enterprise, Burke's predecessor is Hobbes; but the book has a larger psychological ambition as well: it aims to track to a non-rational source the most conspicuously rational of human actions by finding their motive in a human craving for representations as such, a habitual reliance on ideas or words rather than things or experiences. Here Burke has no model: only Machiavelli comes close, and it is not very close. But I have now to add a distinction the histories tend to ignore. The *Sublime and Beautiful* registers with enormous power an Enlightenment iconoclasm regarding the co-operative effects of art and morality. Burke's rival here and fellow iconoclast is the Rousseau of the *Letter to D'Alembert*—another work that shows the mutual permeability of, on the one hand, the feelings of approval and disapproval that are the cement of morality, and, on the other, the emotions of pleasure, revulsion, and morbid interest that belong to our experience as spectators of art.

Morbid interest as an aesthetic emotion has not been much noticed by moral philosophers, but there is a tremendous example of it in book four of the *Republic*, where Socrates is trying to prove that besides the rational and the appetitive faculties, there is a third part of the soul, the spirited, which may be used to foster and check the other parts. He then tells the anecdote of Leontius, the son of Aglaion, who "was going up from Piraeus along the outside of the North Wall when he saw some corpses lying at the executioner's feet. He had an appetite to look at them, but at the same time he was disgusted and turned away. For a time he struggled with himself and covered his face, but, finally, overpowered by the appetite, he pushed his eyes wide open and rushed towards the corpses, saying, 'Look for yourselves, you evil wretches, take your fill of the beautiful sight!'" I leave this without comment except to say that it is so startling and true an example as to prove more than it means to—namely that there may be a faculty or tendency of the soul, besides appetite, which serves as a soil for perverse desires. In short, one need not suppose that the effect described here comes from the appetitive part of the soul being

held in check by the spirited part. Much of Rousseau's thinking about art, and much of Burke's, can be inferred from this one moment in the *Republic*.

Plato's example, like Burke's kindred example in the *Sublime and Beautiful* of the priority of an execution to every other kind of spectacle, reminds us vividly and unpleasantly of the human propensity for watching as people are turned into corpses. What all such examples suggest is how impoverished our language of taste is, and maybe how impoverished it has to be in order to submit to the regularity of a language. Carol Kay discussing Hume's *Enquiry into Morals* and his essay "Of the Standard of Taste" observes: "It seems that there are fewer terms of value than there are opinions, and the apparent continuity of these general terms gives the illusion of more similarity of opinion than there really is." This is, I think, a significant internal inference from Hume's argument; but Burke (who was Hume's disciple in moral philosophy) would probably have wanted to add: "There are fewer terms of criticism than there are art emotions, and the apparent regularity of the idiom of judgment in every age gives the illusion of more uniformity of response than there really is." That is why he proposes to take his inquiry back to the *origin* of our ideas of the sublime and beautiful: that far back, perhaps there is less chance of our being deluded; we will be able to describe the few elementary feelings in the simplicity to which they are reducible. Every reader of the book remembers at least its main reduction. "We submit to what we admire, but we love what submits to us." Out of that primary antithesis, Burke builds his polarity of fear, grandeur, and virile assertiveness, ranged against love, delicacy, and feminine submissiveness.

In the first part of the *Sublime and Beautiful,* sympathy is defined as "a sort of substitution." Burke's understanding of his subject turns on a different kind of substitution, the process by which we make a reality *tell* by turning it into a representation. Pleasure is the motive for this, since the mind comes to know unconsciously, by the satisfaction of its desires, what only philosophers have realized in the abstract, that "objects which in the reality would shock, are in tragical, and such like representations, the source of a very high species of pleasure." When Burke says that at any theatrical performance, news of a hanging taking place nearby would empty the theatre, the *frisson* of the example may draw attention from an important generalization he offers directly after: "I believe that this notion of our having a simple pain in the reality, yet a delight in the representation, arises from hence, that we do not sufficiently distinguish what we would by no means chuse to do, from what we should be eager enough to see if it were once done." The application of this remark to such genres as epic, tragedy, and historical painting will be clear at once, but suppose we extend it to political writing of an apparently sober and purposeful sort? Is it possible to imagine a political writer, and indeed a political theorist, moved by curiosity to see certain interdicted thoughts become vivid in words "if it were once done"? What if the same thinker were to make sure it is once done, in the only way a writer can make sure? This may seem an unlikely whim, so long as we preserve a deference toward the impartiality that is often claimed by political writers. Yet the ground is taken from the objection when one recalls that on Burke's analysis the motive of the writer must be unconscious in any case. (Though the difficulty is more intricate than that: the opening sentence of the *Sublime and Beautiful* asserts that "The first and the simplest emotion which we discover in the human mind, is curiosity." To what extent is curiosity an emotion of which we can be conscious?) According to Burke, we have a desire for strong emotions to be produced in us, a desire that itself resists analysis and cuts short deliberation, and which, once we submit to it, is sure to yield effects in excess of our expectation and without the intervention of the will.

In part II, section 4, the section on obscurity, Burke adds a further note about a necessary uncertainty in the causes of such excitement:

> It is one thing to make an idea clear, and another to make it *affecting* to the imagination. If I make a drawing of a palace, or a temple or a landscape, I present a very clear idea of those objects; but then (allowing for the effect of imitation which is something) my picture can at most affect only as the palace, temple, or landscape would have affected in the reality. On the other hand, the most lively and spirited verbal description I can give, raises a very obscure and imperfect — of such objects; but then it is in my power to raise a stronger *emotion* by the description than I could do by the best painting.

The more obscure or unclear or uncertain the idea, the more indefinite and ambiguous and suspended will be the signification of anything conveyed in words, and the better chance it will have to arouse our emotions in ways impossible to anticipate. A "very obscure and imperfect idea" of the object is not a sufficient condition of great emotions in the spectator. In Burke's treatment, it comes close to seeming a necessary condition. And he draws the appropriate conclusion when he remarks in the next section: "It is our ignorance of things that causes all our admiration, and chiefly excites our passions. Knowledge and acquaintance make the most striking causes affect but little. It is thus with the vulgar, and all men are as the vulgar in what they do not understand." Greatness, or the idea of greatness, which is all we are ever conversant with, always goes with unfamiliarity: those who live in a state of superstition or dread, perpetually overawed by natural phenomena whose causes they have not learned, will also be those who live most constantly in the presence of sublime ideas. The enlightened differ from them, but only in degree.

The argument here seems to establish that, to the extent that the arts are interested in great effects, they cannot be interested in acts of communication that are accurate, adequate, or accountable. The suspension of sense occurs on both sides, of course: the artist cannot command his meanings, any more than the audience can control them. But, so far, the implications seem confined to the arts, and they tell us what a perceptive reader might have worked out from hints in Longinus. Burke, however, takes an unprecedented next step in part V of the *Sublime and Beautiful,* which is entitled "Words." So entirely do we count on words to function as universals, that they quickly lose any pretense of reference? But, says Burke, we actually come to rely on this as one of their convenient effects: "The sounds being often used without reference to any particular occasion, and carrying still their first impressions, they at last utterly lose their connection with the particular occasions that gave rise to them." The process of dissociation, in short, which regularly turns metaphors into dead metaphors, works also at the same time to turn referring into non-referring literalisms. This is, to repeat, an ordinary convenience of words, even as it is the source of their possible estrangement from us and their unpredictable power. "Nothing is an imitation further than as it resembles some other thing; and words undoubtedly have no sort of resemblance to the ideas for which they stand." And yet, unmeaning as they are in this sense, they are able to convey all the more strongly a charge of irregular passion: "We yield to sympathy, what we refuse to description." The interesting thought for a reader of Burke is that an artist of persuasion, a political writer or speaker, both aims and is compelled to use words for precisely this emotive end. He may aim at controllable effects on readers, but must take the uncertainty with the influence his words

have. Where great effects of persuasion are achieved, we should thus expect to notice gaps in descriptive accuracy, adequacy, and accountability.

A writer as intelligent and self-conscious as Burke might be supposed to build into his political works themselves an awareness of the incommensurability of the means of language with an end marked by any final or calculable effect. He does give such signs I believe, in a way that deserves to hold our attention, and not only in contexts where he is speaking of obscure projections which he deplores, or the production of illusions which he contingently favors. I will offer only two examples here. In the *Speech on Fox's East India Bill,* where he asks how wicked deeds may be simply reported without an appearance of endorsing them, Burke underscores his concern by citing an example of how certain things being vividly described may make us yield to a wrong sympathy:

> It has been said (and, with regard to one of them, with truth) that Tacitus and Machiavel, by their cold way of relating enormous crimes, have in some sort appeared not to disapprove them; that they seem a sort of professors of the art of tyranny, and that they corrupt the minds of their readers, by not expressing the detestation and horrour that naturally belong to horrible and detestable proceedings.

Feelings of strong disapproval do naturally belong to such events in experience, but, from the uncertainty of words and our curiosity for excitement which knows no moral ground, all such natural "belonging" passes into suspense when involved with the mediation of words.

The other example comes from his letter to Charles-Jean-François Depont—the tentative, scrupulous, analytic document of November 1789 that was the germ of Burke's *Reflections*—where he speaks of having hesitated to send Depont his views in writing, because "in seasons of jealousy, suspicion is vigilant and active," and the authorities intercepting such a letter might piece together, from certain hints or phrases, a tendency that would redound against the letter's recipient. Burke continues:

> In the ill-connected and inconclusive logic of the passions, whatever may be blameable is easily transferred from the guilty writer to the innocent receiver. It is an awkward as well as an unpleasant accident; but it is one that has sometimes happened. A man may be made a martyr to tenets the most opposite to his own.

What is said here about the plausibility of identifying sender with receiver, or author with reader, must apply with the same force (in the argument on "words" of the *Sublime and Beautiful*) to the supposed identity of persuasive effect and persuasive intention anywhere in writing. A work may be made a martyr to purposes the most opposite to its own—a writer may make the world a casualty of intentions he scarcely discerned in himself.

This separation of author's intention from reader's understanding is familiar to critics of literature. It seems to be less familiar to historians of political thought, and part of the reason is obvious. We have or can reconstruct fairly often, with the classics of political theory, as we seldom do or can with the classics of poetry or fiction, a convincing statement of the author's purpose. Indeed, the great books of

political theory are, it could be said, nothing but statements of intentions from beginning to end. But they are to that extent merely *descriptions*; yet we know they are something more. And if Burke is right that "nothing is imitation further than as it resembles some other thing; and words undoubtedly have no sort of resemblance to the ideas for which they stand," there is reason to suppose that this applies to political prose as much as it does to fiction or poetry. It follows that political writing too may suffer the insensible transition by which the clear expression becomes the strong expression (to use the division Burke himself adopts at V.7). We can never know the moment when that has happened, in a single reading or in the history of reception of a celebrated text, but when it does happen all bets are off about the kind of persuasion that has been effected.

The poet, orator, popular educator and radical leader of the 1790s, John Thelwall, said that the *Reflections* "made more democrats, among the thinking part of mankind, than all the works ever written in answer to it." He was talking about the words of the book, not just the intellectual debate it provoked. It looks, then, as if Burke himself was fated to be one of the casualties of that obscurity of words which is part and parcel of their convenience and their rapidity of suggestion. But what could he have done differently or better in the *Reflections*, if he wanted to avoid giving encouragement to tenets the opposite of his own? A writer can never be equal to his desire not to be equal to the facts. As Tacitus and Machiavelli, by describing the unspeakable, made it thinkable after all, Burke in picturing the greatest of disasters to the social order made it seem conceivable, and by writing its catastrophic history may have suggested to some that its worst effects could be endured.

A theatrically gifted twelve-year-old of my acquaintance was watching *The Thin Red Line* on tape the other day. When the first scouts from the company approached the ridge where a Japanese machine-gun was dug in, and the bullets started to rip, he rattled away in homage with an imaginary machine-gun from the couch. He wasn't rooting for the Japanese to win, just watching and getting into the spirit of things, in a certain way. I could have told him it was not meant to be a run-of-the-mill actioner but something more grave and deliberate and certainly anti-war. One can always say the tasteful thing and try to remedy or counteract the unthinking imitative response. But, if I have Burke right, this is the normal or rather the usual manner in which human beings register the effects of aesthetic stimuli. It combines a hunger for belief and an instinct for imitation—one wants to wrap oneself in the skin of an exotic experience, and this desire comes to children and grownups far more easily than romantic sympathy or the entering into the feelings or mood of another person on moral terms. When the experience in question is too dreadful to be assimilated close-up—or finally assimilated in any way—Burke says it belongs to the category of the sublime. When it appears so welcoming and attractive as to be no sooner glimpsed than embraced by the mind, it belongs to the category of the beautiful. It is the peculiar feature of the beautiful, according to Burke, that we approve of ourselves in an attitude of attention that confers aesthetic approval on the object, whereas, in the face of the sublime, mere approval is beside the point. It took Kant to propose the tempting complementary hypothesis that with objects that evade the mind's grasp, we may admire ourselves in an attitude of admiration, and thus be both chastened and exalted by the human power to conceive of that which is beyond conceiving.

But that extension of the argument is Kantian through and through. Whatever one makes of Burke's moral psychology, it seems clear that for him the aesthetic is nothing to rejoice in. It is a

primitive susceptibility of the nerves and senses, which can be brought under reflection, but which (he implies in his comments on words) in most cases will succeed in evading analysis. There are more feelings than we have terms for, though many of those feelings are themselves chiefly caused by words that won't stay fixed, and this is a reason bigger than culture, and augmenting the effects of culture, for the phenomenon of diversity of taste in the arts. Carol Kay says in her essay on Hume's idea of a standard that since taste keeps close company with morals, occasions of strong disagreement may arise and "when such conflicts occur, there is no critical responsibility to struggle against moral distaste. There is, on the contrary, a moral responsibility to give way to it"—at least there is if we take seriously Hume's trust in our obligation to furnish ourselves for action with every help we find in the constitution of our nature. It does seem a deeply Humean thought, this responsibility to give way to moral distaste, though we must do so in the knowledge that other judgments, the rivals of ours, may be founded not less firmly in manners that have a different history.

That it is also a Burkean thought seems the natural inference from the argument on taste and morals in the *Reflections* and the *Regicide Peace*. "We have not been drawn and trussed, in order that we may be filled, like stuffed birds in a museum, with chaff and rags, and paltry, blurred shreds of paper about the rights of man." We do not feel or judge this way, and to say it as Burke does is to propound something akin to a speech act in the imperative mood. *Let* us not be so. If others in sufficient numbers continue to think otherwise, however, their way of thinking will come to prevail. Theirs will become the natural way, and the distaste it has overridden will appear in retrospect a curious eccentricity. Burke in his anti-revolutionary writings has more to say about the distaste we ought to give way to than about those sacred feelings which the heart owns and the understanding ratifies. But the moral emphasis of his political work bears an unsettled relation to the analysis in the *Sublime and Beautiful,* where ideas appear as a trace or ghostly residue of impressions whose path we cannot chart, and substantial meanings are broken down to effects merely of "certain words heated originally by the breath of others." I have never been able to decide, in reading this last phrase, whether he means words heated by other speakers, or words heated by other words. I suppose, on Burke's oddly impersonal view of the subject, it does not matter much.

To sum up briefly: we have assumed we had a placeholder for a slot the eighteenth century needed filled—a Longinian treatise on the dignity of the art of writing, a foundational tract on manners that inscribes sexual hierarchy in the very nature of things, a work of the scientific Enlightenment that offers a resolution to the controversies of taste and at the same time paradoxically gives a justification *avant la lettre* for the sublime style from Martin to Turner and from Ossian to *Tintern Abbey*. What we have instead is something we cannot use as a placeholder: a work of agnostic unbelief both as to the susceptibility of the emotions to regulation and the ameliorative effects of art. The work we put on our lists, but did not read, belonged to one extreme of the age of Johnson and Reynolds, but it was recognizably of their family. The work that the young Burke wrote, which we don't know what to do with, contains the sentence "Beauty is so far from belonging to the idea of custom, that in reality what affects us in that manner is extremely rare and uncommon." And it goes on: "The beautiful strikes us as much by its novelty as the deformed itself." Shall we call this romantic? Radical? A piece of pure foppery? I confess that the more I read his book, the less I feel I know about the man who wrote it.

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WILLIAM GODWIN AND THE POLITICAL INSTITUTION OF LITERATURE[1]

ANTHONY JARRELLS

In reading the novels of Defoe, Sterne, and Richardson "in relation to" Hobbes, Hume, and Burke, Carol Kay helps us to grasp a different kind of connection between these novels — or indeed, the eighteenth-century novel more generally — and the more overtly political novels that emerged later in the century from writers like William Godwin. In her "Hobbesian" literary history we find not so much a formalist connection —although her concern with the techniques of characterization would be just that— as what we might call, following Kay, a "political" connection: that is, a developing connection between the concerns reflected by the novelist and those reflected by the state. For example, Kay explains in her preface that "analysis of the novels reveals that structures which seem independent of or alternative to the state are described even by the novelists as interdependent with it."[2] Godwin, while no "Hobbesist," recognized the pervasiveness of this connection, finding in it as he did the root of societal ills. *Caleb Williams*, in fact, was written in part to show one of the principle themes from his *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice*, that of how government "...insinuates itself into our personal dispositions, and insensibly communicates its own spirit to our private transactions."[3] Kay's analyses bring to the surface the connection between the private and the political that Godwin and others surely read in the novels of his predecessors — especially Richardson — and that he wished to explore more fully: first in his political writings, then in his novels, and finally in a theory of fiction that would pit literature's ability to show this connection against history's penchant for obfuscating it.[4]

It is not Godwin's writings, however, that Kay looks to in her conclusion. For while Godwin the novelist can be understood to follow in the tradition of the writers that Kay examines — in that he connects the private and the political — Godwin's political philosophy opposes itself both to the organic "stability" of the state apparatus and to a century's worth of political thought that helped to underpin it. Kay's study finds closure instead with Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, a text that keeps much more to the line of thought initiated in Hobbes and that draws largely on the history between the English and the French revolutions in hopes of countering the fervor and optimism in England that initially greeted the storming of the Bastille. Burke's *Reflections* seems a likely culminating instance in Kay's study for this and for a second reason: in Burke's text Kay also posits a transformation in the "literary ecology" of Britain, a point after which "his predecessors can hardly be read or understood" but through Burke's mediation.[5] Although in many ways more a man of letters in the eighteenth-century sense (like Hume) than a poet figure or man of *literature* in the "romantic" sense that was taking shape at that very moment, Burke had a tremendous influence on the category of "literature" as it emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[6] In addition, Burke brings novelistic conventions both to his writing (in the epistolary form of his *Reflections*, for example) and to

his understanding of how governments should function — that is, as Terry Eagleton suggests, as "a kind of fiction we collaboratively sustain."[7] Indeed, Burke tends toward an aestheticization of the institutions of government and property as they descended from the Revolution and Settlement of 1688-89, toward a dressing up of power in the accoutrements of tradition and grandeur.[8] "To make us love our country," Burke says, (in)famously, "our country ought to be lovely."[9] In the terms of Kay's argument Burke's text offers a sort of reverse logic: his *Reflections* can be said to construct a theory of government that emphasizes a relation to fiction.[10]

But if for Burke politics tends toward the fictional, for Godwin it is fiction that tends toward the political. Godwin first asserts the "insinuation" of government into private life in his *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice*, published in 1793. But this assertion actually produces a corresponding novelist in Godwin himself, and may in part account for the differences between Godwin's early attempts at the genre — his *Imogen, Italian Letters*, and *Damon and Delia*, for example, all published in 1784 — and the post-*Enquiry* fictional writing beginning with *Caleb Williams*.[11] Godwin's *Enquiry* points toward the private, or domestic, as a fruitful site of investigation into the political. It is a small wonder, then, that his ensuing "studies" employ the fictional as a means for *insinuating* a more radical strain of thinking into those very opinions by which the political is maintained.[12] Indeed, Godwin seems to view fiction's relation to government not in terms of its providing a mask or a softening effect, but rather as a corrosive, of sorts — that is, as a means of dissolving the latter while attempting to institute the possibilities inherent in the former. I will argue that Godwin's fiction in the 1790s is a product of his search for a genre capable of clarifying the pervasive effects of government on individuals and of countering a universal, or "Enlightenment" historiography (as in Hume, for example, and reflected in part in Burke) with a different kind of history: a history of private individuals struggling against the very institution that was supposed to have made them free. This search, as well as the first of its products, *Caleb Williams,* in turn alters Godwin's conception of the political and leads him to a theorization of genre that both legitimates novels and distinguishes them from histories by characterizing them as *Literature* — that is, by rendering them an institution in their own right.

All of this is not to suggest that Kay should have concluded with Godwin instead of Burke. For reasons already mentioned this would pose many problems to her Hobbesian account of the eighteenth century. Rather, it is to suggest that her *Political Constructions* allows for the possibility — and this because of its emphasis on a Hobbesian, or political genealogy — of following an alternative path from the traditions of eighteenth-century novel writing and political thought and through the transformed "literary ecology" of Britain that Kay posits in Burke and following the French Revolution. This is the path that I wish to pursue via the writings of Godwin. Many for a time did follow the path opened up by the publication of *An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* — among the more famous being Wordsworth, Coleridge, Percy Shelley, Elizabeth Inchbald, Thomas Holcroft, Mary Hays, and William Hazlitt. But with the exception of only a few, most eventually concluded this path to be a dead end. And until quite recently, Godwin has been remarked upon for the most part only for the unique place held by his *Caleb Williams* in the canon of the English novel, his influence on other figures, like Shelley, and perhaps as the progenitor of a rational form of anarchism. His historical novels, literary theory, and political philosophy have been largely confined to that curious and short-lived group of literary radicals, the Jacobin novelists. The current revived interest in his work (for example, the work of Pamela

Clemit, Clifford Siskin, Jon Klancher, Tilottama Rajan, Gary Handwerk, and the previous foundational work of Marilyn Butler, Gary Kelly, and Mark Philp), however, along with a renewed interest in the category of "Literature" (with a capital "L") can be no coincidence. This is perhaps because in Godwin's writings we find the possibility of a different way of understanding the history that fell between the "bloodless" revolution of 1688 and the bloody one of 1789, as well as a different approach to theorizing the institutions of government and property that "stabilized" the period from the former to the latter. In addition, we find an attempt to posit the possibility of an institution that would rival government (or even replace it), instead of contributing to its machinations of power. For Godwin this institution began with the novel.

The publication of William Godwin's *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* in 1793 was a major event in 1790s England, especially as it provided for a political education of sorts to Jacobin writers, romantic poets, and "Rights of Man" theorists. The *Enquiry* articulated one of the most philosophically sophisticated of responses to the kind of political analysis employed in Burke's *Reflections,* and asserted more generally the priority of a science of politics. Indeed, as William Hazlitt remarks in his *Spirit of the Age*, "Tom Paine was considered for the time as a Tom Fool to him."[13] A mammoth work of political philosophy, *Political Justice* assimilated over a century's worth of thought and sought to transform it in the interest of achieving intellectual and social progress. For Godwin asserts that "there is no science that is not capable of additions; there is no art that may not be carried to a still higher perfection. If this be true of all other sciences, why not of morals? If this be true of all other arts, why not of social *institution*."[14] And, it could be added, of "man" himself. Godwin's doctrine of the "perfectibility of man" led him to posit an Enlightenment-liberalist version of what would become an infamous (late) Marxist concept, the withering away of the state. By bringing society into accord with the dictates of reason, thought Godwin, a repressive state apparatus that lends support only to error would no longer be necessary. "With what delight," Godwin exclaimed, "must every well informed friend of mankind look forward to the auspicious period, the dissolution of political government, of that brute engine, which has been the only perennial cause of the vices of mankind..." (311). A topic of infinite importance, then, is systematically presented in order to help bring about its end.

However, even in the *Enquiry* itself, Godwin could not, finally, do away with the state. He refers to "short term" uses for authoritative or repressive measures on behalf of the state, as well as the possible necessity for an authority "empowered" to declare the general principles by which "the equity of the community will be regulated." In fact, what we get at the outset of the second volume of *Political Justice* is a move toward an alternative terminology for a future, government-less state:

> It was in the recollection of this truth [that of the current state of "imperfection" of man] that I have preferred the term political institution to that of government, the former appearing to be sufficiently expressive of that relative form, whatever it be, into which individuals would fall, when there was no need of force to direct them into their proper channel, and were no refractory members to correct. (207)

Other than the absence of the need for force, Godwin does not go on to address what a political

institution is in relation to government.[15] We are to understand it negatively, as something which has not been achieved, or lived up to ("whatever it be"). And yet the denomination ("political institution") is "sufficiently expressive" of its "relative" form, says Godwin. It would seem that we can know such a form only through our knowledge of something else that is *not* it. Godwin might think of such a move as being one from the empirically present to the theoretically possible.[16] Someone like Burke, on the other hand, or Hume, would counter by denigrating such a move as one toward the imaginative, or the impossible. We can offer our own term for it, a term that was itself being (re)envisioned at this very moment: fiction.[17] In other words, Godwin's future state is deferred into an alternative generic realm — that of the novel.[18] And as will hopefully become clear, such a move requires some theorizing of its own.

Many critics have argued that Godwin's *Caleb Williams*, published one year after the *Enquiry,* is an attempt to "translate" the ideas of *Political Justice*. For example, Gary Kelly tells us that after *Political Justice* Godwin "planned to go on to write a massive work of Enlightenment 'philosophical history'."[19] Instead, he wrote *Caleb Williams,* a novel "thoroughly imbued with Enlightenment ideas," that "translates the principle ideas of the *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* and Enlightenment critical historiography into the form of fiction."[20] However, Kelly's classic account of Godwin's work in the 1790s leaves something out — namely, genre. Godwin planned to write a massive work of Enlightenment philosophical history; but in the place of that work he wrote in a genre that was equated with anything but enlightenment. Granted, in his *Enquiry* Godwin does say that "literature" is one of three ways by which the human mind "[advances] toward [a] state of perfection" (14) — the other two being education and political justice. But as David McCracken has pointed out, though "imaginative works...have important functions in spreading truths and suggesting truths...they are apparently excluded from the genus "literature" as Godwin defines it in 1793."[21] There is, then, something more going on in *Caleb Williams* than the mere "translation" of the *Enquiry*'s philosophical principles — that is, something more like "revision" or "reformulation." What is of interest here is the direction Godwin's conception of the political takes after this fictional reformulation of the *Enquiry*, especially as this direction would seem to be intimately connected to Godwin's revised conception of fiction — indeed, of "literature" itself.

In looking ahead to Godwin's next set of non-fictional writings in the 1790s, most of which were gathered under the title of *The Enquirer* (1797), several significant changes can be observed. The first is the obvious one reflected in the title: from an "enquiry" to an "enquirer" — from a stress on the objective product of a science to the more subjective emphasis on the person inquiring. As Mark Philp suggests, by the end of the 1790s "Godwin's rationalism ebbed and he endorsed a sentiment-based theory of moral judgment and moral motivation."[22] Or to put it somewhat more banally, Godwin moved from a position of knowledge to that of an inquiring mind that wanted to know. This move is reflected generically in the shift from system to essay. Godwin's stated intention in the *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* is to add to those "few works of literature [that] are held in greater estimation," those "which treat in a methodical and elementary way of the principles of science" (iii). The *Enquirer,* though, "a series of essays," has as its subtitle "Reflections on Education, Manners, and Literature." And the first thing Godwin tells us is that "The volume here presented to the reader, is upon a construction totally different from that of a work upon the principles of political science, published by the same

author four years ago."[23] He goes on to describe the differences between the two "principal methods according to which the truth may be investigated." The first, that of the *Enquiry*, is the "highest style of man," yet is "perhaps a method of investigation incommensurate to our powers" (77). The second that of *The Enquirer,* proceeds via "an incessant recurrence to experiment and actual observation" (77). That is, Godwin's new approach proceeds more like the poetic "experiments" that comprised Wordsworth and Coleridge's *Lyrical Ballads.*

A second and closely related change is that of Godwin's feelings toward the French Revolution. The *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* was clearly influenced by the ideas and optimism of the events taking place across the channel.[24] But in *The Enquirer* Godwin confesses that he has cooled in his enthusiasm:

> While the principles of Gallic republicanism were yet in their infancy, the friends of innovation were somewhat too imperious in their tone. Their minds were in a state of exaltation and ferment. They were too impatient and impetuous. There was something in their sternness that savoured of barbarism.... (78)

It is not terribly surprising that Godwin would stand back from the violent course taken by the Revolution following the completion of his *Enquiry.* Godwin's gradualist philosophy had always stood opposed to the use of violence as a means of change. But the arguments in *Political Justice* against violence were not enough to separate Godwin from the "men of blood" whose ideals *Political Justice* also served in part to forward. This was in large part because of the form such arguments took in Godwin's writing. "After 1793 especially," writes David Simpson, "everyone with any tolerance for system or theory was branded a Jacobin, and writers sympathetic to a reformist cause were often all the more cautious."[25] Between 1793-1797, then, there was an increasing need for a writer like Godwin to distance his systematic approach to knowledge, grounded as it was *generically* in some of the same dangerous French and Enlightenment thinking that had led "naturally" to terror, and the violence that had come to define the French Revolution for many British people. One obvious way to do this was to distance himself from his system.

However, Godwin adds that while he might have disdained to write his *Enquirer* essays four years prior, he is nevertheless "persuaded that the cause of political reform, and the cause of intellectual and literary refinement, are inseparably connected" (79). As with the ambiguous "political institution," Godwin does not offer a definition of what he means by "literary." Yet a simple perusal of the contents of *The Enquirer* suggests that something has changed: titles such as "Of the Awakening of the Mind," "Of an Early Taste for Reading," "Of the Study of the Classics," and "Of English Style," point to a clear difference from the contents of the *Enquiry.* From a definition of literature as a "diffusion of knowledge through the medium of discussion,"[26] we find a new emphasis on reading, taste, and style. Indeed, what we find in *The Enquirer* is a conception of literature that not only includes the fictional, but that orients itself precisely toward it, especially as the fictional might provide for a political education of sorts, what Jon Klancher has called "genre-reform," that might itself utilize the writings of Jacobin novelists and romantic poets. Clifford Siskin traces such a move between the very titles of the novel that falls between these two works, *Things as They Are, or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams.*

"What is continuous," writes Siskin, "is the power of the *or* in Godwin's title: how *Things as They Are* can almost silently give way to the fictitious *Adventures* of an individual character."[27] As Siskin sees it, there is a move from "things" to "character." Or to repeat the point made above, from inquiry to inquirer.

The place where Godwin himself comes closest to theorizing this move is in the essay "Of History and Romance," an essay written for a possible sequel to the *Enquirer.* As Klancher explains, "whether prose fiction was or should be one of the genres encompassed by the Enlightenment category of literature was a question Godwin took up in 'Of History and Romance.'"[28] Godwin looks to clear a space for imaginative works not at the expense of philosophy and metaphysics, but rather upon the ground of history — and specifically the "Enlightenment universal history"[29] that Kelly links to Godwin's project in *Caleb Williams*. "The writer of romance then," exclaims Godwin, provocatively,

> is to be considered as the writer of real history; while he who was formerly called the historian, must be contented to step down into the place of his rival, with this disadvantage, that he is a romance writer, without the arduous, the enthusiastic and sublime licence of imagination, that belong to that species of composition.[30]

A good romance is for Godwin better history than a good history; for it allows for the development and shaping of character that are not consonant with the facts. This notion of the poet being more truthful than the historian because he admits to his lying is based on mimesis, verisimilitude, and invention, terms associated with that peculiar species, the novel.[31] In "Of History and Romance" Godwin attempts to claim a place for the novel (for "romance" and "novel" are used interchangeably) that is further up the genre hierarchy, while at the same time disclaiming the current place of history — or really, while reclaiming a place for an alternative history: one that remained to be written.[32]

Godwin begins his essay with a claim that "the study of history may well be ranked among those pursuits which are most worthy to be chosen by a rational being" (359). As in *Political Justice,* Godwin establishes the importance of his topic before he proceeds to undercut it by offering something different in its place. He goes on to divide the study of history into two branches: the general approach, or the study of mankind "in a mass"; and "the study of the individual." The first is for Godwin linked to (Scottish) Enlightenment history, in that it is written "entirely in terms of abstraction, and without descending so much as to name one of those individuals of which the nation is composed"(359). This approach is discredited nearly from the start, for "the mind of man does not love abstractions" (361). Godwin explains that it is only out of habit and custom that we give to philosophical abstractions the higher estimation. But the abstractions of history, a science in its "infancy," are even "more cumbrous and unwieldy" — assumingly because we are not used to them. Lest we become so, however, Godwin moves on to discuss the second branch of the study of society: the study of individuals. It is through this second branch that we can begin to view ourselves. Whereas the first approach is "dry and frigid," the latter is "the most fruitful source of activity and motive" (361). Stressing an approach to history that aims to "understand the machine of society, and to direct it to its best purposes" (362), Godwin implicitly compares this second branch of history to his stated aim in *Political Justice*: he explains that

through it, "we shall be enabled to add to the knowledge of the past a sagacity that can penetrate into the depths of futurity" (363).

As we have seen in our comparison with *The Enquirer*, however, we know that in 1797 Godwin would not rest there. And in "Of History and Romance" he lands on individual history only to substantiate that which he hopes to supplant via his theory of fiction. Individual history, if it lives up to its own standard, should present great individuals, or characters. But Godwin, not content to remain with such a character merely on the "public stage," explains that he would instead

> Follow him into his closet. [He] would see the friend and the father of a family, as well as the patriot. [He] would read his works and letters, if any remain to us. [He] would observe the turn of his thoughts and the character of his phraseology...study his public orations...collate his behaviour in prosperity with his behaviour in adversity.... [He] should rejoice to have, or to be enabled to make, if that were possible, a journal of his ordinary and minutest actions. (364)

In Godwin's description we see "history" more as it was used in works like Fielding's *The History of Tom Jones, a Foundling.* In other words, like fiction. As in the aim of *The Enquirer*, Godwin's history would be comprised of local investigations "into the humbler walks of private life" (*Enquirer* 79); or more specifically, and as stated in the preface to *Caleb Williams*, "a general review of the modes of domestic and unrecorded despotism by which man becomes the destroyer of man."[33]

Looking at England's own "insipid and insufferable" history since the 1688 Revolution, especially as it had been rendered by historians like Hume and apologists for tradition like Burke, Godwin asserts that "indeed all history bears too near a resemblance to fable" (367). Even if facts themselves were not contradictory and "unsatisfactory" it is only the chronicle that would have any claim to historical truth. Yet such a genre is lacking in the invigorating force of "muscles and articulations"; it is as dead as so many abstractions or dry principles. In order to flesh out, so to speak, the bones of historical data, something else is needed: "licentia historica." The "noblest and most excellent species of history" exclaims Godwin, is that species of literature that "calls itself romance or novel" (368). It is in fiction that "a scanty substratum of facts and dates" are interweaved with "a number of happy, ingenious and instructive inventions" (368). And while many have suggested that the "mixed" nature of such a composition brings out the worst of both worlds — both invention and facts being compromised — Godwin diffuses such an argument by applying to historical composition that does not claim any invention. In other words, it is precisely the mix that works for Godwin: invention penetrating the futurity of mere facts; facts taming the banalities of the romance genre.[34] And it is thus that the novel finds its way into the ranks of "literature" as Godwin reckoned the term in 1797.

Of course the novel was widely read, too. And McCracken writes that for Godwin the novel was "in short, a means of propaganda."[35] Godwin would seem to agree when he explains in his preface to *Caleb Williams* that,

> It is but of late that the inestimable importance of political principles has been ade-

> quately apprehended. It is now known to philosophers, that the spirit and character of the government intrudes itself into every rank of society. But this is a truth highly worthy to be communicated to persons whom books of philosophy and science are never likely to reach. (3)

However, while the novel may have been an effective vehicle for radical principles, it was not the vehicle part of the equation that qualified it as literature. If anything, the popularity of novels served to work against them — at least for Godwin. For him it is a "class" of readers "consisting of women and boys, and which is considerably numerous," that "requires a continual supply of books of this sort" (369). Godwin wants to pick from what he refers to as the trash heap the finer specimens by "those persons who had really written a romance, not those who had vainly attempted it" (369).

The principles of selection that comprise the process by which such specimens are chosen are what we would today call disciplinarity, the canon formation, or simply, literature:

> The critic and the moralist, in their estimate of romances, have borrowed the principle that regulates the speculations of trade. They have weighed novels by the great and taken into their view the whole scum and surcharge of the press. But surely this is not the way in which literature would teach us to consider the subject.... There is no species of literature that would stand this ordeal. (369)

Far from championing the strengths that someone like Gallagher has more recently found in the genre (or someone like Anna Barbauld, to name one of Godwin's contemporaries),[36] Godwin wants to release the novel from the "speculations of trade," from the "whole scum and surcharge of the press." Here the metrical genres and the systems become not something novels are set against (as in Barbauld, for example), but rather models for the inclusion of a genre that has become "feminized" and "vulgarized" since the efforts of writers like Fielding or Richardson. What is being "thrown out," says Siskin, is "the connection of the genre to the gender with which it was linked throughout the eighteenth century: the women whose 'continual' need had elicited the scum."[37] But while this is undoubtedly true, Godwin does not necessarily exclude women writers from "literature"; rather, he wants to exclude those books that are associated by and large with women readers (and "boys") — those "mass market" books that suggest an undiscriminating taste and too acute a sense of the market.[38] Godwin wants the novel to be associated not with domestic pleasure but with "manly" respect — indeed, with the somebodies of the world.[39]

For Godwin, it would seem that novels have been judged according to the faulty criteria of "general" history. That is, they have been judged "in a mass." Godwin implicitly compares the faulty criteria for judging history and the "feminized" logic of the market. Any definition of "literature," we must assume, would have to be articulated against these criteria, this logic. For literature would have us judge by the individual, by the "great" in the other sense, as in "excellent." What we get is a strange logic suggesting that fiction is a lesser species of written composition when it is judged according to historical criteria, but a finer one when judged as history itself should be: as literature. History is already fiction, Godwin suggests; the problem is that it is not literature.

However, Godwin does not go on to offer a specific set of criteria by which we might delineate the "literary." The best we can do is to extrapolate such criteria from the totality of his political, philosophical, and literary writings. For example, Godwin's critique of the general, like his critique of government in *Political Justice,* finds it unfit both for history and for romance. But unless this argument is understood in the context of the political philosophy — that is, unless the political connection is affirmed — the alternative to the general, "literature," remains trapped in a rationalist tautology: we know it because literature tells us what it is. Within the context of the arguments developed in *Political Justice*, though, we can see that literature is to history what political institution is to government: a relative form that can only be articulated negatively — the one against the abstractions of history, the other against the violence of the state. "Literature," we come to understand, comprises a set of criteria that remain, like the British Constitution, to be written. It marks an attempt to institute a history of the future: the individual removed both from coercion and from "the mass."

But Godwin's argument is almost more clever than it is logical. At least this would seem to be the only way to read his final deduction: "to write romance is a task too great for the powers of man, and under which he must be expected to totter" (372). Now, instead of recapitulating the sentiments of *Political Justice*, Godwin appears to be in the less systematic mode of *The Enquirer:* romance, like Godwin's attempt at system before it, is *too great for "man's" powers.*[40] Yet unlike in *The Enquirer,* Godwin does not offer anything in the place of fiction (for example, the local investigations and essayistic form of *The Enquirer* itself). One must assume that it will be the critic — or perhaps the reader more generally — who will be left to comment upon this newly canonized genre, just as the inquirer essays, or attempts, where the inquiry fails. In a sense it will be the reader that marks the distance between where we are and where we have not yet reached. Like "government" in *Political Justice,* history has not been thoroughly done away with, as it were: it remains as the marker for what can only be articulated negatively. Indeed, for Godwin, "history" would need to be negated before anything but a fictional resolution could materialize.

Godwin's *Caleb Williams*, first published in 1794, and thus between the *Enquiry* and *The Enquirer*, recapitulates in its narrative structure a similar logic of substitution and displacement to the one I have tried to outline in the move from inquiry to inquirer and from history to romance. It also foregrounds the connection to violence that lurks behind the generic scenes, so to speak, of the sudden shifts in Godwin's writing in the 1790s. For example, when Caleb exclaims that he will "use no daggers" but will instead "tell a tale," we are to meant to compare this to a previous moment in the text, a moment when Caleb's nemesis, Ferdinando Falkland, presumably uses the former — a dagger — to murder his own antagonist, Tyrrel, from whom he has suffered a public humiliation. What emerges in this comparison are two such examples of substitution and displacement. First, in terms of character. A desperate Caleb, like a desperate Falkland before him, is about to commit a murder. Previously in the novel, in the battle over what Michael McKeon would call "aristocratic ideology," the urbane and chivalric Falkland vanquishes the rough, country "gentleman," Tyrrel. Yet in doing so, Falkland effectively becomes Tyrrel, or like him, in stooping to a use of force that is contrary to the code of honor he professes to live by. "No two characters," says Mr. Collins, Falkland's steward, "can be in certain respects more strongly contrasted, than the Mr Falkland of a date prior and subsequent to these events."[41] We need only compare Falkland's imprisonment of Caleb to Tyrrel's earlier treatment of

Emily Melvile to grasp the scale of Falkland's transformation.

But it is over what McKeon would call a "question of virtue" — that is, a question "of how the external social order is related to the internal, moral state of its members" — that Falkland and Caleb come to be foes.[42] Unlike Falkland and Tyrrel, Caleb and Falkland are not economic equals. And even though Caleb may have elevated himself above his class position via Falkland's library and via Falkland himself, who serves as a mentor to him, it is clear throughout the novel that his inequality renders his burden of proof all the more heavy. Nevertheless, Caleb attempts to use his knowledge as a way of leveling the field and of increasing his power. For example, while conversing on the topic of Alexander, Caleb inquires of Falkland how he came "to be surnamed the Great"; for he seems to Caleb to be rather "the Great Cut-Throat" (115). Falkland, for whom this is blasphemy, explains that,

> The death of a hundred thousand men is at first sight very shocking; but what in reality are a hundred thousand such men, more than a hundred thousand sheep? It is mind, Williams, the generation of knowledge and virtue, that we ought to love. This was the project of Alexander; he set out in a great undertaking to civilise mankind.... (116)

Caleb, not quite convinced, but quite in order to further provoke, responds: "and yet, sir, I am afraid that the pike and the battleaxe are not the right instruments for making men wise" (116). It is clear that Falkland identifies himself with Alexander. "Alexander, I say, does not deserve this rigour," he states. Caleb, who also understands this identification, represents here what Nietzsche would later call the cunning of Judeo-Christian ethics — the tasty little lamb revenging itself upon the "evil" bird of prey. For in attempting to get Falkland to slip up — that is, to betray some piece of evidence against himself — Caleb makes clear that ends do not always justify means, that abstractions such as "honour" and "civilisation" are compromised by the historical violence from which they have sprung.

Caleb, it seems, would forego violence as a means "for making men wise." But if for Caleb the pike and the battleaxe (not to mention the dagger) are not fit instruments for making men wise then we must assume that it is writing itself that will supply their place. Toward the end of the novel, this substitution is made explicit. In wondering whether or not he has left anything unsaid (and just prior to posting his writings — like some Richardsonian heroine — to yet another "father" figure, Mr. Collins) Caleb concludes that,

> The contents of that fatal trunk, from which all my misfortunes originated, I have never been able to ascertain. I once thought it contained some murderous instrument or relic connected with the fate of the unhappy Tyrrel. I am now persuaded that the secret it encloses is a faithful narrative of that and its concomitant transactions, written by Mr Falkland, and reserved in case of the worst.... (326)

The supposed weapon in Falkland's trunk was the only piece of evidence that might have exonerated Caleb (his resort to Falkland's method — that is, pleading his character — having failed miserably). Yet where Falkland previously convicts Caleb in the eyes of the public by importing evidence *into* Caleb's concealed trunk, Caleb moves at the end to convict Falkland by transporting concealed

evidence *out* of Falkland's. In place of this evidence he would have us find a narrative. What Godwin has done via Caleb is to render the question of "virtue" (in McKeon's terms) a question of "truth," as well. That is, in Caleb's account the question of ends — virtue or honor — becomes one and the same with the question of means — in this case, as McKeon suggests, a question of "how to tell the truth in narrative."[43] It is truth, after all, that is what we might call Caleb's abstraction (in the same way that Falkland's is honor).

But in highlighting the question of means, Godwin has also rendered writing a weapon, of sorts. This is the second example of substitution and displacement that governs the novel: not characters, but things — and more specifically, weapons. In this substitution of a narrative for a murderous implement we see Caleb attempting ultimately to displace not of an act of violence — Falkland's murder of Tyrrel — but rather one of writing: Falkland's account of said act. The dagger has become the narrative, and in telling his own tale, Caleb will not be assaulting, so to speak, an unarmed Falkland. It will be a public affair, Caleb versus Falkland, as opposed to a covert action. Caleb has his tale, Falkland has his; and if the latter's never comes to light, if he is never detected in his guilt, says Caleb, "mine may amply, severely perhaps, supply its place" (326). However, Falkland is detected in his guilt, and Caleb's writing has the added responsibility of contributing "to redeem the wreck" of his own reputation. As we will see, this last proves to be beyond Caleb's powers. But where his words are terrifically effective is in the laying low of Falkland. For upon hearing Caleb's tale at their final confrontation Falkland exclaims: "I could have resisted any plan of malicious accusation you might have brought against me. But I see that the artless and manly story you have told has carried conviction to every hearer" (335). Whereas before it was Caleb who could be compared to Emily Melvile, in a startling reversal, it is now Falkland who, like Melvile, survives but three days, and Caleb, like Falkland before him, who is a "murderer."

In the end Caleb does understand himself to be a murderer, his tale having led to the death of Falkland. Various explanations have been given for Caleb's guilt: for example, McCracken's claim that in stooping to a dependency on the law Caleb has compromised himself and, we can add, employed a violent institution to complete his business.[44] But in looking more closely at the novel's structure and again in relation to the political and philosophical writings that surround it on either side, we can add something to this explanation. Caleb's quest in the novel for evidence — for truth — renders him an inquirer of a particularly obsessive kind. What Godwin says of the philosophizing friends of the French Revolution can in turn be said of Caleb: "[he] was too impatient and impetuous. There was something in [his] sternness that savoured of barbarism" (*Enquirer* 78). In fixating on the secret of the "fatal" trunk as the means to the truth that would convict Falkland and redeem himself, Caleb effectively renders Falkland an object of inquiry. That is, he fails to see him as a person, and thus repeats in his quest for truth the same reifying logic that is ultimately responsible for things as they are. The dagger that Caleb is sure lies concealed in the trunk is transferred — unwittingly, perhaps — by Caleb into his narrative (which becomes a weapon of sorts). There remains, finally, a covert as well as violent element in Caleb's public act. Similarly, elements of Godwin's political system have been embedded in his fictional narrative, to be read and used by those who would not otherwise have access to the loftier (and more expensive) philosophical genres. Neither Caleb nor Godwin, it seems, can quite do away with violence. Such means, however, are contrary to the code of "truth" that both profess to live by.

If it is Caleb that finally takes the place of Falkland — that is, takes his place as a murderer — then in the end it is Caleb's narrative that must stand in for his own previous presence: it opposes his act of reification by taking it up and casting it in an estranged light for the "curious" reader. Again we see a shift in emphasis from an object of inquiry to the inquirer himself. Caleb's inquiry, like his attempt to vindicate his character, has failed: both were "incommensurate" with his powers. But from this failure a certain victory or success can be recuperated: the success of the reader who can see past Caleb's truth to the truth inherent in the possibility of narrative. "Sympathy, the magnetic virtue, the hidden essence of life" (*Caleb Williams* 318), may have come too late for Caleb; but the possibility still remains for the reader who has learned to distrust this narrator and to think for him or herself about the distance between things as they seem, things as they are, and things as they might be.[45] Like the "political institution" that remains ambiguous in *Political Justice* and the unspecified "literature" in the essay "Of History and Romance," we are left with a "relative form," one that must be understood against Caleb's interpretation of things, and thus against the violence that remains embedded in his narrative. This violence from which Caleb's narrative cannot free itself serves in Godwin's novel as a stand-in for history; it marks what in Fredric Jameson's words "hurts," what "refuses desire."[46] What Godwin's novel recapitulates, in fact, is not only the logic of substitution and displacement that manifests itself in his non-fictional writings, but also what Jameson refers to more generally as the dialectic of utopia and ideology: for while being limited by the reifying logic from which it cannot fully distance itself, Caleb's narrative nevertheless offers the possibility of a direction beyond such logic, and beyond the use of force, precisely in order, it would seem, to direct us into our proper channels.[47]

What I have tried to argue via Godwin's diverse output in the 1790s is that for Godwin, "literature" must affirm a political connection — and this not only because the domestic is a space ripe for comprehending the insinuation of government into private life, but also because the novel as "literature" is just such a non-coercive institution as projected in *Political Justice*.[48] It is as if "literature," too, can be understood as "sufficiently expressive of that relative form, whatever it be, into which individuals would fall, when there was no need of force to direct them into their proper channel, and were no refractory members to correct." One can think of the scum and surcharge of the press standing in for the "refractory members." The ambiguous "political institution" is only complete with "literature" attached to it: literature, after all, is that space within which an alternative to institutional history and the history of political institutions can be written and read. But literature also institutes a different way of rendering the past, one that cannot be abstracted from the realities of what Lukacs describes as the "ceaseless class struggles and their bloody resolution in great or small, successful or abortive uprisings."[49] The *institution* of literature takes up and attempts to hold its ground against the dehistoricizing machinations of abstract or idealist history as well as those fictions of state stability: "custom," "tradition" and "hereditary title." The term "political institution," then, vacillating as it can between that which has been and that which could be—between that which marks history and that which disrupts it—is a term ripe with possibility.[50] For the attempt to institute it begins with the institution of literature itself.

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NOTES

1. I would like to thank Cliff Siskin for his careful reading and helpful critique of my essay. His suggestions and support have proved immensely valuable in defining the scope and the shape of my argument.

2. Carol Kay, *Political Constructions: Defoe, Richardson, and Sterne in Relation to Hobbes, Hume, and Burke* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), ix.

3. William Godwin, *An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice*, ed. Isaac Kramnick (Penguin: 1985), 81.

4. Both Mark Philp and Pamela Clemit explain that Godwin actively read the novels of his predecessors and contemporaries alike. Clemit remarks, for example, that Godwin reread Richardson's *Clarissa* while revising the ending to *Caleb Williams*. She also suggests that Godwin drew on previous fictional models that "develop[ed] the puritan preoccupation with the mediation of truth in narrative." Pamela Clemit, *The Godwinian Novel: The Rational Fictions of Godwin, Brockden Brown, Mary Shelley* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 55. See also Mark Philp, *Godwin's Political Justice* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).

5. Kay, *Political Constructions*, 267.

6. See David Simpson, *Romanticism, Nationalism, and the Revolt Against Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 126-48. For arguments that posit a change in the concept of "literature" that dates from the mid to the late-eighteenth century, see Alvin Kernan, *Samuel Johnson and the Impact of Print* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 3-23, 283-316; Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 183-88; and Clifford Siskin, *The Work of Writing*: Literature and *Social Change in Britain, 1700-1830* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 1-29 and 172-92.

7. Terry Eagleton, *Heathcliff and the Great Hunger: Studies in Irish Culture* (London: Verso, 1995), 39.

8. See Tom Furniss, *Edmund Burke's Aesthetic Ideology: Language, Gender, and Political Economy in Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); David Bromwich, "Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*," *A Companion to Romanticism*, ed. Duncan Wu (Blackwell, 1998); and Terry Eagleton, *Heathcliff and the Great Hunger*, chapter 2.

9. Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, ed. Conor Cruise O'Brien (Penguin: 1968), 172. In his response to Burke, Thomas Paine exclaims that "as to the tragic paintings by which Mr. Burke has outraged his own imagination, and seeks to work upon that of his readers, they are very well calculated for theatrical representation, where facts are manufactured for the sake of show, and accommodated to produce, through weakness of sympathy, a weeping effect. But Mr. Burke should recollect that he is writing History, and not Plays; and that his readers will expect truth, and not the

spouting rant of high-toned exclamation." Thomas Paine, *Rights of Man* (Penguin, 1985), 49-50.

10. The corresponding novelist in this development would probably be Walter Scott, though Kay does not go on to speak of him. For the place of Scott's historical fiction in eighteenth-century traditions of fiction and thought, see Ian Duncan, *Modern Romance and Transformations of the Novel: the Gothic, Scott, Dickens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Homer Brown, *Institutions of the English Novel from Defoe to Scott* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997). For a classic view of Scott as instigating a new approach to history and fiction, see Georg Lukacs, *The Historical Novel*, trans. Hannah and Stanley Mitchell (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983).

11. After the 1790s Godwin largely gave up writing political philosophy and turned instead to writing novels, histories, and children's books. For the various changes in Godwin's career as a writer see William St. Clair, *The Godwins and the Shelleys: The Biography of a Family* (London: Faber and Faber, 1989), and Philp, *Godwin's Political Justice*. For a perspective that posits continuity between Godwin's early and later fiction see Clemit, *The Godwinian Novel.*

12. This despite Godwin's claim in the Preface to *Caleb Williams* that the novel form serves simply as a popular "vehicle" for the communication of political ideas. I will discuss this more fully below. On opinion and government see *Political Justice*, Part 2, Book VI.

13. *The Complete Works of William Hazlitt,* Vol. 11, ed. P.P. Howe (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, LTD, 1932), 16.

14. William Godwin, An *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, The Political and The Philosophical Writings of William Godwin*. Vol. 3, ed. Mark Philp (London: Pickering, 1993), 30 (Godwin's emphasis). Hereafter cited in the text. All further quotations from *Political Justice* are taken from this first edition, published in 1793. This is necessary, in part, in order to mark the changes that occur in Godwin's thought in the 1790s. But for a defense of this edition as an authoritative one, see Philp's Introduction to *The Political and Philosophical Writings of William Godwin*, Vol. 1.

15. The term "political institution" is ambiguous and gives itself to various definitions throughout Godwin's text. As it is used here, however, at the start of the Second Volume of *Political Justice,* the term seems to express the possible future that Godwin will devote the rest of his *Enquiry* to exploring, having developed his ideas on past and present institutions in the First Volume. This passage remains unchanged throughout all three editions.

16. Or as Hazlitt shrewdly suggests, "By overshooting the mark, or by 'flying an eagle flight, forth and right on,' he has pointed out the limit or line of separation, between what is practicable and what is barely conceivable — by imposing impossible tasks on the naked strength of the will, he has discovered how far it is or is not in our powers to dispense with the illusions of sense...." Hazlitt, *Spirit of the Age,* 23.

17. For example, critics such as Catherine Gallagher and Clifford Siskin have followed a tradition of post-Ian Watt scholarship in positing a rise in novel reading that occurred not from Defoe to Richardson and Fielding, but rather in the last two decades of the eighteenth century and the first decade of the nineteenth century. Gallagher claims that "it was during this period that novels became the favorite reading matter of that common avatar of Nobody: Everybody. The market in novels during those decades appears to have expanded even faster than the swelling general marketplace of books." Catherine Gallagher, *Nobody's Story: The Vanishing Acts of Women Writers in the Marketplace, 1670-1820* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 220. See also Clifford Siskin, *The Work of Writing*, 155-71.

18. In his *Politics and History: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hegel, Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1972), Louis Althusser offers us a way of understanding this move from philosophy to fiction. He concludes that Rousseau's *Social Contract*, both as a concept and as a text, masks the play of the very discrepancies which enable it. He argues that these discrepancies are consistently deferred until, finally, they approach the real (*la réalité même*). At this point there is a deferral or "transfer" of a different kind, that of "the impossible theoretical solution into the alternative to theory, literature. The admirable 'fictional triumph' of an unprecedented writing" (160). Althusser's claim is a productive one to follow up with regards to Godwin and the curious place of *Caleb Williams* in the development of the English novel (its "unprecedented" status) — not in terms of seeing it as a translation of the principles of *Political Justice*, but rather in terms of its being an attempt to resolve the philosophical difficulties that arise in the political theory in the alternative register of fiction. Godwin, of course, does not see the two as antithetical in any doomed way. And in fact his fictional reformulation has serious effects on his political philosophy as well. See Philp, *Godwin's Political Justice*.

19. Gary Kelly, *English Fiction of the Romantic Period, 1789-1830* (London: Longman, 1989), 33.

20. *Ibid.*, 33. In his *Godwin's Political Justice* Philp offers a more balanced view: he explains that *Caleb Williams* is "not simply a deduction from the first edition of *Political Justice*: it both advances certain of Godwin's central concerns and offers us a modification of his arguments which prefigure changes which he makes to the second edition" (106).

21. David McCracken, "Godwin's Literary Theory: The Alliance Between Fiction and Political Philosophy," *Philological Quarterly* (49:1 1970), 117-18.

22. Philp, General Introduction, *The Political and Philosophical Writings of William Godwin*, Vol. 1, ed. Martin Fitzpatrick (London: Pickering, 1993), 10.

23. William Godwin, *The Enquirer: Reflections on Education, Manners, and Literature, The Political and Philosophical Writings of William Godwin*, Vol. 5, ed. Pamela Clemit (London: Pickering, 119), 77. Hereafter cited in the text.

24. For an account of the influence on Godwin of eighteenth-century French thinkers, especially D'Holbach, and of the French Revolution more generally on British thought, see Seamus Deane,

The French Revolution and Enlightenment in England, 1789-1832 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).

25. Simpson, *Romanticism, Nationalism, and the Revolt Against Theory*, 55.

26. McCracken, "Godwin's Literary Theory," 115.

27. Clifford Siskin, *The Work of Writing*, 156.

28. Jon Klancher, "Godwin and the Republican Romance: Genre, Politics, and Contingency in Cultural History," *Modern Language Quarterly* (56:2 1995), 147.

29. *Ibid.*, 147.

30. Godwin, "Of History and Romance," *Caleb Williams*, ed. Maurice Hindle (Penguin Classics, 1987), 372. Hereafter cited in the text.

31. See Gallagher, *Nobody's Story*; Michael McKeon, *The Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); and Lennard Davis, *Factual Fictions: The Origins of the English Novel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

32. Klancher calls this "republican romance" and characterizes it as a genre that "would thereby refute the necessity of British history as the universal historians had narrated it, the better to locate the unrealized possible futures that proliferated from the mid-seventeenth century." "Godwin and the Republican Romance," 160.

33. Godwin, *Caleb Williams*, ed. Maurice Hindle (Penguin Classics, 1987), 3.

34. Such a sentiment may very well be an allusion to the embattled ground of the English Constitution — a constitution, it should be stressed, that remained to be written. Writers like Hume and Burke looked to the Revolutionary Settlement as an exception to historical reasoning, as an anomaly. Both attempted to salvage the monarchy and preserve the traditional form of government from this settlement, an attempt that led to certain glaring contradictions. Kay writes that "Stylistic mixture is a virtue in Burke and in the Declaration of Right — it is a sign of natural feeling — but it is a vice in the French revolutionary mentality and in the proceedings of the (English) Revolutionary Society" (*Political Constructions,* 275). In Godwin's work, there emerges the possibility of (re)writing the constitution in / as literature.

35. McCracken, "Godwin's Literary Theory," 131.

36. See Barbauld's *On the Origin and Progress of Novel-Writing, in British Literature, 1780-1830*, eds. Anne Mellor and Richard Matlack (Harcourt, 1996).

37. Siskin, *Work of Writing*, 170.

38. The latter being something Godwin himself had to be acutely aware of, writing as he did for a living.

39. This is not to suggest, however, that the domestic was to be ignored, or somehow jettisoned from the novel. For Godwin, the domestic *is* a space of political insinuation, as we have seen. However, it would seem that the domestic is only "literary" for Godwin when this political connection is affirmed, when character is shown to be necessarily shaped by such a connection. This politicization of the domestic has the effect of rendering the domestic more "manly," and thus, for Godwin, more worthy of respect. In their Introduction to The Collected Novels and *Memoirs of William Godwin*, Vol. 1, ed. Mark Philp (London: Pickering, 1992), Philp and Marilyn Butler claim that Godwin was "genuinely" a colleague of the women writers he was friends with, and argue that he "enhanced the possibilities of the literature of private life, by deepening the psychology of the naturalistic domestic novel..." (45). But the work of Nancy Armstrong helps us to see the complexities of the domestic sphere that Godwin remained largely in ignorance of — how, for example, in its seeming *not* to be political "domestic fiction could represent an alternative form of political power." See Armstrong, Desire *and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 29.

40. See also Klancher, 162.

41. *Caleb Williams* (1987), 101, hereafter cited in the text.

42. McKeon, *Origins of the English Novel,* 20.

43. *Ibid.*, 20

44. In his introduction to the Norton edition of *Caleb Williams* (1977) McCracken adds that "the direct and private confrontation of truth with error, testing the power of truth, is what Caleb should have attempted, but did not" (xviii).

45. Such is the only form of success that Godwin *can* recuperate, given his politics. Sympathy is here, in a sense, a weak (and nonviolent) version of collectivity. For Godwin's politics were directed as much against "political associations" as against government itself. His disdain for even peaceful collective action meant that Godwin, like his contemporary, Wordsworth, could posit in literature the potential only for a radical *individualism*. It is this aspect of Godwin's politics that renders more recent critics on the left — E.P. Thompson, for example — hostile to his thought and to his place in the Jacobin tradition of late eighteenth-century England. See Godwin's discussion "On Political Associations" in *Political Justice* (1793), book IV, chapter 2.

46. Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as Socially Symbolic Act* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 102.

47. Jameson, *The Political Unconscious*, 281-300.

48. Though as has been discussed, neither can writing escape the negative and often violent effects of power. In this sense Godwin's novel conforms to Michel Foucault's discussion of power in late eighteenth-century France and England. See *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1977); see also Maurice Hindle's Introduction to *Caleb Williams* (Penguin, 1987).

49. Lukacs, *The Historical Novel,* 32.

50. Homer Brown explains that "institution...designates at once an act, an action, a process, and the product of that action or process—at once, action and stasis, lingering effect, trace, or remainder as such. From the Latin *instituare*, to institute means literally to cause to stand or stand up, to move something to standing or at least the illusion of standing in one place—that is to say, something that stays." "Why the Story of the Origin of the English Novel is an American Romance (if not the great American novel)," *Cultural Institutions of the Novel,* eds. Deirdre Lynch and William Warner (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 19.

CEREBRAL LOVE: ROUSSEAU, THE NOVEL, AND THE STATE

BRUCE ROBBINS

One of the distinctive contributions of Carol Kay's Political Constructions is the argument that the supposedly "private" domain of the novel is shaped by the practice and theory of the sovereign state. This is one of many things that I myself gratefully learned from Carol Kay during the years I was privileged to know her, and it's connected to two other things in a way that I'd like to try to tease out today. First, it is connected to Carol's unfashionable insistence, in a time when many of us practice scholarship in the name of "politics," that it is extremely perilous to do so without maintaining a clear engagement with politics in the literal, citizenly, state-related sense, a sense which is more difficult to relate to literature than looser or more "personal" senses. On the personal level, secondly, it was from Carol I first heard the word "assimilationist" used to describe Jews like her family and mine who eagerly seized the opportunities offered by the United States to put their cultures of origin behind them and embrace a more ecumenical identity. The absolute and liberating lack of shame with which Carol accepted this self-description and passed it on was possible, I think, because Carol's assimilationist parents worked for the US government during the New Deal and because that experience of an interventionist and relatively progressive state allowed her to think of the society of destination in terms of a strenuous if imperfect dedication to the general welfare. In retrospect, it seems to me that it was the mild shock of finding myself named an assimilationist that led me to write an undergraduate essay on the Bildungsroman, with guidance from Carol Kay as well as from Jonathan Arac. And it was a long-term inspiration for the book project on upward mobility stories that I am working on now— a project devoted to making the counterintuitive argument that a genre apparently devoted to individualism and self-reliance can only be understood as training for the emergent welfare state.

Common sense of course opposes upward mobility and the welfare state. It points at examples like Justice Clarence Thomas, whose rise to the Supreme Court involved casting himself as a rags-to-riches hero of self-reliance and simultaneously casting his sister as a "welfare queen," pathologically dependent on state aid. Thomas could make this case, however, only by ignoring both the institutional force of the civil rights movement in making space for his career and all the work (paid as well as unpaid) that the sister had done to care for other family members, including the aunt who raised her. The upward mobility story would become much more interesting if the social interdependence

on which all supposedly independent labor depends could be factored back in. My hypothesis is that this social interdependence is a real if covert presence in the upward mobility story, where it takes the narrative form of an apparently decentralized figure: the mentor or benefactor who intervenes on the protagonist's behalf, though not without some ambiguity of motive, to make the mobility possible. Narratively speaking, it is this figure that explains the hero's miraculous passage from A to B, society of origin to society of destination, and thus embodies—a point made by Fredric Jameson many years ago— the real storiness of the story.

Looking back from, say, the sinister but effective mentorship of Hannibal Lecter in *Silence of the Lambs* or the benevolent therapeutic mentorship of the Robin Williams figure in *Good Will Hunting,* one could start this argument with Horatio Alger. Though Alger lent his name to the narrative of upward mobility, many critics have noted that his narratives do not in fact embody the self-reliance with which they are popularly identified. "Alger's heroes are rarely 'alone and unaided,'" John Cawelti wrote in 1965, "and do not win their success entirely through individual effort and accomplishment. From the very beginning of his career, the Alger boy demonstrates an astounding propensity for chance encounters with benevolent and useful friends, and his success is largely due to their patronage and assistance." Michael Moon adds a sexual dimension to this "patronage and assistance." Describing the crucial scene between boy and benefactor as "a mutual seduction of sorts,"he offers this analysis: "the ritualistic 'lucky break' that initiates the boy's rising usually takes the form of his attracting the attention of a well-to-do male patron, usually through some spontaneous exhibition of his physical strength or daring. The 'magic trick' that the Alger text ultimately performs is to recuperate the possibility of a man's taking an intense interest in an attractive boy without risking being vilified or persecuted for doing so—indeed, this 'interest' is taken in a manner that is made thoroughly congruent with the social requirements of corporate capitalism on the sides of both parties: boy and potential employer alike 'profit' from it."

But the rich implications of Moon's argument extend beyond the conclusion that the bonds between older patron and street boy can only serve the purposes of corporate capital. This bond, a sort of narrative icon of the limits on and redistribution of individual responsibility, reflects the momentous ethical transformation that was also required if public, taxpayer-financed institutions were ever going to replace private philanthropy in dealing with Alger's homeless children. The "limited liability" that gave the corporation its first English name involved a dispersal of individual responsibility that, however convenient as a device for making and protecting profits, was also about to be refunctioned in support of government intervention in areas where government was felt—and in many quarters is still felt— to have no business. If it defended investors against demands for proper accountability, the "Ltd" perspective also encouraged the threateningly relativistic "no fault" view of poverty, based on a vision of ineluctable social interdependence, that support for the emergent social welfare state would call for and that has by no means overcome all resistance even now. The welfare state needed "limited liability" no less than the corporation did, and the "patronage and assistance" of Alger's benefactors is one way readers learned to recognize it.

Eager to find earlier antecedents for this story, heterosexual as well as homosocial and broad enough to take in the social welfare state as well as corporate capitalism, I'm forced back to the eigh-

teenth century. I will have nothing to say about the future of eighteenth-century studies, and it will be evident enough that I'm no expert on Rousseau. But I'm intrigued by a memory of reading the *Confessions*, during the same period when I was getting to know Carol, and coming upon the early sections dealing with Jean-Jacques' relations with Mme de Warens, the convert to Catholicism, thirteen years his elder, who picked this homeless waif off the streets at the age of 15, took him into her house, got him started in the world, and made him her lover. In the last of his *Reveries of a Solitary Walker,* perhaps the last words he wrote, Rousseau recalls that the happiest days of his life were those he spent with the woman he called "Maman." This description of life with Mme de Warens is "liltingly reminiscent," Nicole Fermon comments, "of the best state man can aspire to, the social contract lived in its full dimensions."

But why should "the social contract lived in its full dimensions" take the form of the couple of the Younger Man and the Older Woman? As the story is told in the *Confessions,* it is somewhat less than idyllic, and somewhat more novelistic, or at least suggestive of the coming novels of Constant, Stendhal, Balzac, and their successors and (so I am tempted to argue) of certain absences of heat, patterned zones of coolness or relative erotic indifference that seem to attend the theme of upward mobility. Rousseau is bewildered by the somewhat dispassionate style in which Mme de Warens proposes that they become lovers, as well as by his own sudden lack of eagerness for that which he has long desired. Reflecting back, he denies that her speeches to him were "cold and sad," but he calls her "not very sensual" and ascribes to her, despite a warm sensibility, "an icy temperament." If this is love, it is love of a distinctly chilly sort. Rousseau's own coolness might result, he thinks, from the fact that she is already "possessed by another man"—that is, from the chill of the power of other men, of which she cannot help but serve as the mediator. Or perhaps it is simply because she is never erotically "interested" in him at all, but inspired rather by motives that are generously pedagogical (she is more concerned, he says, with instructing him than with seducing him) and altruistic. He concludes: "She knew only one real pleasure in the world, and that was giving pleasure to those she loved."

The lowering of the emotional temperature I've called "cerebral love" —which is characteristic, I would argue, of the passionate yet somehow chilly relationships between protagonist and benefactor in a number of other texts— could of course be accounted for without reference to the modern democratic state. One explanation might be simple misogyny. As Fermon goes on to note, Rousseau is making homeopathic use of Mme de Warens: "without desiring to possess her," he says, "I was very glad that she removed my desire to possess others." As Linda Zerilli observes, Rousseau himself sets "the image of the mother substitute (Madame de Warens)," who 'safeguarded me against her and all her sex,'" against "those big-city women, who practice a false species of dissimulation and never love anything but themselves."

Joan Landes's *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution,* a book that gratefully acknowledges its own debt to Carol Kay, develops some of the same themes, but it also shows us that Rousseau is "far from a pedestrian misogynist." "Rousseau's preferred female figure," Landes concludes, "is the beneficent mother or desexualized bestower of Good, the utopian Maman, Mme de Warens of his *Confessions.*" And the logic or force of this utopianism overshoots the fact that, as Landes goes on to note, "He insists over and over again on the importance of woman's reproduc-

tive role." What is so striking about "Maman" is that she is *not* literally speaking a mother—indeed, the peculiar love between her and the young Jean-Jacques differs from the heterosexual norm both in its reversal of authority and in that it does not aim at, end in, or even imitate the realm of biological reproduction. The exteriority to the reproductive cycle signaled by the disparity in age is essential to Rousseau's political project. Rousseau argues not merely that the family cannot be a model for the state, but further that the self-alienation required in order for individuals to re-discover themselves in the general will mean going "against nature" in the sense that the familial is the natural. As Fermon puts it, "democracy becomes possible" only because of an "extensive denaturing process." In order for such a process to be desired at all, it must be eroticized, must come to permeate ground-level affective reality; yet by contrast with the sort of desire with which we are familiar, that which aims at a state no longer metaphorically grounded in familial sexuality may well seem somewhat pale and ambiguous. Is it erotic at all? Or is it merely a "desexualized bestower of Good"?

In literary tradition love outside marriage has often been associated with passion that is more rather than less fervent, for such passion does not have to pass the test of everyday social durability. Here too love stands outside the cycle of biological reproduction. But this love is cooler rather than warmer, I would suggest, precisely because it *does* aspire toward compromise with a reproducible reality. In aiming elsewhere than marriage and progeny, it aims at something other than perpetuating the existing social order; hence its appropriateness to a story of social mobility. But it does seem to aim at *some* social order; hence the pedagogical and altruistic motives that are so visibly if ambiguously mixed into erotic self-interest. For the moment, a social order that would be more rational and more democratic than the cosy, customary, patriarchal bonds of the family remains as anomalous as the love affair itself.

The classic problem of Rousseau's political theory is that his state presumes the existence of the subjects it would have to produce. As Bonnie Honig puts it, "You cannot have good laws without good people and you cannot have good people without good laws." In order to break the vicious circle, Honig argues, a deus ex machina is necessary: "the figure of the founder, a good person prior to good law, a miraculous lawgiver." In *On the Social Contract* Rousseau writes: "The discovery of the best rules of society would require a superior intelligence, who saw all of men's passions yet experienced none of them; who had no relationship at all to our nature yet knew it thoroughly; whose happiness was independent of us, yet who was nevertheless willing to attend to ours." One who experienced none of our passions, whose happiness was independent of ours: Honig is interested in Rousseau's dependence on a founder who would also be a foreigner, but the same description would also apply to women who like foreigners are "barred from active participation" (Landes's words) in the national-state space Rousseau is proposing. Or at any rate, modified mother-figures like his "Maman."

If the disinterestedness of the Older Woman is the site of an unacceptable renunciation of interest and agency on the part of women, it is also, and simultaneously, a model of the ideal and necessary alienation and rediscovery of the self in the general will. For all its risky sense of erotic innovation, this model of alienation is no doubt not a desirable role model. Indeed, the eroticized microcosm of the social contract formed by the exchange between Older Woman and Younger Man is not even the endpoint of the narrative, but only a moment of mediation, an interruption en route to somewhere

more realistic. Yet such moments of passionate chilliness should not be allowed to pass for the result of a relentless psychological realism, a cold-eyed dissection of unsatisfactory, de-idealized eroticism, as they do in successors like Constant and Stendhal. For if they indeed embody principles on which an emergent though as yet unrealized polity might be organized, as I have been suggesting, then their presence adds moral ballast both to ambition generally and to the empty, formal ambitions of the "career" or "professional" woman.

Carol Kay's battle with the anti-statism of American Foucauldians (an anti-statism that is not always characteristic of Foucault himself, or for that matter of other Foucauldians) was not based on utopianism, but on a sober judgment of the political circumstances and possibilities of our time, which led her to conclude that the political project of the welfare state, as a set of real historical accomplishments and still energetic impulses begging to be extended further, has been prematurely given up for dead. When even liberals who might have been assumed sympathetic, like Anthony Giddens, denounce it for its downplaying of "risk," it seems necessary to restore to the welfare state a missing sense of affect and imaginative adventure, a place among our riskiest and most passionate narratives.

Columbia University

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

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IV
COSMOPOLITAN AND POSTCOLONIAL PERSPECTIVES

boundary 2

Benjamin Now:
Critical Encounters with The Arcades Project

Volume 30, Issue 1 March 2003
Philip Rosen and Kevin McLaughlin, special issue editors

The Arcades Project is the unfinished, final work of the influential cultural theorist, critic, and historian Walter Benjamin. Until 1999, this huge, unruly manuscript, which provides a more complete picture of the diversity of Benjamin's work than formerly available, had not been fully translated into English. "Benjamin Now" is the first collection of essays in English to focus on that text.

While this essential text's title refers to its ostensible subject—the nineteenth century shopping arcades of Paris—*The Arcades Project* is a mass of cultural, political, and social material presented in the form of a vast montage. "Benjamin Now" reconsiders the significance of Benjamin's theories and writings in light of this final project.

Contributors: T. J. Clark, Howard Eiland, Peter Fenves, Tom Gunning, Michael Jennings, Claudia Brodsky Lacour, Kevin McLaughlin, Philip Rosen, Henry Sussman, Lindsay Waters, Samuel Weber, Peter Wollen

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INTELLECTUALS IN POWER*

(PREFACE TO THE CHINESE EDITION)

PAUL A. BOVÉ

Carol Kay once sat through my graduate seminar on Antonio Gramsci and Antonio Negri. During the first few weeks, I could see how hard it was for her to remain silent and to swallow all the corrections she had in mind so as to keep my students from suffering too much corruption. One afternoon, from the back of the class, she raised her hand, like a demure undergraduate, to ask if I minded a comment. Grinning at me, she threatened Hobbesian correction: she could stand no more. In a remarkable example of the sprezzatura I shall forever miss, she then made clear how Gramsci and Negri had lost in not taking the English moralists seriously. Of course, this was only one gloriously, funny, erudite, and elegant moment in our long battle whether or not theory had any politics. So, belatedly, I offer her this short explanation that, probably, would not have convinced her.

I wrote *Intellectuals in Power* in the United States in the early 1980s, a period defined by the election of Ronald Reagan to the Presidency and the victory of anti-theoretical humanists in the American academy. The book shows the effects of a struggle to avoid political and intellectual defeat. The Reagan years were a time of great discouragement to rigorous humanists devoted to honest inquiry into matters of power, discourse, institutions, and truth. Since the 1968 election of Richard Nixon, a victory resting in substantial part upon an electoral "Southern Strategy" that co-opted for neo-liberal politics the populist racist sentiment of the former rebellious Confederate States of America, battle raged among many intellectual factions over the direction of culture and humanistic intellectual work. In short, the Reagan administration, elected in 1980, created the conditions for the development of globalization, for the "end of the Cold War," for the coming of neo-liberalism and anti-statism as a base for US domestic and foreign policy—and, in intellectual terms, supported two key groups of humanistic intellectual allies, both former Cold War old-guard 'humanists,' such as Walter Jackson Bate at Harvard and John Silber, the President of Boston University, and younger neo-liberal and anti-theoretical academics who belong to a long tradition of "American firsters," that is, intellectuals who insist on the priority of US traditions and values and who did the dirty work of destroying theory and the discourses of critical postmodernism. I am thinking here of such figures as Walter Benn Michaels and Richard Rorty.

It seemed clear to me in the early 1980s that the intellectual bases for neo-liberal attacks on theory in the US would often come in a conservative cloak because neo-liberals, and for that matter, neo-

conservatives, would welcome the chance to present their revolutionary and disruptive values in the guise of tradition and a return to core values. To confront and attempt to weaken this strategy, in part, I constructed *Intellectuals in Power* to analyze the limits as well as profound potentialities of humanistic discourse, especially as this was being then represented as a greater good, a higher value, than the so-called 'nihilistic' consequences of deconstruction. We should remember that through the early and mid-1980s the reputations of several European thinkers whose works were essential to the success of literary theory were discredited: scholars avidly recalled Heidegger's association with the Nazis; historians unearthed documents testifying to Paul de Man's cooperation with fascist newspapers in Belgium; Michel Foucault died of AIDS, a frightening disease then associated in the US with the 'deviant' behavior of 'homosexuality'—a disease described by the Christian right, an important element in Reagan's ruling coalition, as a just punishment sent by God upon sinners; and Habermas, recalling the Nazis admiration of Nietzsche, labeled Foucault a proto-fascist nihilist because of his work calling into question the effects and values of reason.

Of course, as Edward W. Said had pointed out in 1978, a great deal of especially deconstructive theory had institutionalized itself into vacuous careerism in the US. Like any other academic school, postmodern criticism and especially criticism that, in the potent shadows of Derrida and de Man, called itself deconstructive, fell victim to commodification and lost its value as thinking. Said, in 1978, created a story in which "American deconstructionists" turn their back upon history, upon the long tradition of thought since Vico, a tradition according to which 'man' can know only those things which are the products of his own making. In essence, Said makes 'deconstruction' into a modern avatar of Cartesian analysis, a textual obsession parallel to Descartes' hatred of the linguistic knowledge of human cultures. Said, in other words, attempted something like a critique of deconstruction from the left and in the name of 'history,' in the name of the 'human.' The basis for much of this work appears in Said's discussion of Vico in his great book, *Beginnings*.

Said's critique awkwardly intertwined with the 1980s neo-liberal opposition to theory and postmodernism and, ironically, became itself a resource for the rise of variously abusive trends in critical theory—such as postcolonial criticism—against which Said has since written. In writing *Intellectuals in Power*, I was interested to test how far the sort of critical humanism endorsed by Said against the power of theory might be carried to meet what I took to be the need for participatory democracy in the US. *Intellectuals in Power* has not, I think, yet been read seriously for its political intent. From Nixon to Reagan, the rightward movement of US politics, which had, of course, profound global consequences, essentially de-democratized the polity. In the great US-based effort to reverse the impact of the world-wide student revolts of 1968 and to neutralize the civil rights struggles for women and people not of European origin (one should remember the close alliances between Reagan and Margaret Thatcher here), American neo-liberalism not only minimized the claims people could make upon the state but turned decision making over to inherently non-democratic institutions like the transnational corporations and their state allies.

One 1960s ideal, with a long US and international tradition, of participatory democracy infused with rigorous intellectual standards disappeared in the mist of post-Nixon right-wing populism consummated by Reagan in his slogans "get the government off the backs of the people" and "no public money

for immoral elitist art." Sadly, many US intellectuals re-enforced the programs represented in these slogans by encouraging, against theory, very weak and thin visions of history and humanity as mere notions to legitimate both reactionary and counteractive multicultural research and ideological projects. In the US so-called New Historicism allied themselves with and became avatars of these notions.

Intellectuals in Power attempted both to save the ideal of participatory democracy by building an analysis which showed the great potential of a rigorously applied humanistic criticism and the limits of such possibilities. In effect, the book argued that in the hands of great humanists such as Erich Auerbach, Marshall Hodgson, and Edward Said, critical humanism accomplishes two goals of broad consequence: it shows the unequal disposition of power and allows, in Said's phrase, the intellectual to speak truth to power; but, more important, it shows how eventually critical humanism brings itself up against limits that reveal its own anti-democratic grounds in the state and the intellectual's peculiar rootedness in power. The title of the book often was mistaken by unfriendly critics to refer to intellectuals who "have" power whereas it is a given of this post-Foucauldian book that power is not something that can be understood when placed in the grammatical genitive. Intellectuals are "in" power, that is, immersed within and themselves nodes of systems of power and discourse the effects of which are often beyond their conscious control and contrary to their avowed aims.

Specifically, *Intellectuals in Power* rests upon an analysis of a sharp difference between Edward Said and Michel Foucault. The book argues that Said, for his own purposes, misreads Foucault's theory of power as mere impotent nihilism, and it also claims that Foucault's work presents a clear theory of the genealogical burden limiting the desires of critical humanism as a discursive system. When read with Nietzsche and Foucault in mind, critical humanism—and this is evident in Marshall Hodgson's political methodological ruminations about the limits of historical knowledge—reveals its complicities with anti-democratic forces more important for their inhuman effects than their ability, as it were, to 'co-opt' their speakers. The book then takes the form of an analysis of the possibilities of critical humanism in the work of intellectually rigorous scholars; of a theory of institutionalized discourse; of a reading of Nietzsche and Foucault as themselves theoreticians of knowledge and of the forms given to knowledge production as effects of power; and, finally, as a schematic expression of a desirable political goal resting on some of the complex limits of a dominant but cheapened theory (critical humanism) and the potentials of one that seemed emergent (theory of discourse).

Of course, many things have happened since that time, even during the time the book was being written. At least for the moment the tendency to democracy has been restricted by neo-liberal victories and the struggle for rigorous, erudite, and interested scholarship has gone on, often against ideologues of the conventional right and left. A new book would need to be written today elaborating much greater forces and broader historical sweeps than those attempted in this rather focused but provocative book. I can only hope my Chinese readers will help us all move far beyond the limits of today, limits *Intellectuals in Power* had already come to fear.

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* Paul A. Bové, *Intellectuals in Power: A Genealogy of Critical Humanism*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986; translated by Xian Zhou, Jiangsu People's Publishing House, 2002.

PARIAH MINORITIES

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TURKISH FANTASIES, EUROPEAN ANXIETIES

IREM BALKIR

The cultural chapter of the Maastricht Treaty forsakes any attempt to assert an overall European culture. This carefully worded elision may have to do with the fact that all Europes have already found their own institutional expressions within the system. Or, it may have to do with the impossibility of finding a referential code for the ways in which Europeanness is lived as a set of variably shared assumptions in societies which happen to occupy the same land mass and have the same historic roots and interests.[1] Which ever the stronger reason may be, the absence of a definitional culture helps perpetuate selective global de-linking. That is to say, in France to be European can mean to think globally about a French-led political Europe that will compete with the United States and Japan. In Germany it can position a citizen against nationalism. In Scotland or in one of the Baltic states it can assert nationality against a former empire. To be European in Italy is to extend one's multiple local identities within a nation, a region, a city, etc. In Greece it can express a desire to revive Orthodox heritage by strengthening ties with the nations of the same background.

Cultural politics within the European Union, on the other hand appears and disappears with the political fluctuations on the continent. By not intervening in the ethnic cleansings in Bosnia and Kosovo, in threatening to suspend Austria from certain responsibilities in the European Union so as to comply with the geosynchronous pressure to isolate xenophobic politics, the European Union clearly fosters an idea of European culture whose agreed geographical boundaries changed with the circumstances.

My concern here is not with the identification of the interesting anti-centering moves within a culturally over-structured entity such as the European Union. In this short paper I shall address the issue of the differences between the European and Turkish responses to the purported renunciation of the assertion of an overall European culture in the official discourse. In what follows then, I will try to read the German Constitutional Court's 1993 ruling on the Maastricht Treaty alongside with "No Entry," Orhan Pamuk's allegorical essay in *Where Does Europe End?*.[2] This is a peculiarly non-synchronous border narrative in which missing references, anxiety and fantasy blend with the institutional and professional language of a self-regulating supranational regime on the European side of the border, and with the familiar language of nation-state on the Turkish side of the border. I should add that this border narrative is not a vignette but a refrain that can be added to one of the longest sustained cultural narratives, the classical distinction between Europe and Asia. A host of European thinkers and writers have reiterated this narrative from the fifth century BC to the end of the nineteenth century: Herodotus, Hippocrates, Aristotle, Ptolemy, Strabo, Augustine, Isidore (Bishop) of Seville, Charlemagne, Pope Pius II, Erasmus, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Montaigne, Kant, Napoleon, V. Hugo, Marx, Edward

Tylor,[3] and numerous other anthropologists, orientalists, missionaries, soldiers, travellers who crossed the border.

In construing a comparative border narrative, the German Constitutional Court's decision on the Maastricht treaty should be an appropriate beginning. The absent clause on an agreed cultural definition of Europe was a major source of anxiety for the German Court as it deliberated on the Treaty and extension of the European Union. The Court has based its "strong reservations about further extension of the European Union on the argument that the constitutional state requires a certain cultural homogeneity of people."[4] The substitution of the absent clause in the Treaty with a desire for cultural homogeneity helps uncover the internal reasoning of Europe within the global system: anxiety vis-à-vis other culture(s). According to Habermas, the ruling of the German court is symptomatic of a defensive attitude of the nation-state that cannot provide a frame for the maintenance of democratic citizenship in view of the growing pluralism inside national societies, and the global problems imposed from the outside. For Habermas, the emergence of supranational regimes within the format of the European Union, and keeping up the pace of political action with the globalization of self-regulating systems could be ways out of the impasse. Etienne Balibar also argues that the stumbling block is "always the same": the need to formulate a rule of exclusion grounded in rights and principles. For Balibar, what is "implicitly required is a supplementary rule of exclusion which properly belongs to the new citizenship of the postnational era."[5]

Here, one has to heed Spivak's warning that "it is easier to speak of postnationalism when one participates in a single-state civil society in the metropolis."[6] Given that nearly thirteen million foreigners live in the EU borders not as citizens but as the 16th "heimlich" partner of the Union- and "33% of Europeans who consider themselves quiet or very racist,"[7] we should realize that Habermas's and Balibar's positions, like the debate carried on in the inward-looking EU quarters of European capitals over European cizitenship are utopic ways of addressing the issues of the citizenship.

In an effort to construe a fuller border narrative from the European side, perhaps attending to the situation on the ground can reveal alternative examples of post-nationalism that is not necessarily a negative border praxis. The popular public can actually reveal a heterotopia, a cosmopolitanism that can invent functional multiformities between elements that are not necessarily cognates. I have in mind the example of the German banks that began to offer Islamic financial services to the devout Muslim communities residing in Germany to curb the illegal operations of certain Islamist transnational companies operating between Turkey and Germany. Such alternative post-European financescapes and ethnoscapes disrupt the calls for the reinstitution of cultural homogenization and other hegemonic practices under the guise of selective global de-linking. In the language of border theory, these exemplify discrepant crossings, the shifting pattern of un/documented circulations and negotiations.[8]

Prior to December 1999,[9] it is the foreclosure of such a cosmopolitanism, more so than the unanimous official rejection of Turkey's application for membership in the European Union, that seems to have instigated the *Where Does Europe End?* project, and Orhan Pamuk's allegorical contribution to the collection. In "No Exit" Orhan Pamuk writes:

> ... this absent-minded and bemused traveller casually reads a sign saying "No Entry" on a door. He ignores these words as he does not think they call for his attention. Regardless of the sign, this is not the kind of door that would ever draw his interest. . . . Nevertheless the sign has reminded him that his aimless wandering has its boundaries... the door now intrudes on the fantasy world of the merry wanderer, knowingly reminding him of the boundaries of his own designs. Maybe it's nothing to worry about, but why have they put up that sign? If this is a door, it must lead somewhere. ...Who can actually go through that door? What is it that lets them in? What is it that allows for that? privilege? . . . the final and most logical conclusion: One day, those who were already in, had a private conference to decide on who would be eligible for admission. "As there are far too many coming in, let's bar some of them," they probably said. No doubt some of them felt uneasy, as they too might be thrown out at the end of their talks. The wanderer outside the door had always been familiar with such tense situations, so he could readily imagine the manner in which the participants engaged in the debate that started off in a certain flurry characteristic of those who are keen to protect their property and possessions, their tastes and privileges. . . . Some felt very uneasy, so they did not object to allowing in a few more people from the crowd outside. With their support, the debate assumed the nature of a riddle on the "identity question." During this most enjoyable of activities they all relished finding covert and pretentious ways to recount the merits that distinguished them from those outside. ... What they "were," was what those outside "were not." One could even say that they had managed to be what they were, because of those outside. . . . Moreover, as in the case of the now clear-minded traveller, the sign had also brought about the outsider's awareness in those left out. One did not have to want to go in. It was enough to catch sight of the sign on the door. . . . The question of who and what he is, will then assume additional importance ... his characteristics, tastes, relationships, possessions and property, all begin to transform into items, which he must claim for himself, which he must proudly protect. Elated by his thoughts on identity, he has already begun to feel slightly irritated by those who are not like him. (pp.126-129)

The encounter with the European Union over the last decade significantly changed the "valuing practices"[10] between Europe and Turkey. "No Exit" allegorizes various stages of this conceptual transformation. For those who don't have access to that context, it can even be read as an allegory of border writing with emphases on the differences in reference codes between two cultures where the border crosser is both "self" and "other."[11]

For the Turkish intelligentsia, the idea of Europe and European ideas have been an internalized intellectual frontier since the early decades of the nineteenth century. The periodization of Turkish history is more or less governed by the principle of continuous Europeanization. It is commonly agreed that the chronotopes 1839-1876, 1908-1919, 1923- to the present correspond, at a micro level, to the emergence of the self-reflexive individual—the modern subject, to the gendering of the modern subject, to the assertion of boundaries drawn between publicity and privacy, to the invention of the nation-state and republican heritage with such distinct Turkish forms as "state feminism."[12] It is significant to note that the deterritorialization of European modernity was not the feat of colonial agents, orientalists, missionaries, travellers and so forth, but that of a native intelligentsia who facilitated the cross over of European material into the Turkish cultural referential codes. Turks therefore do have an anamnesis of Europe and European ideas. This anamnesis even has a uni/form: modernity.

The abrasive devaluing practices of the European Union in the chronotope 1987-1999 vitiated this form. "No Entry" is the allegory of this vitiation, of the discovery of the rule of exclusion, and of the search and discovery of another form that increasingly recourses to neo-tribal essentialism for self-representation. As a novelist and a literary public intellectual, Orhan Pamuk is very adept at managing as great a number and diversity of codes as is possible. The attenuation of these codes in "No Exit" is the moral of the allegory. As a piece of criticism, it seeks to correct what the Mexican-American border critics also want to correct. The closure of the border enforces singular referential codes and empties out the signifying possibilities. Exclusion renders invisible the "creative processes of transculturation ...where the person is crisscrossed by multiple identities."[13]

As we face the moral obligation of rethinking our valuing practices for our intellectual revival, and as we seek more cosmopolitan forms for our anamnesis, there will be many occassions to return to Carol Kay's work.

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NOTES

1. See "Council of Europe," in *From the Margins: A Contribution to the Debate on Culture and Development in Europe* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 1997), pp. 25-27.

2. Orhan Pamuk, "No Entry," in *Where Does Europe End?* (Istanbul: Helsinki Citizens' Assembly-Turkey, 1993), pp.126-129.

3. *The History of the Idea of Europe*, Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen, Eds. (London: Routledge, 1995).

4. Jurgen Habermas, "The European Nation-State-Its Achievements and Its Limits. On Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship" in *Mapping the Nation*, Gopal Balakrishnan, Ed. (London: Verso,

1996), p. 293. Following these deliberations, Germany was to become the last nation to sign the Treaty on European Union in October 1993; The treaty entered into force in November 1993. The German Constitutional Court's reservation about cultural homogenisation however set a precedent. The new leader of the CDU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany), the main opposition party, objected to the enlargement of the European Union.

5. Etienne Balibar, "Is European Citizenship Possible?" *Public Culture,* 8, 2. (1996): 361.

6. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward the History of the Vanishing Present* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 419.

7. BBC World, April 7, 2000.

8. Saldivar, José David. *Border Matters: Remapping American Cultural Studies*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

9. The decision to reject Turkey's membership application was unexpectedly reversed in the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, paving the way for European Union membership in a distant future.

10. Carol Kay, "Valuing Practices" *New Literary History* 30 (1999): 757-767.
In her last published essay on Hume, Carol Kay discusses the significance of "valuing practices" for fictional representation, persuasion and conversation.

11. Emily D. Hicks, *Border Writing: The Multidimensional Text* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), pp. xxv-xxvi.

12. See Nilufer Gole, *The Forbidden Modern* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp.27-82.

13. Renato Rosaldo, *Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis* (London: Routledge, 1989, 1993), p.216.

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JONATHAN SWIFT'S *TALE OF A TUB:* A POSTCOLONIAL APPROACH[1]

RASHMI DUBE BHATNAGAR

"Swift's work" observes Edward Said in an early essay, "is a persisting miracle of how much commentary an author's writing can accommodate and still remain problematic."[2] Said alludes to the canonical Englishing of Swift by quoting Norman O. Brown's statement concerning "the housebreaking and domestication of the tiger of English literature."[3] I take Said's insight to mean that the problematic of Swift's work cannot be negotiated by canonical criticism which tends to play down or make unintelligible the Swiftian critique of secular learning in *Tale of a Tub* and remained oblivious of their colonial implications in Swift's work.[4] In dialogue with these critical methods, but also in marked opposition to some of their pre-suppositions, I take *Tale of a Tub* as an exemplar of colonialist representations and thus give the fullest weight to the Swiftian critique of Enlightenment, secular learning, and Grub Street.

Postcolonial criticism effectively names the "problematic" of Swift's works, not simply in terms of the pathology of the author Swift, or the unique textuality of Swiftian works, or even as a problem specific to the interpretive activity, but rather as a problem that properly belongs to the domain of colonial studies.[5] For example, the theoretical issue that has dogged revisionist Irish literary criticism and postcolonial Swift studies concerns the status of Swift's anti-colonial writings. Why is Swift not to be understood as a colonizer? The fact that Swift lived and wrote under colonial conditions certainly makes him a colonial writer, but that does not mean that Swift is not a colonist.[6] The modern reader/critic reconciles the resistance rhetoric inherent in the Swiftian texts and its enormous influence on Irish nationalist movements as well as on postcolonial literatures while acknowledging Swift's complicity in the penal structure of discriminatory laws imposed on Irish Catholics. This is a question that postcolonial theory addresses, not by the interpretive procedure of concrete empirical evidence from Swift's life and works or an authoritative and didactic answer, but by continually re-opening and problematizing Swift's stance as an oppositional writer.

Swift's resistance rhetoric presupposes yet another question. How does the historical fact of Ireland's colonization in the eighteenth century de-stabilize the political implications of Swift's conservatism? Swift should not be read solely in the light of his stated desire to be a token Englishman. The positions adopted by Swift vis-à-vis the discourses of secular learning should also be taken into consideration. This is why *Tale of a Tub* with its blend of Anglican apologetics and Lockean epistemology is of particular interest to the contemporary postcolonial reader/critic.

Swift, as a colonial writer, can sharpen his tools and craft his oppositional project, but he cannot quarrel with history and erase his positioning in relation to colonial power, the dependent kingdom of Ireland, and the master discourses, nor can he dismiss imperial England's political domination and cultural hegemony. By means of playing with reinscription and relocation, Swift manages to displace limitations otherwise imposed by the dominant discourse.

The biographical contexts within which Swift's works emerged provide the setting for legitimating interpretations of his writings. This is especially true of the nineteenth-century biographies of English vintage that portray Swift as a bigoted, misanthropic, and clinically insane author. One such instance consists in discrediting Swift by pointing out his class affiliation as a member of the privileged Anglo-Irish elite, a section of Irish society that enabled British rule over Ireland, profited from the persecution of the native majority of Irish Catholics, and sanctioned other colonial practices such as the discriminations against the minority of Ulster Presbyterians.[7]

It is of the utmost importance, while reading the Swiftian texts, to take into account the conventional prejudices of the Anglo-Irish in Swift's time, who felt that their privilege and security rested on the economic, political, and religious discrimination of the Irish Catholic majority and the Presbyterian minority. The problem is how to read this biographical "fact." There is always the implicit temptation to judge Swift according to the nativist ideal within which anti-colonial utterance stems from those artists and writers who are not guilty of sectarian prejudice.

Since I write from a post-colonial perspective I contest the search for purity in the writer's ideology and argue in favor of close attention to the fact that anti-colonial writings, movements and agitations in Ireland gained greatest public attention when they emanated from the indigenous elites rather than from the oppressed Catholic sections of Irish society.

Privilege is apparent in the fact that as an Anglo-Irishman Swift had access to university education, government employment, and political representation through the Irish parliament. Lack of privilege is evident when we look at Swift's relation to the institution of patriarchy; a fatherless orphan he grew up a poor dependent. He inherited neither money nor land.[8] An uneven claim on class privilege is also discernible in his relation to education and employment. Swift was able to obtain the best education thanks to his paternal uncles, but did not relish memories of his being a poor relative. During the sixteen nineties, Swift had to return from the humiliating failure of his second employment as an Anglican priest and request his first employer to grant him the very position he had left as literary secretary. He struggled and negotiated with his subject-position as an underprivileged member of the privileged Anglo-Irish elite by reading voraciously and writing about his readings in a commonplace notebook and it is in the midst of this self-study that Swift composed *Tale of a Tub*.

Writers play with the ambiguities of their cultural location by triggering the reader's manifold imagings of the putative author of the text, or as Derrida suggests in *Otobiographies*, readers and critics bio-graph the writer of the text.[9] As a young man Swift was a mediocre student. Yet when it came to self-study he was brilliant. In the 1710 *Apology* attached to *Tale of a Tub*, Swift observes: "The Author was then young, his invention at the height, and his reading fresh in his head."[10] *Tale* is in many ways

the product of a self-taught young man; its subversiveness, energy, controlled wildness and profound insights belong to the hours Swift spent in William Temple's study. His ineptitude in reproducing the manners and beliefs of his class can be gauged from the fact that Swift was a misfit in the world of learning, and it is this sense of being lowly enough to write anonymously or ghostwrite others' compositions that Swift conveys through the Grub Street hack.

The processes of cultural colonialism by which the imperial power erases the colonial writer and wipes out or deforms the cultural production of indigenous people, are described in *Tale of a Tub* through the nightmarish experiences of the hack. The hack is one who finds that the posters he has put up on the streets are all torn down:

> The Originals were posted fresh upon all gates and corners of streets; but returning in a very few hours to take a review, they were all torn down, and fresh ones in their places: I enquired after them, among readers and booksellers, but I enquired in vain, the memorial of them was lost among men, their place was no more to be found: and I was laughed to scorn, for a clown and a pedant, without all taste and refinement, little versed in the course of present affairs, and that knew nothing of what had pass'd in the best companies of court and town. [11]

The psychoanalytic overtones emerging from this passage are rather obvious; the writing subject discovers that his writings are irreparably destroyed, "the memorial of them was lost among men, and their place was no more to be found." The dreaming subject is caught in a repetitive cycle of inquiring "after them, among readers and booksellers." In a dream -like state the hackish writer makes a second discovery, namely that everyone is laughing at him. In setting about on a fruitless search for his lost writings the hack displays his ignorance of the times. Thus the text enacts the violent processes of erasure by essaying and maintaining the tone of self-mockery and self-flagellation. [12]

Swift scholars have commented on how Swift hit multiple satiric targets through the hack, but few critics have seen the autobiographical element in this literary self-portrait. [13] It is precisely because of the colonial intellectual's hybrid positioning vis-à-vis secular learning that the splitting between the writing self and author/hack occurs in *Tale of a Tub*. It offers the reader a specifically colonial image of the public realm in which writing takes shape in a dream-like state of violent erasure. Unlike the glorious images to be found in the discourses of nationalism of the intellectual as the bard of the people, the nationalist poet, the wandering minstrel or the poet laureate, *Tale* images the writing subject in conditions of colonialism similar to those of the hack. Indeed the readerly experience of hearing the hack drone on and on, without stopping for breath, is to come to know a figure invested with all that one hates and despises about bad writers and bad orators. There are times in the text when the hack becomes like a dartboard; every possible sin of bad writing is imputed to him and exemplified by him. Within a postcolonial framework such a savage self-portrait names the violent colonial processes by which the aspiring colonial writer is turned into a servant of the empire.

In outlining the colonial referent of this passage, I am not suggesting for one moment that we erase the historical context, i.e. the emergence of a literary marketplace, of book printing, and mass produc-

tion symbolized by the literary topography of Grub Street.[14] I am however inviting us to consider what might be the positionality or angle of vision the Swiftian hack adopts vis-à-vis this bustling intellectual commerce in eighteenth- century England. He perceives the threat of knowledge-related sweatshops. One way to rethink the referent of the passage quoted above is to recognize that the Swiftian reference is to knowledge production through print capitalism, but the view is from below. Who is the dreaming subject in this passage? This psychoanalytic question has to be answered in terms of the psychosocial effects of colonial domination over the colonized. The dream describes the fear of erasure. The dream configures the identity of the dreaming subject in terms of the hack who finds that the posters he has put up on the streets are all torn down. Thus the processes of cultural colonialism by which the imperial power erases the colonial writer and wipes out or deforms the cultural production of indigenous people, are described in *Tale* through this nightmarish scenario.

In my interpretation of the passage, Grub Street is neither reducible to, nor unconnected to, issues of nation and empire. Postcolonial criticism does not collapse these vast and significant processes into issues of empire. Rather postcolonial criticism illuminates the positionality from which the colonial writer sees, makes sense of and inserts himself into the emergent literary marketplace. Ideally the postcolonial critic is attentive to the rhetoricity of the text and—especially in this instance— to the textual reconstruction of the author in *Tale*.[15] Thus the dominant referent of the representation of authorship in *Tale* remains the emergent forces of print and the corollary issues of knowledge production. The postcolonial critic seeks out the intersections, the uneven conjunctures and collisions between the forces of modernity that are operative through colonialism and print production.

The great distinction of *Tale of a Tub* is to name the intersection between Enlightenment and empire in terms of the production of literary sweatshops.[16] The text gives us an unforgettable image of the writer produced under the dual conditions of colonialism and the marketplace of book production: it is the image of the colonial intellectual turned into a sweatshop hack. I do not imply that all the hacks on Grub Street in eighteenth century England were Irish. My argument is concerned with positionality, with perspective and with the colonial writer's negotiation with his place in given social structures. The fear of becoming a denizen of the literary sweatshops is far greater for the educated colonial native. Unlike the English poor and the proletarianized peasantry, the educated Anglo-Irishman possesses a university education and literary skills. Yet he must pay the price in order to gain employment and become a sweatshop hack.

A literary secretary, an Anglican pastor with meager resources, a pamphleteer in the service of the Tory party, these were the employment opportunities that determined Swift's access to class privilege. His employment at Moor Park as the secretary of William Temple became an enduring metaphor for his unequal and humiliating relation to the English elite. Employment in eighteenth-century Ireland depended in large measure on patronage and influence rather than merit. Furthermore Swift's relation to the Anglican church as a site of influence and advantage was marked by misfortune and lack of privilege. Swift's insights into the underbelly of the Anglican church were not due to his consciously seeking the role of the outcast, but to his repeated failures at earning the favor of the wealthy.

It is unnecessary to glorify or demonize Swift's lifelong attempts at seeking preferment; the insights

of the anti-colonial writer are a product of his failures and his reflection on his failures. In the traumatic year he spent as a new pastor at Kilroot, Swift found that his church had neither roof nor congregation. He composed sermons he could not deliver and did not like, because all his attention was taken up with studying the very church that stole his congregation, namely the Scotch-Irish Ulster Presbyterians who were migrating in large numbers from Scotland to Ulster, and had a vigorous and dynamic sense of their faith.

Swift's perspective rooted in his witnessing the underbelly of Anglican monopoly influenced his writings on the marginalization of true religious faith and sympathy for the Enlightenment. Swift saw the impoverished priests and their meager earnings: he also saw the cultural marginality at the base—a marginality that was hidden from the view of the rich and powerful bishops: he clashed with the Anglican bishops in eighteenth-century Ireland. These bishops were often of English stock; they showed political allegiance to England, and assumed no responsibility for their Irish constituency. *Tale* was written during the very years when Swift returned to Moor Park, and had the time to reflect on the fact that he failed at his first job. On the one hand, Swift saw that his church lacked moral and cultural authority. On the other hand, he had a profound intuition that the emancipatory possibilities afforded by secular learning along with the fact that secularism released human knowledge and human actions from the clutches of the mediaeval church were not undiluted goods.

Perhaps the most intriguing evidence of the ways in which Swift weaves the narrative of empire into the narrative of the processes of secular learning that were dear to the Enlightenment resides in the structure of the text. Structuralist literary theory has enabled us to be attentive to the significance of analysis of the structure of the text, although poststructuralist critique of structuralism cautions against turning formalist analyses into fetishes. Through a broad alliance between postcolonial theory and structuralism, I suggest that the structure of *Tale* mimics the problem of beginnings and silence in a colonized society, and thereby literally enacts the processes of secular learning.[17] The text has a peculiar alternating structure, in fact the key to the text lies in the structural relations between the digressions and the body of the text. The thick wad of prefatory material does not let the hack begin the story proper.

It is in this way that the text mimics the problem of beginnings for the writing subject in colonialism: the colonial writer has to begin over and over again and repeatedly fail at telling his story from his own point of view. The story he wishes to tell can only be narrated through enacting the repeated interruptions of the story about religion; therefore the religious allegory is never told in one, harmonious, steady and continuous flow; the digressions disrupt the narrative flow of the religious parable, until finally the religious parable is literally swallowed up by the digressions on secular learning. Here then was an image of the Enlightenment in Ireland, an image that could help us understand how the imperial power designates and demarcates the secular and religious spheres in the colony.

The Irish critic Seamus Deane insightfully positions or rather re-positions Swift within the Anglo-Irish literary tradition.[18] Deane's brilliant work has dispelled many of the myths and prejudices that cling to Irish literary traditions. From the canonical perspective of Swift as a Tory Anglican, Deane de-Anglicizes Swift by placing him within the intellectual and cultural battles that are specific to the Anglo-

Irish *literati*. Such an approach unfortunately has its limitations as it re-casts Swift as a sectarian and group-specific intellectual. As a sectarian intellectual Swift's discontent with empire and Enlightenment is motivated by the beleaguered monopolist base of Anglo-Irish political power and Anglican monopoly practices. [19] If one places Swift within the Anglo-Irish literary tradition, one honors the heterogeneity of the cultural landscape of the colonized country. Yet such an approach can fall prey to interpreting Swift's oppositional writings, and indeed the opposition within those writings, as assumed by the group interests of the Anglo-Irish community. The insights of a colonial writer are rooted in, but not necessarily limited by, his group affiliations. It would be more accurate to say that under conditions of colonialism, subject positions for the colonial subject are dispersed, contradictory, uneven, multi-layered and hybrid. [20]

This is a hybridity that positions Swift in such a way that he can neither wholly repudiate the anticipatory movements in the new secular learning that emerge out of philosophy, science and the deist circles in England, nor can he completely submit to its implications. Neither a disciple nor a full-fledged opponent, the colonial intellectual often finds that he has internalized the master discourses on many levels: at the same time he is unable to live with their implications, so that the object of his opposition turns into what Ashish Nandy most aptly calls "the intimate enemy." [21]

In conclusion, the protocols of postcolonial criticism do not permit that large intellectual and social movements like the Enlightenment be treated as reducible to, or conflated with imperialism. Nevertheless postcolonial criticism puts into crisis the assumption that intellectual history, namely the debates about secular learning —they occupy a significant place in *Tale of a Tub*—are in a domain separate and distinct from England's colonial endeavors. In more ways than one the intersections between Enlightenment and empire remains the untold story. The literary text, far from articulating the individual pathology of Swift, hints at the interconnectedness between empire and Enlightenment that is not chronicled in official history and philosophy. This unresearched and untold story cannot be narrated via empirical proof, testimonies or eyewitness accounts; the other history—that of the colonialist roots of the Enlightenment— is often told through the mediated refraction of literary texts like *Tale of a Tub*.

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NOTES

1. Conversations held with Carol Kay between 1989 and 1996 helped shape this essay. These exchanges took place in an Independent Study, in Professor Kay's course on eighteenth-century British social thought. Her comments on my dissertation on Swift and her written responses to my book prospectus on Swift have also guided me. In this essay I draw on bits and pieces of her observations and critical analysis, handwritten letters she wrote to me, as well as her marginalia on my work. Most of all I rely on the single most important tool for women's history: women's memory, passing down oral storytelling, remembered conversations about ideas and books, and correspondence. I also refer to the dialogue

with colleagues and friends at Delhi University and at the University of Pittsburgh. I am also grateful to Steve Newman, Marie-Rose Logan, and Margaret Barton-Fumo for their useful suggestions in the writing and revising of this essay.

2. Edward W. Said, "Swift's Tory Anarchy," *(Eighteenth-Century Studies*, vol. 3 no. 1, Fall, 1969, 48). Carol Kay shared with many scholars the belief that Said's early Swift essays were part of a projected book on Swift that might have changed the direction of Swift studies. Instead some of Said's ideas may have gone into the making of his path breaking work *Orientalism.* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978).

3. *ibid.*, 48.

4. Well- known examples of such criticism are Philip Harth, *Swift and Anglican Rationalism: The Religious Background of "A Tale of a Tub"* (Leiden & New York: E.J. Brill, 1992); Louis Landa, *Swift and the Church of Ireland*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1954).

5. For a stimulating direction in postcolonial studies see the use of *Subaltern Studies* to reinterpret Irish history in David Lloyd, "Subalternity in Ireland" (*Subaltern Studies IX* eds. Dipesh Chakrabarty and Shahid Amin, (Delhi: Oxford University Press,1996). See also Carole Fabricant, "Speaking for the Irish Nation: The Drapier, the Bishop, and the Problems of Colonial Representation," *English Literary History*, 66.2,1999,337-372.

6. I am grateful to Jonathan Arac for raising this question in his written comments on my dissertation in the spring of 1996.

7. My problematizing of received notions of the political project of the Enlightenment in this article has been enabled, in great measure, by Carol Kay's scholarly and pedagogical principle of questioning received notions of the political contexts of literature. Kay's book announced this vision of a revisionist eighteenth century literature and politics "by constructing a new political thematics that draws on British, rather than continental, philosophy and takes into account basic elements of British political history from the English Civil War to the French Revolution"*(Political Constructions : Defoe, Richardson and Sterne in Relation to Hobbes, Hume and Burke* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1988, vii). In *Political Constructions* Kay did for the eighteenth- century novel what Frederic Jameson did for Marxist literary criticism in *The Political Unconscious* (London: Methuen & Co., 1981). Instead of adopted the anesthetized view of the eighteenth-century novel as a reflection of the rise of the middle class, or the new woman, or empire, Kay turned the tide by making the provocative suggestion that eighteenth-century novels were politico-philosophical treatises that transferred and remapped politico-philosophical meditations and interventions into the newly legitimated literary form of the novel.

8. Swift's personal thriftiness like saving on coals in the London winter by dining out with his wealthy friends, combined with the numerous tales of his giving loans to people in need, suggests his familiarity with genteel poverty. The privilege of class and religious faith was offset by other factors: one of those factors was the fear of mental illness, namely Swift's lifelong fear of the onset of madness. A secondary

factor concerns involvement in community versus personal isolation: Swift gathered around him all those who, like Stella, were also living in dire circumstances or suffered religious discrimination like Alexander Pope.

9. Jacques Derrida, *The Ear of the Other: Otobiographie, Transference, Translation* ed. Christie McDonald trans. Peggy Kamuf, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988).

10. All quotations from *Tale of a Tub* are from the authoritative edition by A.C. Gutkelch and D. Nichol Smith ed. & intro. (second ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press,1920), 4.

11. *ibid.*, 35.

12. One feature of Gaelic and Third World rhetoric consists of adopting, in a situation of absolute powerlessness, the strategy of self-belittlement in order to maneuver into a position of negotiation. See Frederic Jameson's discussion of the Chinese writer Lu Xun's story where the beggar takes pride in being number one in self-belittlement "Third-World Literature in the era of multinational Capital" *Social Text*, No. 15 Fall 1986, 74.

13. Instead of jettisoning past criticism, I advocate an exploration of the common ground and the differences between the literary theory that deploys the notion of the satiric personae, like Ronald Paulson, *Theme and Structure in Swift's "Tale of a Tub,"* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), and the poststructuralist and postcolonial theory of textual bio-graphing, as well as the splits and schizophrenia in colonial self- representations.

14. For a historically grounded study of Grub Street see Pat Rogers, *Grub Street: Studies in a Subculture, London*: Methuen, 1972. The point of difference between the Rogers study and my interpretation in this article is that I define the historical context of literary portraits of Grub Street in relation to colonialism and the mass production of books.

15. I owe my insights into the rhetoricity of the Swiftian text in part to Carol Kay's brilliant conference paper "Swiftian Perspectives in David Hume," presented at The Notre Dame Sesquicentennial Irish Meetings: Jonathan Swift and Irish Studies, October 17, 1991. Through an analysis of a series of footnotes in David Hume's works, Carol Kay explored the Scottish philosopher's desire to emulate Swiftian prose. She argued that Hume realized that his own era could not follow in Swift's footsteps, to illuminate the moral philosophy of the later eighteenth century.

16. Any discussion of the Swiftian perspective on secular learning in the 1704 volume is incomplete without reference to the companion piece The Battle of the Books, and the excellent work on this text by Joseph M. Levine, *The Battle of the Books: History and Literature in the Augustan Age*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991.

17. My argument about the structure of the Tale is in broad sympathy with the mode of analysis by Warren Montagu, *The Unthinkable Swift: The Spontaneous Philosophy of a Church of England*,

London: Verso,1994.

18. For the best in Irish revisionist literary criticism see Seamus Deane, "Swift and the Anglo-Irish Intellect" *Eighteenth-Century Ireland*,1986)and "The formation of Anglo-Irish literary tradition, 1690-1800" *A Short History of Irish Literature* (London: Hutchinson,1986, 30-59) and ed. *The Field Day Anthology of Irish Literature* (3 vols., Lawrence Hill, Derry, Northern Ireland: Field Day Publications, London; distributed by Faber & Faber,1991). For a good example of the cross-fertilization of revisionist Irish literary criticism and postcolonial theory, see Seamus Deane intro. Terry Eagleton, Edward Said, *Nationalism. Colonialism, and Literature* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,1990); T. O. McLouglin, *Contesting Ireland: Irish Voices Against England in the Eighteenth Century*, (Dublin: Four Courts Press,1999).

19. Swift's position on the penal laws is poised between the propagation of the Anglican position he advocates in his writings on the one hand, and the cultivation of friendships with Catholic landowners in Ireland and with the English , Catholic-born, poet Pope on the other hand. This is not to be read simply as the gap between the personal and the public. Swift's written polemic against the Ulster Presbyterians was not accompanied by any demonstrable desire to persecute the dissenters or join campaigns to "discover" and expose Catholic converts in Ireland and assist in the seizure of their lands. Carol Kay supported my questioning of the canonical judgments of Swift's bigotry. "Like Hobbes" she observes in her book, "Swift reassures his readers that liberty of conscience, in the sense of knowing one's thoughts, can never be taken away: but he condemns liberty of conscience in the sense of propagating private beliefs and overthrowing 'the Faith which the Laws have already established' "(*Political Constructions*, 225).

20. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin suggest that "hybridity and the power it releases may well be seen to be the characteristic feature and contribution of post-colonial, allowing a means of evading the replication of the binary categories of the past and developing new anti-monolithic models of cultural exchange and growth." See *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*, (New York: Routledge, 1995, p.183). For an important essay on the subject see Homi Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Men: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse," *October* 28: 125-33.

21. Ashish Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (Delhi: Oxford University Press ,1983).

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AILING ZHANG AND HER DRIFTING HEROINES: AN AESTHETICS OF EXISTENCE

YI ZHENG

Born in the foreign concessions of Shanghai, Ailing Zhang (1920-1995) was educated in colonial Hong Kong, and inspired by "the meeting place of the East and the West, of tradition and modernity, the new and the old; of good and evil, light and darkness, civilization and barbarity."[1] Ailing Zhang is a writer of the Chinese semi-colonial metropolis. In her fantastically brilliant but brief creative career— during and immediately after the Second World War— she has chronicled nothing less than the crumbling of "old" Chinese civilization, its monstrous modern emergence, and "the small men and women" in between. Alone and in exile, she died at the age of seventy-five in Los Angeles. Because of her wartime appearance in Shanghai during the Japanese Occupation and her rebuttal of the aesthetics/politics of the tragic and heroic as seen befitting her times, she and her stories are more often regarded as the passing of a beautiful comet than anything that merits mention in Chinese literary history. Both her writings and writings about her are making a comeback. For instance, the publication of a *Ailing Zhang (Eileen Chang) Reader* is underway and will be published by the University of California Press.[1] In the following essay, I reflect on the long due possibility of cross-cultural appreciation and understanding of her essays and fiction which arise from and about the fissure between the ruins of civilizations.

I. INTRODUCTION: AILING ZHANG AND THE REVELATION BETWEEN THE RUINS

> In a time of low atmospheric pressure, a place of alienated soil, there is
> no fantasy, and no longing for the blossoming of wondrous flowers.
> But the more important stories of life often crop up like accidents.
> They catch you unaware.
>
> Fu Lei, "On the Fiction of Ailing Zhang"[2]

Fu Lei alludes to the Japanese who occupied Shanghai and to wartime colonial Hong Kong during the mid 1940s, the milieu in which Ailing Zhang and her stories "crop up like accidents." The emergence of Zhang and her writing, like a wondrous flower, appears to many literary historians as a miracle rather than a natural growth. The splendor of the miraculous flowering, however, for them, also foreshadows its own more usual withering. Thus Fu, one of the most celebrated modern Chinese literary and art critics, warns Zhang and the reading public of the rarity of good endings for miraculous splendors in

China. The dazzling charm of Zhang's *Shanghai and Hong Kong Stories*, for Fu, if not exactly the flower of evil, is in the fragile brilliance over-laden with the soil of its original sin, hence merits wary cultivation. The danger of its over-blossoming imperils the very chastity of the artistic muse, and Fu warns the reader that "to protect her is to protect yourself" (*Fu*, 419). Fu's judicious admiration of and, yet, profound unease with Zhang's uncanny effulgence has anticipated and set the tone for the charting of Zhang's place in the memory of a literary posterity as the passage of a beautiful, but treacherous comet.[3]

The unease with Zhang's exorbitant and vagarious appearance on the literary scene actually attests to the anxiety of the modern Chinese intellectuals about the beginning, the end, and the direction of their cultural modernity. Hence, her charm is also her undoing. When Fu lauds her as the delightful stylist that catches the literary scene unaware, he both offers her as a corrective to his fellow literary practitioners who are unduly preoccupied with the battle of "isms" and as a warning against the treachery of extravagant stylization which seems to inhere in an effeminate, decadent "Chinese" cultural tradition. Thus as a true guardian of the tradition set up by the "New Culture" movement since the May Fourth revolution in 1919, both Fu's fascination of and chagrin with Zhang's literary flowering predictably fall on the charm and "caprice" of her stylization, and on her limited "variations upon a theme"—"the defunct aristocracy or petty bourgeoisie entangled in the nightmares between man and woman" (Fu, 413).

Zhang's variations upon the modern Chinese theme seem to lack the tragic and heroic dimension, which according to Fu and his fellow cultural critics are the necessary constitutive properties of a redemptive modern Chinese literature. Thus it is not surprising to find that for all her dazzling brilliance, Zhang has literally no place in the modern Chinese literary history.[4] Her literary exuberance/extravagance seems to embarrass, if not to imperil, a laboriously instituted and vigilantly professed collective modern Chinese cultural memory, not only because of her unfamiliar stories, but also because of the troublesome ambivalence of her very literary emergence in the semi-colonial Shanghai under "Foreign (Japanese)" occupation. Even her most venerating feminist critics have hallowed her presence within the modern Chinese literary scene as a "desolate and reckless smile."[5] To relegate Zhang's presence as a smile or an unwitting but beautiful passing is to underscore her difference, and for the "New" cultural critics, her impenetrable unfamiliarity. Zhang's choice of the limited variations upon one theme is by no means unwitting. "Literary folks generally prefer to concentrate on the heroic aspect of life and disregard the everyday and mundane," Zhang declares in "My Own Writings *(Ziji de Wenzhang)*." And "to stress the heroic is to aspire to the height of the superman, . . ." whereas "I dislike the sublime. I could do with the tragic, but prefer the desolate."[6] Zhang's choice of the mundane disavows the monumentality of history, which the new Chinese cultural critics have transposed from the West. It is a radical re-vision, in Rey Chow's words, of a different modernity.

> I have no wish to write history, and no right to direct or comment on the proper attitudes of historians. But I always hoped in private that they would pay more attention to the irrelevant details of life. Reality is not something one can systematise. It is more like the turning on of seven or eight loudspeakers at once, each sings by itself but somehow all mixed together. Only in the thick of such sound and fury, there sometimes comes to pass an instant of heart-rending illumination. . . . Zhang, "End of the Ember (Jin Yu Lu), "*Collected Works* 53

But Zhang's radical re-vision is not simply a modernity of details that fragments the wholeness of history. She searches for the moment of illumination through the rupture of the ruins of human civilization; a wisdom for life against the odds of history, or, as Michel Foucault formulates it, an aesthetics of existence woven through an extravagance of textual details in the wandering narratives of her drifting heroines. If Foucault's formulation is a projection of a certain ideal but attainable practice of life, Zhang's schema is to procure through re-configurations of textual practice an art of historical and cultural existence for her displaced women. This is what most of her critics fail to understand in their veneration of her ingenious integration of a fiercely "Western" "modernist" sensibility and a formal, older, ephemerally "Chinese" "lyricism," in their appraisal of her excess of details and the intensity of her evocative verbal images. As Yvonne Zhang points out in her discussion of the "rage" over Zhang by contemporary Taiwanese "feminine" writers, that in their appropriation of "Zhang's peculiar sense of history" as cultural nostalgia, they have missed the poignancy, the "disconcerting truth" of "Zhang's caustic criticism of life in both the feudalist and Communist societies." In other words, Zhang's details and images and the history woven out of them are anything but "lyrical reminiscences." However, even as she takes serious notes of Zhang's "peculiar sense of history," Yvonne Chang also defines that sense as at best "an acute self-consciousness of her own powerlessness, capsulated in the term '*wunai*,'" and filtered all too ephemerally through such aesthetic strategies as "poised evasiveness, passivity with heightened consciousness, and self-indulgence in subjective sentiments."[8]

The texture of Zhang's aesthetics of existence, manifested in the structured, highly stylized overflow of details, does come from her "peculiar sense of history." However, its peculiarity and derivative aesthetic schema is not a choice of "*wunai* (choice without choice)" but a deliberate, brazen aside from the monumental variations on the modern Chinese theme. It is interlaced with her perspicacity into the traumatic complexities of the Chinese modern life. Zhang's sense of history has been compared to that of the modernists, in the sense that her vision, like theirs, is relentlessly cast upon a post-war, post-civilization wasteland, and in the sense that "Modernism" is known for its attraction to the marginal, the exile, and the "other," for its "narrative of unsettlement, homelessness, solitude and impoverished independence."[9] It may not seem far amiss, then, to characterize Zhang as a modernist on the margins,[10] since she seems to share modernism's obsession with deviant, atypical examples, with "the marginal as exemplary, in its choice of stylistic and intertextual models, in its selection of paragons, and its thematics" (Chana Kronfeld, 71). But the analogy stops here, and this is not only because Zhang's discordant minor tones are not composed in major keys, as Kronfeld so eloquently describes marginal modernisms. Zhang may have shared the modernist sensibilities, but both her historical vision and aesthetic schema differ from the known properties of modernism significantly. In the course of her writing career, Zhang did not disclose self-conscious inclinations toward participation in any "international" modernist movement. And just as her vision of the modern world as wasteland is by no means apocalyptic, her aesthetics of existence is neither an aesthetics of marginality nor minimalist in its stylistic choices. In fact, one of the major critical complaints about Zhang's writing is her propensity for extravagant stylization, which is seen as a result of her all too-clear memory of a "traditionalist" "Chinese" cultural heritage that is at odds with the modern.[11] Her aesthetics derive directly from her peculiar vision of history and her cross-cultural heritage. It is excessive, "capricious," and defies categorization.

Zhang's aesthetics of existence, which favors the excessive, mundane minutiae of everyday life and what might be called moments of historical illumination, is woven into the ideal of the Clown Woman. A figure taken from the "lowly," vivacious Northern country "Bengbeng Opera," [12] it seems to resemble the modernist configuration of the marginal as exemplary. The figure is introduced in Zhang's "Forward to the Second Edition of *Romances* (Chuanqi Zaibanxu)." Despite her acclaimed "exquisite lyricism," Zhang is also notorious for her fascination with the "vulgar" art forms. Her "taste" is said to be that of the contrast between scarlet and garish green. In "Forward," she re-frames and re-centers her story collection—*Romances* (Chuanqi) about the "outdated Bengbeng opera" staged in Shanghai—with her own romance with the mini-drama of the Clown Woman: "I've always wanted to see it (Bengbeng Opera), at least once, but I can never find anyone to go with; I can't possibly confess and persuade anyone that I am actually interested in such vulgar pursuits. Only until recently I've discovered a Mrs. X whose family refused to stoop so low as to accompany her to see Zhu Baoxiao in the Shanghai heat, so we went together" (Wenji, *Collected Works*, Vol. IV, 135). The country opera is introduced with no apparent reference to the story collection but a clear awareness of the genre's humble origin and stubborn oddity of existence in the hyper-cosmopolitan colonial metropolis. It is introduced as a deliberate confession of a quest for the "low" community of irreverent women. In the narrative, Zhang's re-presentation of the Bengbeng opera [blasts out WC], in primordial brutality, the sound and fury of the wasteland that is overshadowed by its "trivial" prelude, which revolves around the irreverent and irrelevant singing of the Clown Woman. In fact, the meaning of the drama *is* the aside of the Clown Woman. In Zhang's structure of the mini-drama, the prelude—a farce starring the Clown Woman on the theme of husband murdering—is actually the centerpiece. In excessive detail and with the fierce preposterous witticism of the Clown Woman, it simply takes over. As the Taiwanese critic, Zhang Jian, points out in his appraisal of Zhang's stylistic cunning: "After all this, whether the husband is murdered, or the presence of the official-judge in the sedan chair, all seem rather pointless. What is left is the crude and Herculean woman! Only she emerges as the real master of the new barbarian world." [13] Zhang's Clown Woman, however, is not Herculean. Her predominance comes not from mastery but from a tenacious irreverence to the rules of the game (she refuses on all account to answer the judge's question but irrelevantly insists on singing). She does not emerge as the master of the new world—after all, hers is only the sideshow, and she remains the clown, never the heroine—but a farcically insignificant wandering woman in-between. In an unusual move, Zhang has spelled out her role between the fissures of the new and old barbarian world which serve as both the backdrop and center-stage of her *Romances*: "On the wasteland of the future, under the broken tiles and remaining walls, only the woman like the Clown Woman in the Bengbeng Opera can survive unscathed, any time, anywhere, she makes it home" (*Collected Works*, 137). As the central metaphor of Zhang's romances of the drifting Chinese women between the modern ruins, the figuration of the ideal Clown Woman departs significantly from the modernist idealization of the marginal as exemplary. It does not poeticize the "marginality" of the wretched woman, but highlights her side-song. The meaning of her alterity, which is also the meaning of the mini-drama, results not so much from her in-betweeness as in her irreverent and irrelevant singing as it does from her irreverent singing and insistence on disregarding the rules of the game. Zhang does not practice a poetics of marginality in her figuration of the Clown Woman, but an aesthetics of existence that hinges on her (non) heroine's side song, which is derived not only from her historical alterity, but also from her determined irreverence, from her peculiar wisdom developed between the fissure of the historical ruins. And this is how Zhang's central meta-

phor, as the revelation between the ruins, and as what makes sense and frames the narratives of her drifting women, should be understood.

II. HISTORICAL ALTERITY AND THE FREAKISH WISDOM OF THE FALLEN CITIES

Zhang is the writer of "fallen" cities. The fall of Shanghai actually occasioned her transient literary efflorescence. As Meng Ye and Dai Jinghua eloquently put it, the existential possibilities of the "fallen" cities is for Zhang a revelation of the "broken tiles and remaining walls" that re-emerge as the aftermath of historical catastrophe, not only about women, but also about a moribund Chinese civilization lingering on its death bed. [14] But if Zhang's variations on the modern Chinese theme are centered on that revelation, they are never apocalyptic. Her ruins are the "broken tiles and remaining walls" which emerge as death and bespeak no regeneration. As the outcast daughter of an opium-addicted, degenerate and doomed aristocracy, Zhang's nostalgia can best be described as a revelry in figuring the death of that aristocracy. She fancies the semi-colonial, fallen, and occupied "old," but lingering China as ruins upon which her desperate yet recklessly defiant heroines roam in quest for a living. Her backward gaze turns into a ruthless scrutiny, which is devoid of tenderness. It is always tinged with a desperate hatred, a hatred for the killing effect of that very past as well as its irreversible passing. Her fictional world, though often likened to an ephemeral and beautifully faded antique painting [15], involves, nonetheless, a relentless (self) critique, a bitter protest, and a probing reflection on an imposed and imposing Chinese modernity.

> People live in their times. But times sink like shadows, and one feels deserted, like an outcast. To prove one's existence, to grasp that last bit of the tangible and the essential, one has to resort to the memories of the old, resort to any memory of the times when one has lived. This, at least, is much more distinct and endearing than gazing into the future. Then, only then, she attains an extraordinary perception, an estranged familiarity with the surrounding world, sensing, suspecting that this is after all an absurd world of antiquity, dark and brilliant at the same time. It is this embarrassment, this disharmony between reality and memory, that spawns the first slight but solemn tumult, that begins the fervent and earnest but nameless struggle. Wenji, *Collected Works*, IV, 174

Such speculations about time, memory, and the human struggle against history explain Zhang's variations upon the modern Chinese theme. Yet she is not writing an elegy. Zhang accepts the collapse of an "old" "Chinese" civilization in its traumatic encounter with the modern world as a matter of course. Her concern revolves around the possibility of a new beginning and survival of her female subject upon such ruins. Zhang's narrative use of "one" easily and categorically slips into that of "she." Her backward gaze illustrates her desperate but strategic recourse; she is fully aware that the renderings of history have placed her at odds with both the present and the future. She turns the memory upon the ruins into a new beginning, by which she attains not only the full sense of her alterity, but also the necessary estrangement which compels her on her fragile yet relentless struggle, on her solemn quest for life between the fissure of the ruins. Julia Kristeva argues that the alterity and estrangement

of women flows from their relationship with language and from the desire for their privileged position within the symbolic, the "alterity within."[10] Conversely, Zhang's interest in her displaced, estranged and self-estranging heroines is with history as catastrophic events and ruins. Like Kristeva, Zhang seeks, through a poetics of exile and seeks (dis)location, the flash of an epiphany, that moment of striking perception, but her pursuit of the illumination does not rest with the *jouissance* of tongues or the infinity of language that woman as exile so readily and conveniently embodies. Zhang's fascination with estrangement and dislocation is part of the construction of an aesthetics of existence. Above all, she expresses a longing for that tumultuous epiphany which alone will compel the desperate but nonetheless defiant struggle for survival. It is her response to an historical displacement on the part of those who are like her: the "always already" displaced Chinese women.

Zhang's revelation between the ruins is not apocalyptic. In her world, death does not bring regeneration, and her remembrance of the past does not foster a reincarnation of what took place long ago or far away. She merely pieces together an assortment of split images, a pastiche of the disintegrating world for that moment of striking perception. It is simultaneously an epitaph and an overture. This is the quintessence of Zhang and her heroines' apparent nonchalant spatial and temporal movement: they seem to drift between the cracks left open by the collapse of an old civilization and the thrust of a semi-feudal, semi-colonial "modern" China, with that "not so healthy," but "curiously remarkable wisdom" ("Those Shanghainese," *Collected Works*, 20).

That wisdom comes only with the heroine(s) insistence on a historically placed but no less self-imposed estrangement. It is an aberrant and fantastic wisdom that is evident in the peculiar *milieu* of the fallen cities of Shanghai and Hong Kong—"a freakish fruit of the disharmonious intermingling of various deformities, new and old" (*Collected Works*, 20). As the outcast daughter of the last of a dying breed, and a "modern" woman who drifts between the occupied and colonial metropolis, Zhang literally dwells on the very cutting edge of the crash and rupture between the moribund "old" Chinese civilization and its "modern" displacement from the colonizing West. Her stories are as much about the death of a civilization as they are about its aberrant "new" existence and the perilous possibilities that lie between. This is probably why they are no less farce than tragedy, like in a "Peking opera," because "Chinese tragedies are usually farcical and noisy, full of lively clamor," and "in the operas even the most sad scenes are filled with brilliant, flaming colors" ("On Foreigner Watching Peking Opera," *Collected Works*, 26). Zhang's world is tragic, or rather pathetic, yet it is in a farcical way by no means an unsympathetic world. The wasteland of death is not rendered barren or minimalistically dreary. Rather it is minimalistically pinned down by an extravagance of colors, presented with a striking perception and the ripping agony of acceptance of an imposed "historical" "fate." The structure of Zhang's feelings as they emerge from the relationship between her heroines and their world is best captured in the passage describing Bai Liusu's sensation upon entering the hall in her family home, a big house in the concession of Shanghai in which her entire bankrupt gentry clan live together as refugees since the formation of the Republic:

> One can almost see in the hall along the high walls tall bookcases, dark red sandalwood with green engraved emblems. On the display table in the middle, inside a glass case, stands an enamelled Occidental grandfather clock whose mechanism has long stopped

> working. On its sides hang two scarlet scrolls of antithetical couplets, with gold longevity round flower background, each flower holds up one big dripping, inky character. In the dim light, every word seems floating in the air, far from the paper. Liusu feels like a character on the couplet herself, drifting, fluttering, far from the ground.
>
> "Love in the Fallen City (*Qingcheng Zilian*)," *Wenji,* II, 53-54

Liusu's "home" is a canopied, cloistered kingdom of decay, where the faded splendors of color only recall, pathetically, mockingly, the already desecrated sumptuousness of a past. With added layers of gray and dirt bestowed by modern history, the leftover colors of the past are inevitably stained and filthy, often menacing: "Beverly Nichols has a line about the haziness of the crazed: 'In your heart sleeps the moonlight,' whenever I read it, I cannot help thinking about the blue moonlight on our ceiling, full of quiet murderous intent" ("Whispers (Liuyan)," *Collected Works*, 108).

Out of such colors Zhang emerges, like many of her heroines, with that "not so healthy" but "curiously remarkable wisdom," a wisdom of critical estrangement. She simultaneously embodies and defiantly struggles against the always already alien, always already exiled, and always already anomalous existence. But her re-coloring of that world is without self-pity. She has not only accepted her alterity, but deliberately, critically rewritten it: in a world where a woman can only live as daughter, wife or concubine, or mother and mother-in-law, she has refused all by becoming a stranger, a homeless wanderer. It is with such "dubious identity," such critical estrangement that Zhang scrutinizes her world and arranges the fate of her heroines in between its ruins.

A drifting narrative translates chilliness and quiet desperation into an "ephemeral" but nonetheless defiant and relentless aesthetics of dis-coloration, and dis-location. Zhang's drifting narratives, no matter how varied, are invariably variations on the theme of the "fallen" modern Chinese story. But her tales are seldomly direct protests or outbursts of anger. Many have been wary of her "poise" and "evasiveness," of her indulgence in "ephemeral" details. Such lack of nakedness (Zhang loves clothes), of explosion, however, is by no means nonchalant. Zhang's stylistic "ephemerality" is only her structure of feelings—the reflective layering of a "chilling sadness" and "quiet agony" ("Poetry and Hallucination," *Collected Works*, 132), experienced and re-presented after witnessing the killing effect of the "modern" "Chinese" trauma, the pain and destruction it inflicts, and the discovery that the victims are "used to it."

III. THE HISTORICAL ESCAPEMENT: THE DRIFTING DAUGHTERS BETWEEN SHANGHAI AND HONG KONG

The only resolution of Zhang's world seems to be its further disintegration, like a broken mirror, it has to be crushed to pieces. There are only two kinds of species that populate its ghostly space: ephemerally beautiful and recklessly desperate women, and faceless, ageless men of eternal youth.[17] The men are "infantile corpses soaked in distilled alcohol" (*Collected Works*, 135)—in Zhang's structure of feelings, men as a species have no life or feeling, and therefore no presence, except as symbols and props of an endless farce. Her story is essentially one of crushing, of splitting and leaving behind, and men, as bodies and embodiments of that crushing world, are incapable of separation. They have

no dreams therefore no longing, nor that sense of tumultuous uprooting which alone would compel them on a quest for a different existence.

Zhang's domain, then, is a world of women—her story or women's stories—which feminist critics have suggested are her unconscious attempts to create a fatherless world that symbolizes the crumbling of a whole civilization. Whether she does it deliberately or not, Zhang's world is an expanse of fatherless ruins. But her story of the displaced and floating Chinese women is not a re-telling of the maternal legend. In the crumbling but no less smothered kingdom, the mothers are either the "embroidered birds on the silk screen—a white bird nestling in the golden nest, vividly woven on melancholic purple satin. With the passage of time, the feathers are faded, molded, and eaten by worms; but even when it dies, it dies on the screen" ("Bitter Jasmine Tea," *Collected Works*, 54). Or they rule in place of the Fathers inside the canopied bed. However the mother on the bed does not rule like the legendary earth mother who exudes primordial love; instead, she wields her power like the absent (dead) Father, if not directly, through her sons and upon her daughters and daughters-in-law. Thus Zhang's stories of splitting, of *being* between the ruins only belong to the outcast daughters (add self-imposed, self-willed, rebellious and reckless). The strife between mothers and daughters, though, in Zhang's symbolic language structure, is not a replication of Freudian complexes. Their battle is the struggle between the possibility of escape and its negation.

The daughters' story, however, is not simply one of escape. Unlike their counterparts in the stories of the May Fourth writers, Zhang's heroines' displacement and exile does not foretell the emergence of "modern women." Going places does not mean deliverance. In "Going Upstairs," Zhang warns her readers that the act of departing might very well be just going upstairs, "they will all come down when the dinner gong is struck" (*Collected Work*, 73). In Zhang's perception, the ruins outside the canopied bed embody a new barbarian world in which the daughter might dream of escape. Only those like the Clown woman, however, can live with their side song, irreverently and irrelevantly between its cracks, and attain that "not all together healthy, but curiously remarkable wisdom."

"The Embers of Eaglewood—the First Incense" is the first of Zhang's Hong Kong stories, the first weave in the fabrication of the romances of the Clown Woman. The story takes place immediately before the war, before the "fall" of Japan to the British colony of Hong Kong. "At the beginning of the story, Ge Wilong," is "an ordinary girl from Shanghai" (*Collected Works*, II, 1). Like many of Zhang's heroines, she is an ambitious but unlucky female descendent of the old and fallen Chinese gentry who, driven by (mis)fortune, has drifted to Hong Kong in search of new life and place. But the Hong Kong she finds is an even stranger place: looking out from the verandah of her aunt's grand mansion on top of the Hills, "the garden is like a gilded tray held abruptly out in the midst of the wilderness of the hills. . . Here not only the dizzy stark contrast of the colors seem fleeting and unreal—the contrasts appear everywhere; the blunt intermingling of different places and different times thrusts one into a phantasmagoric world" (*Collected Works*, II, 2). The phantasm, however, does not belong to the usual domain of traditional tales. It is the curious but unique phantom of the Colony. Wilong's aunt's house looks like the newest of the most modern "Western" cinemas but for its roof of mock-antique green "Chinese" tiles. The drawing-room, though furnished in the Western style, is not completely devoid of "Oriental" decorations: "But these Oriental colors are apparently garnished for the foreign friends.

Since the English has come all the way to see China, one has to oblige. The China served here is the China dear to the heart of her Western friends: absurd, fragile and farcical" (ibid.). Wilong is fully aware that though new to the Colony, she cannot avoid becoming a reflection of its shadows: "Ge Wilong glanced at herself in the glass door—she has also turned into bits of the Oriental colors. At the moment she is wearing the extraordinary uniform of the Nanying High School, . . . in late Mandarin fashion; it is as though they wanted to dress all their girls as the late Dearer-than-the-Golden-Flower, [18] or maybe it is only part of the Hong Kong authorities' ploy to attract European and American tourists" (ibid.).

Wilong came to Hong Kong initially with her family to avoid the "Fall" of Shanghai into the Japanese hands, and continues to stay for a better fortune away from her "fallen" but nonetheless "steadfast" parents. She dreams of escape and of starting anew in Hong Kong with her aunt. For Wilong, to appeal to her aunt's sympathy is by no means merely opportunist. The latter, an aging but active socialite amongst the rich of the Colony, is herself a rebel of sorts: "You know who I am to your family? —a self-willed sinner wallowing in degeneration; shame and disgrace to the clan; refusing all the good families my brothers can find me only to become a concubine of Lian, humiliating my great bankrupt kindred . . ." (*Collected Works,* II, 9). Mrs. Lian wields vengeance upon her brothers to further her own fortune, not only in money but also in "love." She literally turns herself into the evil flower of Hong Kong. Wilong's escape appears as a detour back to a new-canopied kingdom fostered under the shades of the Fragrant Colony. [19] After their first encounter, "She sees that her aunt is a capable woman, who holds the giant wheel of time in one hand. In her own small world, she has saved the air of lewd luxury of the late Mandarins all to herself, like the Dowager Empress behind the canopy" (*Collected Works*, II, 11). Wilong's, however, has different aspirations. With unusual ingenuity and hardiness, she plans a life in between as a 'new' 'modern' 'independent' woman by learning from her outwitting, decaying aunt, and within both the old and new barbarian world: "as to me, since I've walked into this ghostly world with open eyes, I've nobody to blame if I am possessed. . . . But if I walk straight and stand erect, she'll have to deal with me in decency. Rumors are rumors, if only I just study hard. . . ." (ibid.). Wilong's downfall, therefore, is not that she is complacent with her historical fate, that she has not planned and executed her own flight. It is rather that she has not grasped the odds against her historical escapement, that she has failed to comprehend the force of the "filthy, complex and inexplicable reality" (II, 17) of the new barbarian world which takes shape upon the ruins. Ni-er the servant girl has tried to initiate her into such wisdom:

> "It's not that I want to disappoint you. What if you do graduate? This is just high school, there is only one university in Hong Kong, even the college graduates can't find work. There are jobs, fifty to sixty Yen a month, like teaching in the elementary school of the Nunnery, being bullied by the foreign nuns all the time, it's really not worth it!" . . . "Don't be mad with me if I tell you something. For your own good, you'd better sharpen your eyes and catch someone while you are allowed out." Wilong sneered: "Among aunt's friends? They are either smooth young men like gigolos, or patriarchs with their own harem. Then there are the English soldiers, even them, anyone who is somewhere near a lieutenant will not mix up with us Yellows! And this is your Hong Kong!. . . "(*Collected Works,* II, 18-19)

Wilong's folly is that she believes she can beat them at their own game. The moment she takes stock of the reality that the new ruins of Hong Kong serve as the playground for the daughter/woman, the realization makes her unwilling to repeat the life of her aunt, though it is not enough to compel her out of the game. Lured by its glories and a new sense of freedom (to play), she becomes too fond of its trappings, and worse still, too fond of one of the male players. Wilong's final trapping is an inability to break loose from the conventions of love. Even in this new modern world, Wilong succumbs to a traditional, romantic ideal of women's surrender, which, ironically, she sought to escape. To sustain and pay for her hopeless 'love' and lover/husband, Wilong gradually deteriorates into a high-class prostitute. Yet her story differs from the usual tale of betrayal of the innocent woman in the city of evil because of her acute perception and disconcerting self-awareness. More than once she tries to break free and start again: "I know I've changed. I never liked my old self, but even less the new. I'll go back and begin afresh.... It is easy to think that one can go back and begin a new person . . . a new life . . . but she is no longer so simple. Study hard and then look for a job is not necessarily the proper way out for a pretty but talentless girl like her. . . . Thus a new life means a new man . . . a new man" (II, 41-42)? Wilong has left home and tried to re-emerge in the new barbarian world upon the ruins, but she cannot achieve the status of the Clown woman, because on the new playground she plays the old game. The survival of the Bengbeng Opera's heroine is dependent on her side song, which evokes the conventional wisdom, insists on its irreverence and irrelevance, and totally disregards the rules of the game. Wilong has perception but no illumination, though this alone can compel her to journey through the fissure of the ruins. Thus she voluntarily, almost ironically, embarks on her own sacrifice in the nightmarish entanglement between the ghostly man and ghostly woman. Wilong's journey concludes Zhang's first Hong Kong story and represents her first variation upon the "modern" "Chinese" theme.

"Love in the Fallen City" is the only one of Zhang's drifting narratives in which the daughter/woman achieves success in her historical dis(re)-location. However, the story is not a romance of the flight of the white bird out of the golden clouds on the embroidered screen, but rather a historical accident. The brutality of war destroys the infinitely intricate heavy screen allowing a dead woman to be "resurrected" by chance.[20] Not coincidentally, "Love in the Fallen City" is also one of Zhang's stories that displeases Fu most, not least because it is a romance without the serious and noble fatality of tragedy, which for him is the only proper genre for such great historical events as world wars and the destruction of civilizations. Zhang's writing, however, purports to embrace but only plays with this genre in a stylish cynicism. Rather it is the novella's plot line and narrative structure, which centers on a nightmarish entanglement between a man and woman that serves as an index for Fu's abhorrence toward the limited variations upon one theme. Furthermore, what irks Fu more is Zhang's insistence on not allowing any tragic dimension or "passion" in a love story with an almost apocalyptic background when combining world historical events with such a small man and woman, who with their "petty wisdom" cannot become tragic heroes (Fu, 411). Moreover, her insistence on not allowing them and the "history" they enact any redemption or catharsis in addition to her refusal to bring about the possibility of apocalypse—since there is not even "love" in this purported love story—appears problematic to Fu.

Many contemporary critics (if and when they paid any heed to Zhang and her writings) tend to read the story of Bai Liusu as that of a woman *in* history—a rewriting of the male legend in which a *femme fatale* topples the city. Thus, in their reading, the symbolism of the fallen city and its broken

walls becomes the center of the narrative's signification. As is evident in the following prototypical quotation:

> . . . looking towards it, the wall is tall and imposing, without end. It looks craggy and cold, the colour of death. Her face is framed on the wall, and seems changed by contrast—red lips, moist eyes, and a flesh and blood face full of its own thoughts. Looking at her, Liuyan said: "I don't know why this wall makes me think of the far away and the long ago. . . . one day, when our civilization is destroyed, when everything ended—burnt up, bombed, and collapsed, maybe this wall will remain. Liusu, if we meet then under this wall . . . Liusu, maybe you will be more sincere, and maybe I will be more sincere" Love in the Fallen City," *Collected Works,* 65

Even Fu, who otherwise laments the "pettiness" of theme and over-sophistication of style in the novella, finds the paragraph briefly redeeming, because for him it unexpectedly but promisingly reveals that even Zhang is capable of glancing into the realm of the majestic. "In the novella, in the endlessly plain field there suddenly appears a vast sand storm. But like a sand storm, its tumult is instantaneous. When the feared destruction eventually comes and ends, Liuyan has only added upon his numb nerves some more fatigue. The moment of epiphany is long forgotten. . . ." (*Fu, Collected Works*, 411). As Zhang's feminist critics, Meng and Dai see the symbolism as a rewriting of the myth of the earth mother as an alternative modern apocalypse, even though they have perceptively pointed out earlier that Liusu's narrow escape is accidental rather than necessary. For them too, to focus on the most apocalyptic but very obviously uncharacteristic moment as the center of Zhang's otherwise irrelevant narrative is to classify her rendering of history, civilization and woman as yet another, though different, male/patriarchal legend of the *femme fatale*/earth mother/whore woman, a reconstruction of the archetypal Troy-Helen mythos. Thus in their reading, Liusu's face, framed on the wall, though emphatically captured with its "flesh" and "blood" "red lips and moist eyes," is reduced to a body, whereas the dead gray craggy wall seems to have acquired some of her flesh color and a sinister, bloody life. For them it is upon such exchange of life and death that Zhang's modern apocalypse is written: on the back of the woman on the ruins man/human race is resurrected. In the reconstructed legend the cliché of the *femme fatale* is turned into an alternative earth mother, the Ark of human regeneration. Thus the story of the woman on the ruins becomes both a critique and a celebration of the human flight upon the back of the woman, it becomes, in its end, a sacred story. In their interpretation, though, Meng and Dai emphasize that Zhang's re-telling of the authoritative male myth about history/civilization/woman is not only ironic but also almost literally deconstructive. If, in the Homeric epic, Helen, as cause and trophy of the toppling of Troy, is absent from the narrative, Liusu is from beginning and end the omnipresent narrative center of Zhang's story. She is not only "present" but also the sole mover of the narrative action and consciousness.

However, even Meng and Dai's sympathetically perceived and exquisitely executed readings have missed the point of Bai Liusu's romance. To begin with, her story in the fallen city is by no means a sacred apocalypse —- by the end of the narrative the woman has not rescued the human race from catastrophe; it is rather the calamities of war that have temporarily saved the woman from madness and destruction. The irony and deconstruction of the Helen/Troy mythos, on the other hand, is only the departure of Zhang's romance, not its culmination or denouement. Liusu's tale is not an anti-epic.

It is an irrelevant story with an accidental ending. But for the calamities of history, Liusu would have repeated the destiny of Wilong or that of many of Zhang's heroines. "The fall of Hong Kong has abetted her. But in this inexplicable world, who knows what is cause, what is effect? Who knows it is not just to complete her story that a city is toppled? Thousands die, and thousands suffer; then there are the earth-shaking changes. . . But Liusu has no sense of any particular place in that history. Smiling, she stood up and kicked the mosquito-repellent incense under the table. . . . In the romances the *femme fatales* that topple the cities are always like this" (*Collected Works*, II, 84).

But Liusu is not a *femme fatale* (it is hard to miss the irony in Zhang's evocation of the cliche), in Zhang's romance the role is reserved for her foil, a self-acclaimed wandering Indian princess (who actually lives as a socialite and mistress to a rich English man). Instead, she is a divorcee driven out of her ex-gentry household by her bankrupt siblings, and has to win the battle with her prospective lover/husband with wit in order to find herself a place. Her romance, in its sly tit-for-tat, its slight flirtation, its selfish calculation and its commonplace ending—marriage, is full of "petty" wisdom and truly mundane. Unlike Helen, she is no cause for the historical toppling of the city, nor has she any sense of or place in that history, which, as eventful calamities, has gone ahead against or despite of her existence. Only in its ironic, indiscriminate destruction it has toppled the city for her and has aided unwittingly in her historical escapement. However, in her rather commonplace story, Liusu's lonely exodus seems tenacious, obstinate, if not heroic. Before the story begins, she has already escaped once. Against all odds she has divorced her depraved husband. But her flight then is only a flight "upstairs, "or rather a detour back into the canopied backrooms of her mother's and her own original historical place. Liusu's second flight, her historic drift from Shanghai to Hong Kong is compelled but not without a reckless and relentless courage. The mother's house is seldom a sanctuary for the fleeing daughter, especially when her brothers share her inheritance. Liusu has to leave in order not to be absorbed back into the filthy scarlet background of the past with its faded golden drops. The (dis)relocation to Hong Kong is at least a gambling with chance, an attempt to take matters into her own hands: "Liusu's hands have never touched any chips nor the dice, but she also likes to gamble. She decides to gamble with her fate" (*Collected Works*, II, 60). At least she has nothing to lose.

Liusu's "slight" but "fervent and earnest struggle" is punctured by moments of illumination. But they are not instances of transcendence as grasped by critics like Fu (who tend to forget that the well-worn apocalyptic exclamation in the story is given by Fang Liuyan, the male protagonist who is only a prop in Liusu's story). What Liusu attains through her desperate drift between the fallen colonial metropolis is that "not so healthy" "but curiously remarkable wisdom." Before the flight, locked up inside her "own" home, the dilapidated but still *there* Bai Mansion, Liusu's feverish and bright eyes see everything with a peculiarly sharpened focus:

> You are still young? But it doesn't matter here, here youth is no rare commodity. They have plenty of the young and the lively—children are born one after another, new bright eyes, new tender red lips, new wisdom. But as years go by they are worn out, the eyes darken, life darkens; with the birth of another generation, they are absorbed into the glittering scarlet background of the past splashed with golden drops, and the golden drops are the dim peeping eyes of the long dead. (*Collected Works*, II, 54)

Confined within the proximity of a present past, Liusu's vision may be tinted, however it is not without a peculiar wisdom. Familiarity with the "dim peeping eyes" of the ghostly or ghastly past makes her skeptical of the possibilities for regeneration and revolving changes. As she arrives at the Hong Kong harbor aboard a Dutch passenger ship, Liusu has a sudden epiphany about the Fragrant Colony and her own traversal: "It was a fiery hot afternoon. The first things that caught her eye are the giant billboards, red, orange, pink, reflected in the green sea, patches and strips of hostile colors, rushing up, tumbling down, battling under water with unabated clamor. Liusu wondered if in this exaggerated city when one falls it will not be heavier than anywhere else. Her heart began to pound . . ." (*Collected Works*, II, 60). Unlike Wilong, Liusu has no illusions about the Colony as her new playground or about her freedom to play. She understands with anguish and a sense of self-irony that she is playing the desperate old game on the new barbaric ruins, a nightmarish game Zhang insists as the only one for most of her heroines—the outcast, disinherited, but relentlessly rebellious young gentry women who have the longing but not the "skill" (Liusu's own words) to enter as players into their imposed modernity. Ironically, it is the brutal and endless barbarity of the modern ruins which Liusu apprehends upon her arrival, and which eventuates in its most drastic form on the eve of her re-ascent "upstairs," that has momentarily saved her from her "fate." For all her superior understanding, delicacy of feeling and intricate maneuvering, she has lost the battle and become Liuyan's mistress. It is the war that dramatically destroyed her new house "upstairs" and halted her in her re-absorption back into the bloody scarlet background of the long dead. But her ending does not bring regeneration. Zhang does not grant modern barbarity or the savagery of history apocalyptic redemption for the human race. Not least for her outcast, displaced and devastated heroines. What Zhang is willing to allow her headstrong and struggling heroine, between the fissure of the ruins, is a flash of illumination, a moment of tenderness and a mundane denouement—wartime marriage with uncertain endings:

> Liusu sits up and wraps herself in the quilt, listening to the mournful wind. She knows the grey brick wall near the Fresh Water Bay must still be there, towering and indifferent . . . Drifting, as in a dream, she walks towards it's depth, and sees Liuyan coming rushing. She's finally met him. . . .She suddenly climbs beside Liuyan, separated by his comforter, nestles against him. He holds out his hand and grabs hers. Instantaneously they seem to see through each other. It is only a flashing moment of complete understanding, but the moment, the flashing instant is enough for them to live harmoniously for ten or eight years. (Wendi, *Collected Works*, II, 82)

At the moment of mass destruction, in the narrow space between death and the lowest form of existence, men and women seem finally leveled to equality. That is the only ground for Liusu's euphoria. What Zhang is willing to grant her drifting heroine at the end of an atrocious human destruction is nothing more than "ten or eight years" of mundane existence, but it is a new assignment not without dignity. And that hard-won, scanty dignity is not without Liusu's own agency. Her romance offers no catharsis of redemption, either for herself or mankind. After all, as yet another aside of the denouement of her story, the smart, shrewd, but repressed Mistress Four figures she should also divorce her good-for-nothing husband—if Liusu has done so well, how can anyone blame others for following suit? "Liusu stoops down in the shadow of the lamp and lights the mosquito-incense. Thinking about Mistress Four, a smile flickers on her face" (II, 84).

Liusu, in her euphoria of a momentarily mundane existence, is not a Bengbeng Opera heroine, though in some respect she is like the Clown Woman who insists on her irrelevant story, on singing the side song, on irreversibly and relentlessly crossing the rules of the game. Zhang, in her construction of the aesthetics of dislocation, an aesthetics between the fissure of the ruins, has relegated the role to a different kind of woman, or perhaps more accurately, to a different class of women. After all, the Bengbeng opera and its playing women belong to the margins of the "cultivated" society; they entertain the plebeian. In that setting, Liusu and her fellow "gentry" female travelers can only be its chance visitors. For all the devastating tumbling and endless dislocation between the ruins, Zhang concludes with her sympathetic relentlessness, they are incapable of complete separation from their cultivation, from that intricately enclosed moonlit high ceiling "full of quiet murderous intent," as Liusu cries out aloud to Liuyan: "It is much better like that, seeing it for the first time. No matter how wicked, how filthy, it is people outside, things outside. But suppose you grow up inside, with it everywhere around you, how can you tell which are they, which are you" (II, 66)?

IV. THE "CLOWN WOMAN" AMONG THE "BROKEN TILES AND REMAINING WALLS"

In contrast, A Xiao, like most of Zhang's drifting heroines, is adept. But unlike them, she is an outsider of the waned but still glaring scarlet background: a Shuzhou maid in the foreign concession of Shanghai. "The Osmanthus Heat: A Xiao's Autunm Lament" [21] is one of the few stories in modern Chinese literary history *of* a servant woman. The clever, wry, impervious A Xiao is not only the focus but also the eye and conscience of Zhang's narrative, which moves with and is filtered through the structure of her feelings and perception. A Xiao's narrow, long eyes pass through, observe, register, and scrutinize the incongruous existential possibilities of the wartime semi-colonial Shanghai through and around the kitchen of her English master.

Unlike Zhang's gentry heroines, A Xiao is incapable of nostalgia. She is a fiercely self-proclaimed urbanite: "To cope with the wartime restriction of running water, every household has acquired a clay water jar, and on its sauce-yellow surface there is painted a light-yellow dragon. Any woman who sees herself in the water somehow looks like an ancient, classic beauty. But A Xiao is an urban woman, she'd rather take a peep at herself in the broken pocket mirror (taken from a purse) pasted on the powder green wall beside the door" (*Collected Works*, I, 175). A Xiao's non-relation to "old" cultural memory and her peculiar urbanity as a waged nanny in the metropolis is enforced. The only link between her and the old country from which she is permanently dislocated, since her employment as a servant in the city, is her limited economic exchange with her mother, who neither acknowledges her common-law husband nor her son (it is rather significant to note that A Xiao and her husband did not go through any accepted ritual of marriage). The absence of cultural ritual is ensued by qualifications of her institutional status as a wife and a woman—both her son's and her own livelihood depend solely on her servitude: "Looking at Baisun, her heart is filled with a widow's sorrow. Even though she has her man, and it's better than having none, she has to depend on herself" (I, 184). But A Xiao's lament entertains no illusion about the age-old institution of marriage: "at the same time she finds it rather tasteless to mull over it. After all her son has grown so big, why sulk? If her man cannot support her,

even if they are wed in red regalia he also doesn't have to do it. Who can she blame if she is born to be busy? The money he earns can hardly sustain himself. Sometimes he has to borrow her money to join the guild" (I, 185). A Xiao's lament about and adamant clinging to her peculiar urbanity is her fervent though slight struggle amid the harsh incongruities of an imposed "modern" life where neither the old nor the new offers a woman of her kind any respite or alleviation. But it is also such relentless existential possibilities that make her wise. Surpassing all other Zhang heroines, A Xiao is an irreverent but expert interpreter of the phantasmal realities of the colonial metropolis, even in moments of despair she maintains her independence of judgment.

Armed with her curiously remarkable wisdom, A Xiao observes with shrewd perception the world of the new barbaric ruins which has brought her and her nauseatingly petty but suave English master together in a new kind of servitude. In their relation of master and servant, A Xiao is certainly the one for whom understanding and judgment is reserved. For A Xiao, her master's house is very much the epitome of the fallen, incongruous realities of the semi-colonial China, and his petty quotidian life is similar to the ordinary, small-time colonials. Characteristic of Zhang's "cinematic blown-up of details" (Rey Chow), A Xiao sums up her master with wry, cutting humor and irreverent, exaggerated minutiae: "the flesh on the master's face is like a piece of medium-rare steak, reddish with blood strips. What with the newly cultivated mustache, his face looks like a particularly nourishing half-hatched egg, with little spots of yellow wings visible." And his bedchamber "is filled with knickknacks, like the boudoir of an upper-class white Russian whore, who has pecked pieces of brunches and leaves of China to decorate her nest" (I, 1176-180). A Xiao's biting perception of her master is far from personal venom, nor is it merely the judgment of a merciless sharp-eyed, sharp-tongued woman. Her assessment of him also reflects her attitude towards the fallen condition of the new ruins and the context of his *being there*: "(quoting him) 'Shanghai is really getting worse! The Chinese, even the servants have learnt how to cheat and bully the foreigners!' But if he is not in Shanghai, all foreigners in their own, real foreign places have to go fight each other, he would be long dead!" (I, 181).

A Xiao, with her wry wisdom and irreverent judgment, is the interpreter of Shanghai's semi-colonial realities. Her vision is confined, irrelevant, by no means Godlike, and her lament does not aspire to any wasteland profundity. Both A Xiao's wisdom and sadness are limited, and her frustration is most often about the daily defeat of her life between the margins of her futile ambition to maintain a basic dignity for living. As A Xiao scrutinizes, ponders and labors through the irritating and incongruous life in wartime Shanghai, she is angry, defeated but nonetheless benevolent. Her benevolence extends not only to her fellow servant women, her son, her ne'er-do-well husband, but also to her rather unsavory English master, and the whole train of his pathetic foreign and Chinese consort women. It is as though with her peculiar perception from the margins she has 'seen through' the existential state of herself and her fellow creatures. Her vision is with distance but not transcendence. Amid her myriad lamentations, A Xiao has achieved a certain dexterous art of life between the fissures of the ruins. It is a dexterity of a very limited kind, as her life story, including her acute perception and fierce independence of judgment, is filtered through the typical Ailing Zhang "trivialized and privatized affective structure" (Chow, 116). Like "Love in the Fallen City," A Xiao's relation with and perception of the "Fallen City" is always and only through her kitchen and her master's apartment building. World historical events—World War II, and the fall of the city, are only pervasive but secondary clamors to A Xiao's daily lamentations.

Thus by its very design her story is insignificant. It is irrelevant to the ragings of *history out there,* except as something they insouciantly, ruthlessly impinge upon. Tumbled along and thrown between the "historical" ruins, A Xiao laments but reserves her judgment. Her lamentation is not nostalgic, nor has it any hint of self-pity. She laments, by way of the daily irritations of the incongruities of life in wartime Shanghai, within the confines of her English master's apartment rooms, the *fallen* conditions of "modern" Chinese life. As for herself, she has made do with irreverence and remarkable wisdom. What she has achieved, in the relentless "heat" of the war-ravaged, occupied metropolis, is nothing less than *living* with perceptive and dignified benevolence.

It will not be far amiss, then, to assume that it is through the ingenuity of A Xiao's art of life, that Ailing Zhang has woven her aesthetics of existence for her drifting heroines between the fissures of the ruins. After all, she has declared rather unequivocally, that "the woman who prevails in the new barbarian world is not the wild rose that everybody imagines, with big black fiery eyes, tougher than man and always wipe in hand, ready to strike any minute, . . . On the wasteland of the future, under the broken tiles and remaining walls, only the woman like the Clown Woman in the Bengbeng Opera can survive unscathed, any time, anywhere, she makes it home" (*Collected Works*, 137). A Xiao, with her critical but non-transcendent vision and her cunning for life, is closest to Zhang's ideal of the Clown woman. And her vision closest to Zhang's own. As previously noted, Zhang's place in relation to her heroines and their miniature drama is not that of the stage director but that of the voice-over.[22] It is a voice-over simultaneously offstage and enmeshed with the voices of her center stage characters'; a critical scrutiny as well as a sympathetic echo of their slight but tumultuous struggle, of their "curiously remarkable wisdom." It is a voice-over woven in and out of the side song of the Clown Woman, in the figuration of an historical aesthetics that depend upon her irreverent but insistent singing. The insistence on voice, on singing tenaciously aside, is the quintessence of Zhang's aesthetic schema and historical vision. It marks her ideal of the Clown Woman and the narrative of her drifting heroines aside from the stereotypical figuration, both by contemporary critics and classical modernists, of "marginal prototypes," which turns nothings into somethings, and is always ready to be re-absorbed by an invisible center.[23] Zhang's voice, over but with the voices of her (non)heroines', persistently irreverent and emphatically "trivialized," is nonetheless critical and visionary in the midst of the sound and fury of the variations upon the "modern" Chinese theme. What she offers, brazenly and obstinately, is a critique, and a vision, of the historical condition of Chinese modernity and its manifold life and death minutiae for some of her female and other non-heroic fellow beings; a critical vision made all the more poignant for its desolate defiance and non-transcendence, for its contemporary as well as posterior receptive misconception. After all, even though she is declared the next seeker (of the truth of Chinese modernity) after Lu Xun (Yu Qing, *Works*, IV, 430), her search is not for the direction of History but an aesthetics of existence between the historical ruins. Zhang's aspiration, like that which she charts for her desolate but ambitious heroines with their inexorable longings to make it, is that of the Clown Woman, who never tries to master but defies the catastrophes of history.[24]

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NOTES

1. Ke Ling, "An Embroidered Portrait of the Ten-Mile Playground *(Wei Shili Yangcang Xouxang)," China Daily*, Taiwan, January 9 1994. Quoted from Shao, Yingjian, *Romance Literature and Whispered Life (Changi Wenxe yu Liuyan Rensheng)*, Beijing: Life/Books/ New Knowledge the Three Unity Press, 1998.

2. It is worth noting, though, that Professor C. T. Hsia had recognized her talents and recommended her as one of the best Modern Chinese writers in his *A History of Modern Chinese Fiction* published in the US decades ago. As this volume of *Annals of Scholarship* is going to press, Linda Norton informs us that the *Chang Reader*, edited by Karen Kingsbury will probably be ready for publication by Spring 2003 [Ed.]

3. Fu Lei, well- known modern Chinese translator, art and literary critic. Unless otherwise noted, all translations in the text are mine.

4. In the more official modern Chinese literary history, she is simply written off as a flower of evil, for the fact that she flourished as a stylist during the last two years of Japanese occupation.

5. In the "diasporic" Chinese literary circles, Zhang is more or less lauded as the exquisite stylist who is loved not only for her charming, feminine stories but also for her own sensational life story, except the serious critical attention paid to her by C. T. Hsia. The more recent critical studies on her works have been mostly written by mainland and overseas Chinese feminists. For example, see Men Yue and Dai Jing-hua, *Fuchu Lishi Dibiao (Emerging Out of the Historical Surface: Studies in Modern Chinese Literature by Women,)*, " *Na Chanlian de Waner Yixiao* (Ailing Chang: That Lonely and Reckless Smile)," 321-339.

6. Meng and Dai, 321.

7. Zhang, *Zhang Ailing Wenji (Collected Works of Eileen Chang)*, Vol. IV, 173.

8. Rey Chow, "Modernity and Narration in Detail," *Woman and Chinese Modernity: the Politics of Reading between West and East*, Minnesota University of Minnesota Press, 1991, 84-120.

9. Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang, "Yuan Qiongqiong and the Rage for Zhang among Taiwan's *Feminine* Writers," *Gender Politics in Modern China*, ed. Tani E. Barlow, Durham: Duke University Press, 1993, 215-237.

10. See Chana Kronfeld's excellent work on marginality and modernism, *On the Margins of Modernism: Decentering Literary Dynamics*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

11. Fu, 417-18.

12. An old-fashioned popular country opera called "Bengbeng Xi (Bouncing Drama)," originated from north China. The genre is generally considered rustic and unrefined. It is not usually frequented by the *literati.*

13. Zhang Jian, *"Zhang Ailing de Zixuxing Xiaoxiaoshuo," Zhang Ailing Xinlun*, ("On the mini-stories of Eileen Chang—Forward to the Second Edition of *Romances," New Commentary on Eileen Chang)*, Taipei: The Book Spring Publishers, 1996, 195.

14. Dai and Meng, 321.

15. Chinese (sur) realist painting is characterized by fine brushwork and an almost exaggerated attention to details..

16. See *Ethics, Politics, and Difference in Julia Kristeva's Writing*. Ed. Kelly Oliver, New York: Routledge, 1993.

17. Meng and Dai, 326-27.

18. Famous courtesan of the late Qing Dynasty, rumored to have pleased the German General during the invasion and occupation of Beijing by the United Army of the Eight Powers after the Boxer Rebellion.

19. In Chinese language Hong Kong means the Fragrant Harbor.

20. Dai and Meng, "Civilization, History, and Woman," 333.

21. "Osmanthus Heat" is a vernacular expression used in Shanghai to refer to the humid and hot days at the beginning of autumn.

22. Yu Qin, *"Zhang Ailing zhuanlue*," ("Biographic Sketches of Eileen Chang," Wenji, *(Collected Works,)* IV, 430.

23. Kronfeld, 225-26.

24. Professor Jonathan Arac from the University of Pittsburgh and Professor Iren Eber of the East Asian Studies Department, Hebrew University kindly read the essay, their advices have proved invaluable in its completion and revision.

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